An economic investigation of the use and impact of patents and trade marks in Germany by Schautschick, Philipp
An Economic Investigation of the Use
and Impact of Patents and Trade Marks
in Germany
Philipp Schautschick
12 December 2014
An Economic Investigation of the Use
and Impact of Patents and Trade Marks
in Germany
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2014
vorgelegt von
Philipp Schautschick
Referent: Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Ph.D.
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 13. Mai 2015
Contents
Preface -1
1 European Patent and Trade Mark Systems 3
1.1 Patent systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Trade mark systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic Literature 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 The use of trade marks in the UK, US, and Australia . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Cross country comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Sector and industry differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.3 Differences between large and small firms . . . . . . . 20
2.2.4 Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 What trade marks can proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Proxy for innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 Proxy for product differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 The incentives to use trade marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.1 Informing the consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.2 Realising synergies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.3 Raising rivals’ costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 The relation between trade marks and firm performance . . . 38
2.5.1 Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.2 Market value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5.3 Trade marks, productivity, and profitability . . . . . . . 50
2.5.4 Employment and wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
I
Contents
3 The Effect of IPRs and Different Knowledge Types on Firm Entry 61
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 Empirical methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
A static linear model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
A dynamic linear model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4 Data and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.1 Construction of variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Proxy variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.1 Sample composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.2 IPR activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.3 Firm entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6.1 Cross-sector regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6.2 Young firm IPR activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.6.3 Sector-level regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.4 Summary and discussion of findings . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4 The Role of Innovation and the Financial Crisis in New Firm Sur-
vival and Employment Growth in Germany 97
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2.1 Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2.2 Innovation and employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.3 Patents and trade marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
II
Contents
4.4 Survival analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.1 Non-parametric analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.2 Semi-parametric analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5 Employment analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Postface 127
A Appendix 129
A.1 Technical notes and definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.2 Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A.3 Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
List of Figures 149
List of Tables 151
Bibliography 153
III

Acknowledgements
I thank my supervisors Dietmar Harhoff and Klaus Schmidt. I also thank
Monika Schnitzer for supporting the process of the dissertation and for acting
as examiner in the thesis defense.
The continuing advice and support from Christine Greenhalgh helped me
to gain a perspective on my work and on the path ahead of me. I am sincerely
thankful for the time and the encouragement I received from her. Working
with Christian Helmers was insightful and inspiring. I appreciate the ex-
perience I gained from our collaboration and I look forward to continuing
working together in the future.
The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition supported me
financially and provided the workplace where I met my outstanding and
trusted friends Lisa Fey and Julia Molestina. We embarked on this long jour-
ney together, and I am looking forward to seeing where it will lead us. I also
appreciate the enduring support and the feedback from Reto Hilty.
Writing this thesis was a long and at times frustrating process. My pa-
tient and reliable friends Miriam Horn, Petra Maaß, Mizuki Aosaki and Sen
Bhuvanendra gave me perspective and stability. Special gratitude in this re-
spect goes to Sebastian Jacobs. His ambition and energy are pervasive, and I
repeatedly turned to him for motivation. Kunal Lodhia never stopped show-
ing me and sharing with me the joy of life and the benefits of hard work.
Above all, I am grateful for the enduring support throughout all these
years from my mother, Ingrid Schautschick, and my partner, Stephanie Car-
stensen. They gave this undertaking a meaning when I was oblivious of it,
and they never questioned my decisions.
I wrote this thesis in memory of Mark Rogers, who introduced me to the
economics of intellectual property rights in general and of trade marks in
particular.

Preface
Stimulating innovation is high up on most countries’ agenda. The “Innova-
tion Union” is one of seven flagship initiatives of the European Union’s (EU)
ten-year growth and jobs strategy “EU 2020.” Innovation is an engine to cre-
ate job opportunities, to make countries more competitive in the global mar-
ket place, to increase food and resource security and to fight global warm-
ing.1 President Obama’s “Strategy for American Innovation” builds on the
premise that “innovation-based economic growth will bring greater income,
higher quality jobs, and improved health and quality of life to all U.S. cit-
izens.”2 And China’s 12th five-year plan includes concrete innovation targets
to sustain high economic growth and to create millions of new jobs.3
Innovation involves a “new or significantly improved product (goods
or services), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational
method in business practice, workplace organization or external relations
(OECD and Eurostat, 2005, p. 46).” At least since Schumpeter (1934; 1950)
we know that innovation is an important driver of economic growth, and
policy makers all over the world associate economic growth with increasing
living standards. Opportunities to maintain and increase economic growth
therefore attract attention by academics and policy makers alike.
To create jobs and increase international competitiveness through inno-
vation policies, decision makers need to understand the economics of inno-
vation - what affects innovation and what is affected by it. Innovation data
is a central element of the economics of innovation. For over three decades,
many economic studies of innovation and intellectual property have focused
on the analysis of research and development (R&D) and patents. However,
these activities are mainly observed in manufacturing industries (Griliches,
1http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm, last accessed 10.12.2014
2http://www.whitehouse.gov/innovation/strategy, last accessed 10.12.2014
3http://www.china-botschaft.de/det/zgyw/t804125.htm, last accessed 12.10.2014
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1981, 1990; Hall and Harhoff, 2012). Less attention has been paid to trade
marks, even though these intellectual property rights (IPRs) are more widely
used by firms of all types across the whole economy. This trend is changing.
In the second chapter, I summarise the existing empirical economic lit-
erature to inform the reader about what has been established to date and
to identify what is needed from future research. This growing literature ex-
plores the expanding use of trade marks. The rising interest in the economics
of trade marks is partly due to the large amount of trade mark data that have
become available, but mainly a result of the growing importance of inno-
vation and the proliferation of product variety in developed economies. The
overarching issue that is informed by these empirical studies is to what extent
markets are characterised as reflecting the sale of heterogeneous products
competing on quality, variety and price. This type of non-price competition
is often qualified as Schumpeterian competition via both major and minor
innovations. It ensures ever rising productivity, product quality and product
variation in the modern economy.4
In the third and fourth chapter, I focus on the role of knowledge and inno-
vation related activities in firm and industry performance. The OECD Oslo
Manual identifies both aspects as relevant to innovation policy (OECD and
Eurostat, 2005, pp. 41). To address the role of knowledge, it is necessary to
distinguish between the different types of knowledge. Access to knowledge
varies with type and affects the diffusion of it. Knowledge diffusion in turn
determines the supply of potential entrants in an industry and thus firm entry
(Winter, 1984). In chapter 3, I investigate empirically the effects of different
knowledge types and innovation related activities on firm entry. In partic-
ular, I investigate an extension of an implicit hypothesis in Winter (1984):
firm entry is roughly proportional to the number of individuals who are ex-
posed to the knowledge required to operate in an industry, because these
individuals generate innovative ideas that can lead to firm entry. To this end,
I created a new German Firm-Level Intellectual-Property data set (GFLIP),
4See Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2012 for a recent discussion of this process.
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covering the period 2002-12. I show that knowledge types and innovation
related activities prevalent in an industry explain some of the cross-industry
differences in firm entry, even though their marginal effects are small.
Successful entry is not only determined by knowledge types and inno-
vation related activities. An idea is merely one ingredient for successful
firm entry. Once entrepreneurs have an idea that is relevant to the industry,
their post-entry performance depends on the remaining ingredients (Gort
and Klepper, 1982; Winter, 1984). Entrepreneurs can enter an industry and
stand up to established firms if the remaining ingredients are available to
everyone and easy to learn. Nelson and Winter (1974) call such a situation
an entrepreneurial regime. By contrast, if entry by an entrepreneur requires
experience and routine in coordinating all the ingredients, successful entry
by new firms is less likely to occur. This is a routinized regime. Both regimes
are types of the technological regime prevailing in an industry. Following
Audretsch (1991), I investigate the effect of the technological regime on firm
entry by separately analysing innovation related activities by young firms.
Some of the barriers to entry identified in Bain’s (1956) seminal work of-
ten fail to explain entry patterns. For instance, Acs and Audretsch (1989b;
1989a) find no significant effect of capital-intensity in an industry on firm
entry. Summarizing the literature up to that date, Geroski (1995) notes that
entry, even in large numbers, is not a rare occurrence in most markets in spite
of high econometric measures of entry barriers. Some authors have claimed
that it is survival and growth rather than entry that sustains employment,
know-how and value added (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988a; Mata
and Portugal, 1994; Wagner, 1994).
Previous studies of German post-entry performance focus on the effect of
the characteristics of the founder (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler, 1992),
on the choice of the form of ownership, liability and the age of the owner
(Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode, 1998), on employment growth just before
entry (the “shadow of death”) (Almus, 2004), and on regional differences
(Fritsch, Brixy, and Falck, 2006). The role of knowledge and of innovation
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related activities prevalent in an industry in post-entry performance by Ger-
man firms has not yet been analysed. I address this gap in chapter 4, where
I show that high entry rates are correlated with high exit rates, innovation
related activities contribute to the probability of successful entry, and more
specialised knowledge in an industry appears to be associated with lower
entry rates.
This thesis contains several contributions. First, I survey the existing em-
pirical economic literature on trade marks to date and identify what is needed
from future research in this field. Second, I examine the role of knowledge
in firm creation, using national patent and trade mark data. Using national
trade mark data for Germany is new. Previous studies on German firms only
include Community trade marks or aggregated statistics from the World In-
tellectual Property Office (WIPO). Third, the period under investigation is
particularly interesting because it includes the financial crisis. I follow two
cohorts of new firms established in 2003 and 2006, respectively. Firms start-
ing a business in 2006 did not know that that the financial crisis of 2007-08
was about to happen. In economic terms, the financial crisis presents a nat-
ural experiment for new firms. By comparing survival patterns of firms that
were hit by the financial crisis in their first year with survival patterns of
firms that had more time to establish themselves, I disclose unobserved ef-
fects that determine young firm survival and are much stronger than those of
knowledge and innovative activity.
2
Chapter 1
European Patent and Trade Mark
Systems
In this section I summarise the specific requirements to apply for a patent or
to register a trade mark, and I discuss the different routes to obtaining patent
or trade mark protection.
1.1 Patent systems5
A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention. Following Article 27
of the TRIPS agreement, a patent can only be filed for inventions that are new,
industrially applicable and contain an inventive step. These requirements make
a patent a unique indicator for inventive output (Schmookler, 1966).
In particular, the exclusive rights granted by a patent are
“(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to pre-
vent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of:
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing (6) for these
purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent
third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using
the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling,
or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained di-
rectly by that process (TRIPS, Art.28, 1).”
5A more comprehensive introduction to patent systems and their implications for patent
statistics can be found in the OECD Patent Statistic Manual (OECD, 2009).
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Patents can be obtained via different routes. As I distinguish between European
and German national patents in the following chapters, I provide a brief
overview of the differences between German national, European and inter-
national patents.6 The choice of the route depends on the geographical scope
a patent shall have. While the requirements regarding the patentable subject
matter do not differ much across levels and most high-income countries, the
differences in formal requirements can be substantial.
The process of applying for and registering a national patent in Germany
is governed by the “Patentgesetz” (patent law, PatG), which is largely har-
monised with other patent laws in the European Union, although some dif-
ferences between countries persist (Hall and Harhoff, 2012). Taking the na-
tional route, the inventor applies to the German Patent and Trade mark Of-
fice (DPMA). The first application is referred to as the priority application and
is assigned a priority date. The content of the application will not be disclosed
to the public until 18 months after the priority date (§31(2) PatG). Within the
first 12 months after the filing of the priority application, the inventor can file
additional patent applications at other national or regional patent offices, or
at the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO) in Geneva. In each case, the applicant can only claim the priority
date as the beginning date of the protection of the invention (§40(1) PatG).
The laws concerning the European patent are laid down by the European
Patent Convention (EPC), which was signed by seven countries in October
1973 in Munich and entered into force on 7 October 1977.7 While through
the national route each application is considered and subsequently granted
or rejected by the national patent offices independently, the European Patent
Office (EPO) has the authority to grant or reject patent applications for the
whole region (Article 1 and 2 EPC). The goal of the EPC was to establish a
6A current development is the establishment of the Unitary Patent, which will allow in-
ventors to file a single patent that would be valid in 25 countries and covered by only
one patent court (Unified Patent Court). While this is “history in the making,” it is an
ongoing process and does not affect the analysis in this thesis. For more information see
http://www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/unitary-patent.html, last accessed 27/11/2014.
7The contracting countries on the date of entry into force were: Belgium, West Germany,
France, Luxombourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
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Figure 1.1.1: Time line for the international route
Source: OECD Patent Statistic Manual 2009, p.54
single patent system providing the same legal protection of industrial prop-
erty in the contracting states on the basis of a single application (Article 2(2)
EPC). Taking the European route, the applicant files an application with the
EPO or under certain conditions with the central industrial property office
(Article 75(1) EPC) and designates the contracting states in which the patent
shall be validated (Article 3 EPC). As all granted patents ultimately obtain
national status (Article 66 EPC), however, the applicant may have to submit
a translation into a recognized language of the designated country within
three months after the patent is mentioned in the European Patent Bulletin
before its legal protection can be enforced in designated countries (Article
65(1) EPC). Designation can also require payment of a designation fee (Arti-
cle 79(2) EPC), which can vary across countries.
Alternatively, applicants can take the international route and file a request
for an international application (IA) under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).
The PCT was concluded in 1970 and had 148 Contracting Parties as of Novem-
ber 2014.8 It is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO). Although international applications can be filed with the Interna-
tional Bureau of WIPO in Geneva, residents of contracting states usually file
the application at their national or regional office. Applicants designate the
8http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=6, last accessed
27/11/2014
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countries in which protection is desired in the application (Article 4(1) PCT).
One of the major patent offices, which has been appointed by the PCT As-
sembly as an International Searching Authority (ISA), then conducts the in-
ternational search to establish the current state of the art (Article 15(1) and 15(2)
PCT). This results in an international search report (ISR) (Article 18 PCT), which
is essentially a list of citations of prior art that may affect the patentability of
the invention - i.e. knowledge of methods and technology that is related to,
and existed before, the application was filed. The IA and the ISR are pub-
lished 18 months after the priority date (Article 21 (2a) PCT). Within three
months after this or 22 months after the priority date, whichever is later, the
applicant can demand an international preliminary examination (IPE) (Article
31(6); Rule 54bis PCT), which results in an IPE report. These steps can delay
the national procedure of the patent application (see figure 1.1.1). Finally,
after a maximum of 30 months after the priority date, the IPE report will be
made public (Article 21(3); Rule 44bis PCT) and the application enters into
the national/regional phase.
There are at least two good reasons to file a request for an international
application. Firstly, the international phase of the PCT route is not very costly
and buys a substantial amount of time to improve and evaluate the economic
value of an invention. Thus, inventors may file an application ’just in case’.
Secondly, if the invention is worthwhile seeking protection internationally,
the PCT route provides an efficient way to reach a large number of countries
with a single application.
1.2 Trade mark systems
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
an international agreement within the World Trade Organisation, which came
into effect 1 January 1995 and covered 160 member states as of June 2014, sets
down minimum standards for the different types of intellectual property that
are binding for the member parties. It defines a trade mark as
6
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“any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguish-
ing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark (Arti-
cle 15(1) TRIPS).”
If such a sign is representable graphically, e.g. in words (including personal
names), designs, letters, numerals, or by the shape of goods or their pack-
aging, it is, in principle, eligible for registration by legal and natural persons.
In countries that are members of the agreement, the issuing authorities are ex-
pected to promptly publish trade mark applications before registration and
allow third parties to oppose an application (Article 15(5) TRIPS).
Based on the Agreement, members can specify detailed rules for the pro-
vision of trade mark protection. As I study Community and German trade
marks in this thesis, and the national laws are by and large harmonized
with the regional laws in the EU, I will refer to Council Regulation (EC)
No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark where TRIPS does not provide
guidelines to illustrate the requirements and exceptions for trade mark regis-
tration. For instance, registration can be rejected based on absolute grounds
if the trade mark is devoid of any distinctive character, if it is purely descript-
ive, or if it consists exclusively of signs or indications which have become
customary in the current language (Article 7 EC 207/2009). If no grounds
for absolute refusal exist, a trade mark can be rejected, opposed, or cancelled
if there exist relative grounds for refusal, e.g. if it is similar to or identical
with an earlier trade mark, and the product for which registration is applied
is similar to or identical with the product the earlier trade mark protects (Ar-
ticle 8(a) EC 207/2009). Registration can also be rejected if this identity or
similarity creates likelihood for confusion (Article 8(b) EC 207/2009). This is a
situation in which the average consumer may be confused as to the true ori-
gin of a product because of the similarity of the signs. Moreover, a trade mark
registration can also be rejected or cancelled in case the product is not sim-
ilar or identical. This can happen when the similarity of the newly registered
7
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trade mark with an existing one creates an association with the owner of the
senior trade mark that does not actually exist, or if it causes damage to the
established owner when used (Article 16(3) TRIPS). The agreement leaves
discretion with member countries with regard to the use requirement. In
most legal systems, owners of trade marks have a minimum grace period
of three years of non-interrupted non-use before the registration can be can-
celled (Article 19 TRIPS). If a trade mark owner in these jurisdictions cannot
prove having used the trade mark in commerce, a third party can request the
cancellation of that trade mark (Article 15 EC 207/2009).
There are different routes to registering a trade mark: the domestic route
by applying directly at a country’s trade mark office, the regional route where
applicable, e.g. at the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM)
for the Community trade mark (CTM) covering the European Union (EU), or
the international route via the Madrid protocol of 1989 which relates to the
Madrid Agreement of 1891. OHIM was established in 1996, but elements of
the CTM regulation are still controversial and debated among legal scholars,
for instance the fact that it grants full protection in all Member States of the
EU, even if a CTM is only used in a small region. This and further issues re-
garding the European trade mark system are thoroughly discussed in a study
by the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition (Knaak, Kur, and
von Mühlendahl, 2012). The international application, by contrast, is a terri-
torial extension of existing trade mark protection and cannot establish first
protection (Article 1(2) Madrid Agreement). A trade mark therefore has to be
registered at a national or regional office of a member nation, before further
countries or regions can be designated in an international application.
Trade marks are registered for particular classes of goods and services
(Article 28, EC 207/2009). In most jurisdictions, the classification scheme
used is the Nice classification (NCL), which is based on the Nice Agree-
ment Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957. The agreement
has 84 contracting parties as of November 2014, and as of 2012 the NCL is
8
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reviewed every year. The NCL 2014 consists of 35 goods classes and 11 ser-
vices classes.9 In principle, a trade mark application can include all classes
of goods and services, but in most jurisdictions additional classes cost extra.
Thus, the large majority of trade marks is only registered in as many classes
as are included in the basic price.(von Graevenitz et al., 2012) In most legis-
lations, the basic registrations is for one class, but somewhat controversially
the Community trade mark registration includes three classes by default.
The costs of registering and renewing trade marks do vary across juris-
dictions. For instance, as of 2014, registering a trade mark in three classes in
Germany (OHIM, USPTO) cost €290 (€900, €661).10 After at least seven years
(ten in most jurisdictions), a renewal fee has to be paid, otherwise the trade
mark is deleted from the register. In 2014, the renewal fee for three classes
in Germany (OHIM, USPTO) was €750 (€1500, €964).11 The different require-
ments to obtain a trade mark, e.g. the stronger enforcement of a use require-
ment in the U.S., the differences in geographical coverages, e.g. Community
versus national trade marks, and the differences in the route to a trade mark
registration need to be accounted for in studies that analyse more than one
type of trade mark. The unitary character of CTMs, for instance, not only
grants wider protection, but also exposes owners to a larger pool of senior or
other similar trade marks. Studies that only focus on one type of trade mark
data where more types are possible inevitably miss out on some information.
European firms, for instance, are likely to either apply for national or Com-
munity trade marks, but rarely for both. I discuss these issues as they occur
throughout chapter 2.
9For more information, see http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/nice/, last
accessed 27/11/2014
10Three classes at $275 per class at €0.8/$ on 27/11/2014. Source: DPMA:
http://www.dpma.de/english/trade_marks/fees/index.html;
OHIM: https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/fees-and-payments;
USPTO: http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/tm_fee_info.jsp, last accessed 27/11/2014.
11Renewing three classes at $400 per class at €0.8/$ on 27/11/2014
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Chapter 2
Empirical Studies of Trade Marks:
The Existing Economic Literature
2.1 Introduction12
For over three decades many economic studies of innovation and intellectual
property have focused on the analysis of R&D and patents, which are activ-
ities predominantly observed in some manufacturing sector (Griliches, 1981,
1990; Hall and Harhoff, 2012). Less attention has been paid to trade marks,
even though these intellectual property rights (IPRs) are more widely used
by firms of all types across the whole economy.
Trade marks allow their owners and licensees to prohibit others to sell the
same or similar products using the protected mark. Trade marks have four
main functions: indicating origin, signalling, incentivising investment and
facilitating product differentiation.
The indication of origin is the oldest and primary function of trade marks.
It ensures that consumers can identify a specific product without investigat-
ing each alternative before purchase. Trade marks therefore lower the costs of
the search consumers undertake to find their most preferred product bundle
(Landes and Posner, 1987). Being able to save time on studying each product
for its attributes presumes that it is possible for consumers to learn about
all product attributes. Products, however, often have credence attributes as
well as search and experience attributes (Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni,
12This chapter is joint work with Christine Greenhalgh, St. Peter’s College, University of
Oxford, and has been published as a working paper in 2013: Schautschick and Greenhalgh
(2013).
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1973). Consumers can discover the search attributes prior to purchase, e.g.
the colour of an apple, and they learn experience attributes by consumption,
e.g. the taste of an apple. It can take a while or even be impossible for the
average consumer, however, to find out about credence attributes, such as
whether the apple was organically grown. While producers know the at-
tributes of their products, consumers may not. If information is distributed
asymmetrically between buyers and sellers, markets can fail to perform ef-
ficiently (Akerlof, 1970). Trade marks can reduce information asymmetries
between firms and consumers by signalling (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Sha-
piro, 1982). They can also lower the relevance of information asymmetries
on the purchasing decision once consumers trust the signal. In the latter
case, firms reduce asymmetric information by simplifying the communica-
tion of facts ("Product A uses the same ingredients as product B"), and by
relying on trust ("If you liked product A, you will also like product B"). This
can only work if firms send signals that are reliable over time and across
products. This consistency requirement facilitates the signalling function of
a trade mark.
The signalling function creates investment incentives for firms to improve
their products in the first place, and to keep constant or improve the quality
of their products over time to build a reputation (Chamberlin, 1933; Landes
and Posner, 1987; Economides, 1988). Firms that are not willing or able to
keep their promises are not likely to file and maintain trade marks. The sig-
nalling function also creates incentives for firms to offer varieties that without
trade marks might not find buyers. Hence, trade marks support product differ-
entiation. In a homogeneous product market, product differentiation allows
firms to move away from pure price competition and to make strictly positive
profits, at least in the short run (Hotelling, 1929; Chamberlin, 1933).
Our aim in this paper is to survey the existing empirical economic lit-
erature to inform the reader by summarising what has been established to
date and to identify what is needed from future research. This growing body
of literature explores the expanding use of trade marks. The rising interest
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in the economics of trade marks is partly due to the large amount of trade
mark data that have become available, but mainly a result of the growing im-
portance of innovation and the proliferation of product variety in developed
economies. The overarching issue that is informed by these empirical stud-
ies is to what extent markets are better characterised as reflecting the sale of
heterogeneous products competing on quality, variety and price. This pro-
cess is often characterised as Schumpeterian competition via both major and
minor innovations. It ensures ever rising productivity, product quality and
product variation in the modern economy (See Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2012
for a recent discussion of this process).
The theory outlined above is our collection and abstraction of existing
theory of trade marks and its various interpretations in the studies analysed
in this paper. Most studies, however, either focus only on individual aspects
of the four functions or use trade marks as a proxy for innovation. For the
reader’s convenience we therefore outline the main theoretical predictions,
which form the basis for the individual empirical models, within each section
rather than here.
In section 1, we document the use of trade marks by firms in several ad-
vanced countries, including Australia, the United Kingdom and the United
States, and by firms of different sizes and in different industries. In section
2, we review attempts to gauge the function of trade marks as indicator of
innovation and product differentiation. In section 3, we survey studies that
demonstrate firms’ incentives to trade mark, including transferring informa-
tion to consumers, realising synergies between different types of IPRs and
attempting to raise rivals’ costs. In section 4, we provide an overview of
the importance of trade mark use for firm survival and the association of
trade marks with several dimensions of firm performance and productivity,
including their ability to generate well-paid jobs. In the last section we con-
clude with some remarks on common weaknesses in the studies surveyed
and suggestions how they can be overcome.
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2.2 The use of trade marks in the UK, US, and Australia
2.2.1 Cross country comparisons
Trade marks have been in existence for more than a century in high-income
countries. But whichever country is examined, the growth of trade mark
registrations has been astonishingly rapid in the period since 1975. Taking
first the long view of earlier history, we consult Duguid, Da Silva Lopes, and
Mercer (2010). These authors construct three series of data on trade mark reg-
istrations for France, the UK, and the US for the century leading up to 1970.
While they acknowledge that the data sources are not without difficulties for
making comparisons over such a long period, they conclude that France and
Britain had both an earlier and more enduring interest in trade-marking than
the U.S. Even so, in all three countries the gradual rise in trade mark activity
was very modest over this 100 year period in comparison with what occurred
in the latter part of the 20th century.
The increased growth in trade mark registrations in recent decades be-
gan about ten years earlier than that for patents, which only took off from
the mid-1980s (figure 2.2.1). Jensen and Webster (2004) date the upsurge
in Australian trade mark registrations to the mid-1970s, calculating that this
growth exceeded that of real GDP by 2.3% p.a. between 1975 and 2002, hav-
ing previously only just kept pace. Trade-marking activities in the US, UK,
and Australia show a remarkable degree of correspondence in their patterns
of growth from 1975 to 2002 (figure 2.2.2). Applications for both types of
IPRs seem to be impeded by recessions (von Graevenitz et al., 2012), and
each country sees rapid contraction in IPR applications during 2000 to 2002.
Trade mark growth was somewhat more volatile in the UK than in the US
and Australia, dipping during 1991-1992 in what was for the UK a significant
recession. Compared with activity in the 1980s, Greenhalgh, Longland, and
Bosworth (2003) identify considerably faster growth in trade-marking activ-
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Figure 2.2.1: Demand for patents and trade marks at USPTO
Source: Figure 1 in von Graevenitz et al. (2012)
ity following the recovery from the recession of 1991-1992.13
Lybbert, Zolas, and Bhattacharyya (2014) report that trade mark growth
in high-income countries increased by around 50% between 2004 and 2008,
and middle-income countries experienced even faster growth in trade mark
output. By contrast, low-income countries hardly experienced any growth. A
recent report by the World Intellectual Property Organisation, WIPO (2013,
Figure 3) compares trade mark applications relative to GDP in high- and
middle-income countries from 1985 to 2011. Trade mark intensity (measured
as the number of trade marks per dollar of GDP) in high-income countries
increased rapidly until a peak in 2000. Following this it reverted to and sta-
bilised around the average levels of the 1990s. Trade mark growth remained
proportional to GDP in middle-income countries until the 1990s, after which
it grew rapidly without showing any similarities with the reversal of trade
mark growth in high-income countries at the turn of the millennium. What
explains the worldwide increase of trade mark registrations?
There are two candidates as reasons for this rapid growth. First, the de-
mand for differentiated and higher quality products has been increasing due
13In figure 2.2.1 we can see that for the U.S., trade marks recovered quite rapidly after this
downturn during the ‘dot.com’ bust.
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Figure 2.2.2: Recent Trends in Global Trade Marking Activity, 1975-2002
Source: WIPO data base as represented in Jensen and Webster (2004).
to rising consumer incomes. Second, production has been growing, which
leads to the existence of more firms and products. The findings by Jensen
and Webster (2004) suggest that the demand effect (measured as GDP per
capita) is stronger than the growth effect (measured as change in industry
production). If the national firms are not behind this growth in trade marks,
who is?
Baroncelli E. (2005) study the shares of foreign and domestic residents
registering trade marks and find clear differences by level of development.
Their analysis of over 100 countries observed during 1994-1998 shows that
the foreign residents’ share of registrations was inversely related to the level
of income per capita. In high-income countries it was 34% on average, rising
to 46% in middle-income, and to 81% in low-income countries. They interpret
these differences as indicating that higher development is associated with a
greater degree of dominance of domestic brands in the home market and a
stronger presence of these same brands in foreign markets. This relationship,
however, is likely to differ between countries within each of the three groups
and will also change over time.
Falling transport and communication costs as well as the rising globalisa-
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tion of the world economy make it easier for firms to extend their business
beyond national borders (Jensen and Webster, 2004). This could explain the
rise in the share of registrations of trade marks by foreign nationals in Aus-
tralia from 23% to 31% between 1985 and 2002. It is also a likely explanation
for the rapid changes in the origins of foreign registrations that Baroncelli E.
(2005) observe for countries of all income groups in their sample: during
the five years 1994-1998, middle- and low-income countries displaced shares
previously held by high-income countries by 3% in high-, 4% in middle-, and
16% in low-income countries. Yet, analysing the intensity of foreign trade
marks relative to the value of exports received from the foreign countries
shows that high-income countries file more foreign trade marks per dollar
export value than countries from lower income groups (Lybbert, Zolas, and
Bhattacharyya, 2014). To get a better idea of the changes in trade marking
patterns worldwide, we now look in more detail at selected countries’ trade
marking landscapes.
2.2.2 Sector and industry differences
Starting with the large cross-country database of Baroncelli E. (2005), these
authors find that the highest use of trade marks across the world occurs in
the R&D intensive scientific equipment and pharmaceuticals sectors. Also
present in the top ten sectors are advertising-intensive manufacturing indus-
tries, such as clothing, footwear, detergents and food products. Greenhalgh,
Longland, and Bosworth (2003) study UK trade marks from 1989 to 2000 and
find that the fastest expanding product classes of trade marks over this period
were predominantly service marks. Registrations in these classes expanded
seven-fold from 1993 to 2000.
While these two studies are conducted using the Nice classification sys-
tem for trade marks, the following studies use industry classification codes
after trade marks were matched to their owners. When matching IPRs to fi-
nancial data, we need to carefully think about the consequences of varying
firm-IPR ownership structures. For stand-alone firms there is no issue. For
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subsidiaries or parents, however, the question arises how to allocate the IPRs
owned by other parts of the group. In the case where each subsidiary op-
erates independently and files their IPRs individually, nothing needs to be
done. It is often the case, however, that the parent firm holds all IPRs and
subsidiaries are free to use them or to acquire exclusive licences. Alterna-
tively, there may exist an individual subsidiary that is solely devoted to deal
with the group’s IPR holdings. Unless we indicate otherwise, the studies we
review in this paper take account of this by adding up all IPRs for a group
and then allocating the aggregate number of rights to each firm within the
group. While this is a consistent approach, it probably overstates the IPR
holdings by individual subsidiaries significantly and thus may lead to severe
underestimation of the impact of IPRs.
Jensen and Webster (2004) find that service industries in Australia, in-
cluding communication, education, and personal services, also experienced
particularly strong growth in trade mark applications between 1975 and 2002.
Moreover, trade mark applications in industries subject to considerable eco-
nomic deregulation and restructuring over this period - such as electricity,
gas and water - grew stronger than in most other industries. Besides back
office services such as call centres and digitalisation tasks, it is not obvious
how services can easily be exported. We might thus expect to find growing
numbers of service marks mainly for national trade marks. But we would be
wrong.
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2008) document four types of IPR activity in the
UK over the period 1996-2000, namely domestic and European trade mark
and patent activity for large and medium-sized firms. These authors com-
pare IPR activity in eight service sectors with that in agriculture, manufac-
turing, utilities, and construction sectors. Manufacturing and utilities sectors
dominated patents as well as recorded R&D expenditures, but the differences
by sector in trade mark activity were much less dramatic. The eight service
sectors all showed considerable percentages of firms applying each year for
trade marks both in the UK and at the EU level. Looking at UK trade marks,
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retail firms were more frequently active than manufacturing firms, with more
than 40% of retail firms applying for trade marks in any given year. The hotel
and catering trade also showed rising UK trade mark activity, exceeding that
of manufacturing by the year 2000. But despite the historic importance of UK
marks, in general the growth in trade mark activity for most categories of ser-
vice firms at this time was in their applications for Community trade marks.
This indicates their positive appraisal of the wider remit of such marks, which
only came into existence in 1996.
It is difficult to assess whether allocating trade marks to industries using
their owner’s primary economic activity classification is more or less appro-
priate than using NICE classes. Firms that are mainly active in one industry
might be active in other industries, too, so matching is not a perfect alloca-
tion mechanism. But NICE classes are not perfectly informative about the
product category or industry of a trade-marked product either. The leading
example for their lack of precision is the fact that both the product categories
of computers and fire-extinguishing apparatus are classified as NICE class 9.
Matching trade marks at the firm level and cross-referencing the NICE classes
covered by firms’ trade marks and those firms’ industry classifications could
provide a more accurate correspondence. This approach, however, requires
access to the individual trade marks and to firm-level data. Lybbert, Zolas,
and Bhattacharyya (2014) propose a more flexible approach to create a more
accurate correspondence. These authors use a sophisticated matching algo-
rithm, which allocates industry codes to NACE classes using millions of U.S.
trade mark descriptions and a list of keywords for each industry. Using this
correspondence to match OECD industry data to NICE classes, these authors
report that trade marking activity scaled by value-added is in fact similar
across all industries, with on average 50-100 domestic trade marks per $bil-
lion valued-added.
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2.2.3 Differences between large and small firms
One of the perennial questions in the study of innovation is whether large or
small firms are more prolific, as this may affect the returns to public policy
in areas such as R&D subsidies and other support for innovation. If large
firms were less than proportionately active, then society might prefer to have
two smaller firms, each of half the size of the larger firm, to generate more
new products. Several studies using UK data have explored this issue by
investigating whether (pro rata for their size) smaller firms are more or less
IPR active than larger ones.
Greenhalgh, Longland, and Bosworth (2003) examine medium-sized and
large UK production firms between 1986 and 2000, most of which were listed
on the stock market. Trade mark intensity is measured as the number of
trade marks relative to firm sales or employment, and their analysis shows
a higher intensity of UK trade marks for the medium-sized firms compared
to large firms.14 Greenhalgh and Rogers (2008) expand this database by in-
cluding a parallel panel of service sector firms for the period of 1996-2000.
This addition reveals that in the service industries IPR intensity also falls as
firm size increases. To study whether this relation is consistent across all size
categories, Rogers, Helmers, and Greenhalgh (2007) create a database for the
whole population of firms in the UK for the period 2001-2005, drawing on the
commercially available FAME database of registered companies. Descriptive
statistics of median values as well as multivariate statistical methods confirm
that, in proportion to their asset base, IPR-active SME and micro firms are
more IPR intensive than large firms. This is also consistent with the notion
that IPR-active firms require a critical mass of IPRs to achieve a useful port-
folio of intangible assets. In addition, Jensen and Webster (2006) argue that
the more intense use of IPRs by SMEs in Australia is evidence that the design
of the IPR system does not put small and medium-sized companies at a dis-
advantage compared to large firms. These authors also point out that more
14See Greenhalgh, Longland, and Bosworth (2003) tables 11a, 11b, and figures 7a, 7b.
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intense IPR use is a sign of a lower level of trust between smaller firms, result-
ing from less integration and interaction among them. This then makes the
use of the IPR system more attractive for smaller firms. But does this imply
that small firms are more likely to use IPRs?
Rogers, Helmers, and Greenhalgh (2007) report that less than 5% of the
SMEs applied for one or more of the IPR types at some point in the 2001 to
2005 period. UK trade marks were the most commonly sought IPR type, fol-
lowed by Community marks, UK patents, and lastly EPO patents. The ratio
of SME to large firm IPR activity varied across IPR type and region, but for
trade marks it was around 74% and for patents it was around 60%. Neverthe-
less, because of the very large number of such firms in existence, the absolute
number of trade mark applications by SME and micro firms taken together
considerably exceeded that of all large firms in each year of the study even
though only a small proportion of such firms are IPR-active. These findings
suggest a considerable untapped potential for innovation in SME and micro
firms that might be encouraged by innovation incentives to smaller firms.
2.2.4 Universities
In contrast to the rich body of literature on the use of trade marks by firms,
we are only aware of one study that explicitly focuses on IPR use by uni-
versities. Squicciarini, Millot, and Dernis (2012) present a novel IPR data set
of 621 U.S. universities observed over the period 1997-2007. These authors
relate the trade mark use by universities to characteristics that strongly influ-
ence universities’ products, such as teaching quality and innovative output.
The share of trade marks filed by universities relative to all trade mark ap-
plications has increased slowly but steadily since 1983. Furthermore, trade
mark activity is positively associated with the number of students enrolled,
the share of graduate students, the presence of medical schools, the share of
federal funds received, as well as being a private institution. While some of
these variables are likely to be pairwise correlated, the findings are intuitive.
Larger universities with more funds likely produce more innovative output
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and may have stronger links with the industries to which they can transfer
research outputs. Similarly, private institutions depend more on their rep-
utation and often adopt a more entrepreneurial culture compared to public
institutions, which encompasses more intense use of IPRs.
With this overview of global trade marking trends in mind we now turn to
the more specific questions of how trade mark data can be used empirically,
why firms use trade marks, and what performance effects can empirically be
associated with trade marks.
2.3 What trade marks can proxy
Above we saw that trade marks have become an increasingly attractive part
of firms’ strategies worldwide. What does this tell us? In this section we dis-
cuss literature that has empirically examined whether trade mark data can
reliably indicate innovation and product differentiation, as argued by Mend-
onca, Pereira, and Godinho (2004), Fink, Javorcik, and Spatareanu (2005), and
Mangani (2007). One difficulty is that authors and survey designers differ in
what they consider to qualify as ‘innovation’. Many economists prefer to con-
fine the use of this term to items that are new to the market, whether product
or process. Other writers and surveys, including the Community Innova-
tion Survey, define innovation more broadly to include items and activities
that are new to the firm even if these are not highly original in the market
context. Many such activities would be classified in economic thinking as
imitation arising from the diffusion of innovation. Similarly there is a dis-
tinction within the broad term ‘product differentiation’ between vertical (or
quality) differences and horizontal variety, with the latter adding little or no
quality improvement to a product or its manufacture, but satisfying a selec-
tion of consumers by its new combination of product characteristics. In this
section of the paper we are constrained to follow whatever choices have been
made by the writers whose work we survey, but we shall highlight instances
where findings are derived with different definitions.
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2.3.1 Proxy for innovation
It is difficult to firmly establish the link between trade-marking and innova-
tion activity, because innovation is itself hard to measure. Before trade mark
data became available and large scale surveys were conducted, the most com-
mon variables used as proxy for innovation were R&D activity and later pat-
ent counts. Firms operating in the service sector, however, are not always able
to patent their innovative service products and often don’t engage in R&D.
One of the biggest gaps in our measurement of innovation therefore arises
in this sector. Trade marks are more commonly used in service industries
and the following studies investigate whether trade marks can be used as an
additional proxy for innovation. In an early study, using a survey of 2,500
Benelux SMEs, Allegrezza and Guard-Rauchs (1999) find a positive, signifi-
cant relationship between trade-marking and R&D activity. Considering that
R&D is often used as a proxy for innovation activity, this could indicate links
between innovation and trade marks. Given the small range of industries,
however, in which firms conduct formal R&D, this study is by no means con-
clusive.
Schmoch (2003) analyses the responses of 377 German firms to the 2001
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which contains information about re-
cent innovation activities. He finds a significant correlation between the share
of turnover from innovation and the use of trade marks in knowledge-intensive
service sectors. Gotsch and Hipp (2012) present further work using the Ger-
man part of the 2005 CIS, including answers from over 4000 firms. These au-
thors confirm that the use of trade marks is positively and significantly associ-
ated with innovation in high-tech manufacturing and in knowledge-intensive
service sectors. In low-tech manufacturing or in other service sectors, how-
ever, the link is not significant. Millot (2012) investigates the French part of
the 2008 CIS, covering over 20,000 firms. She distinguishes between product,
process, marketing and business organisation innovations. She finds that in
contrast to process and organisational innovations, product and marketing
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innovations are significantly correlated with trade mark activity in the whole
sample and in all sub-sectors. However, in high-technology manufacturing
sectors, patents also predict trade marking, which weakens the link between
product innovation and trade marks.
Jensen and Webster (2009) (henceforth JW) conduct a similar analysis of
more than 1000 Australian firms that responded to the Melbourne Institute
Business Survey between 2001 and 2007. The firms are drawn from all sectors
of the economy and the sample is broadly representative of the underlying
economic structure. For the whole sample (JW Table II), there are statistically
significant correlations between innovation, patents and trade marks, but the
level of these correlations is not very high. The correlations between repor-
ted R&D activity and use of the three types of IPRs are actually much higher.
Why should this difference in correlations exist? It is perhaps the case that
firms that are attempting to innovate by conducting R&D, even if they are
only occasionally successful at doing so, are more likely to be using IPRs.
When the overall results are broken down by sector, or by type of innova-
tion, there is more to report. In manufacturing (JW Table III), innovation is
correlated with both R&D and trade marks almost equally strongly. In ser-
vices (JW Table IV), there is a weaker correlation with trade marks, but not
with the other measures. Looking across the four innovation types (JW Table
V), product innovation is correlated with patents and trade marks, as well
as R&D, but not with design rights. Process innovation is weakly correlated
with trade marks, but not with other indicators. Marketing innovation is sig-
nificantly correlated with trade marks but only to a minor level, and organ-
isational innovation shows nil or negative correlations with each of the proxy
variables. Jensen and Webster argue that their findings arise because process
and organisational innovation can be more easily protected by secrecy. These
innovations therefore do not impact directly on consumers as is the case with
product and marketing innovation. Overall, the authors of these studies con-
clude that trade marks are a useful innovation indicator, while cautioning
about the need to recognise the differences in correlations by sector and in-
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novation type.
In-depth studies of particular industries reveal further differences between
types of innovation and trade mark practices. Malmberg (2005) compares
historic IPR activity of selected Swedish firms in the electromechanical, auto-
motive, and pharmaceutical industries over time. This author finds very
large differences in trade-marking in relation to product innovation in these
three industries. In both the electromechanical and automotive industry, new
products are often identified by model numbers, obviating the need to re-
gister new trade marks. By contrast, most new products in pharmaceuticals
are trade marked. Pharmaceutical companies face particularly fierce compet-
ition after the expiry of a patent, because generic drugs are chemically equi-
valent to the patented original and are thus physically perfect substitutes.
Several authors have therefore referred to the objective for building brand
names to sustain customer loyalty after the expiry of their patents.
How closely in time are trade marks filed after the event of related in-
novation? Flikkema, de Man, and Wolters (2010) survey 660 companies that
had applied for trade marks at the Benelux office between 2007 and 2008
given they provided valid e-mail addresses. These authors find that about
60 percent of recent Benelux trade mark applications refer directly to a broad
range of innovation activities. In addition, most of the trade marks were filed
close to the market introduction of products. Hence, trade marks are use-
ful to measure product innovations in the late stages of their development,
something that is not always captured by either patents or the bulk of R&D
expenditure occurring earlier in time. Trade marks also capture innovation
activity other IPRs cannot. This is the case particularly for innovation in small
firms that often rely on developing new products from existing technology.
The different approaches used to test the suitability of trade marks as
proxy for innovation stress the difficulty of this undertaking. A trade mark is
a good proxy for innovation if two conditions hold simultaneously:
i) trade mark using firms are innovative firms and
ii) innovative firms use trade marks.
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Assume only i) holds but ii) does not hold strictly, that is, there exist in-
novative firms not using trade marks. Then a trade mark tells us that the
owner is innovative, but there might be many other innovative firms that do
not use trade marks. Conversely, if ii) is true but i) does not hold strictly, a
trade mark only tells us that a firm could be innovative, but not whether it
is. It follows that both directions need to be tested simultaneously to assess
the suitability of trade marks as proxies for innovation. The data used must
therefore include all trade marks of firms, related to innovation or not, and all
firms, innovative or not. The question regarding the use of trade marks in the
CIS 2001 questionnaire, however, explicitly asks for trade marks to “protect
inventions or innovations developed in your enterprise”. The firms indicat-
ing to be trade mark active in the Schmoch (2003) sample are therefore all
innovative by default. Likewise, Malmberg (2005) only investigates product
launches. In both cases it is impossible to test i). Flikkema, de Man, and
Wolters (2010), by contrast, only look at firms that registered trade marks,
which makes it impossible to test ii). To some extent, however, these studies
complement each other. The CIS question was changed for the 2005 survey
to include all trade marks, and it was dropped completely from the 2008 and
2010 CIS. The samples by Jensen and Webster (2009) and Millot (2012), who
match trade mark data to their owners, and by Gotsch and Hipp (2012), who
use the CIS 2005, look at both conditions. Yet, these studies cannot be directly
compared. While Jensen and Webster as well as Millot take into account in-
novations “new to the firm” (in line with the Oslo Manual), Gotsch and Hipp
only consider innovations “new to the market.”
2.3.2 Proxy for product differentiation
Fink, Javorcik, and Spatareanu (2005) as well as Mangani (2007) relate trade
mark registrations and applications, respectively, to country- and industry-
specific characteristics. The underlying assumption is that larger and more
developed countries consume and produce a wider range of products, which
is reflected in trade mark registrations.
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Fink, Javorcik, and Spatareanu (2005) use trade mark data from the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) database and trade data from the
UN COMTRADE database for 22 exporting countries and 100 importing coun-
tries between 1994 and 1998. Trade marks are allocated to industries using
NICE classes. At the country level, the findings suggest a positive relation-
ship between trade mark registrations and the income per head. At the in-
dustry level, import and export volumes are both positively correlated with
the number of trade mark registrations in that industry. Because more trade
in terms of quantity and value indicates a wider range of products, the num-
ber of trade mark registrations does appear to indicate the level of product
differentiation.
Similarly, Mangani (2007) relates countries’ GDP and population size to
the number of trade marks filed by that country to infer the degree of product
differentiation across and within categories of products. This author uses
a cross-section of trade mark application counts of 35 countries that filed
Community trade mark applications in 2003. He shows that the variation
of products across categories is positively and significantly correlated to the
applicant-country’s GDP. Specifically, an increase of total GDP by one percent
leads to a proportionate rise in the level of product differentiation. This total
increase consists of a growing product variety across categories (41 percent)
and an appreciation in the product variation within categories (59 percent).
This variation within categories consists of additional products (93 percent)
and quality levels (7 percent).
The results of the two studies cannot directly be compared for two reas-
ons. Fink et al. allocate trade marks to industries according to an original cor-
respondence between NICE classes and national industry class codes. Man-
gani, by contrast, interprets NICE classes as product categories and ignores
industry-level data. Moreover, Fink et al. consider national, Community and
international trade mark registrations, while Mangani focusses his analysis
on Community trade mark applications at the NICE-class level. As regards
coverage, leaving out national trade mark data inevitably biases the sample
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towards firms that are exposed to international competition, either via multi-
national activity or via competition from abroad.
To sum up this wide literature, studies for many countries and economic
sectors generally support the view that trade marks are a useful addition to
the list of measures that can inform us about innovation activity and product
differentiation at the firm, industry, and country level. Not all innovative
firms, however, use trade marks to protect their innovation, and not all trade-
marking firms are innovative. Other factors, as for instance the choice of
target groups, advertising intensity and import competition, might also af-
fect the trade marking decision. Thus, trade marks are not equally valid for
all firms or countries, not always superior to other measures for a given in-
dustry, and do not provide coverage for all types of innovation. Neverthe-
less, they do contribute to a field where measurement is inherently difficult
and expensive if survey data have to be collected. As regards product dif-
ferentiation, there is some evidence that trade mark activity at the country
and industry level can be informative about levels of horizontal (variety) and
vertical (quality) product differentiation.
2.4 The incentives to use trade marks
Not all innovation types can be protected by patents or secrecy (Hall et al.,
2013). Often, trade marks can help to appropriate rents from innovation
nevertheless. In fact, Frey (2012) reports that IPR management in firms as
a whole supports R&D, business development and marketing efforts. This
author summarises a series of semi-structured interviews with IPR experts in
European and U.S. pharmaceutical firms as well as reporting findings from a
survey of pharmaceutical firms listed either in the EU or the U.S. Both the in-
terviews and the survey show that the primary objectives of firms’ IPR man-
agement are securing freedom-to-operate and maximising exclusivity and
the duration thereof. Moreover, the interviewees rank the protection and
the identity provided by trade marks, as well as their function to commu-
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nicate with customers, as trade marks’ most important functions. Together
with the fact that these firms spend a quarter of their annual turnover on av-
erage on marketing activities, these findings underline their intent to build
a strong brand. What drives this intent, however, remains unanswered - is
it the necessity to keep up with competitors, or the desire to keep them at
bay by creating market power? In this section we present studies analysing
different motives to obtain trade marks, including legitimate reasons such
as informing the consumer as well as more questionable strategies such as
raising rivals’ costs.
2.4.1 Informing the consumer
When investigating the use of trade marks to inform the consumer, it is sen-
sible to first think about how trade-marking and brand-building interact.
Creating and registering a trade mark is a one-off event. Building a brand,
however, involves long-term commitment and includes the provision of cus-
tomer service, activities for reputation-building and the reliable delivery on
promises. Greenhalgh et al. (2011) investigate the interplay between trade
marks and brands. These authors use the Annual Respondent Database (ARD2)
from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) for the period 2000-2006
in combination with the Oxford Firm-Level Intellectual Property Database
(OFLIP). They report that both advertising and trade-marking activity con-
tribute positively to the value generated by the average firm. There is also
some evidence implying that trade-marking and advertising are (imperfect)
substitutes. Advertising is often directed at building-up brand reputation,
and trade marks are the legal basis for a brand. Intuitively, we would there-
fore expect trade-marking and advertising to be complementary activities.
Registering, maintaining and monitoring a trade mark as well as advertising,
however, are costly activities. Any resources allocated to trade-marking are
therefore resources directed away from brand-building. This could explain
the observed substitutive effects of trade-marking and advertising on added
value. Further analyses show that trade-marking and advertising activities
29
Chapter 2. Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic
Literature
are associated with an employment and a turnover premium. But are these
premiums due to consumers being better informed about the firm’s product
or to reduced competition?
Jensen and Webster (2008) study how adding informative labels about un-
observable attributes on retail grocery products affects consumer demand. To
identify the effect of communicating unobservable product attributes, these
authors select brand-unrelated labels for their analysis. These authors use
commercially available monthly data on a bundle of 92 goods in 12 cate-
gories from major supermarkets across Australia over the period 2002-2005.
They investigate only mature product categories, where the products are suf-
ficiently homogeneous, so they can compare the effects of the labelled at-
tributes. The results regarding the attributes are mostly as expected - con-
sumers are more attracted towards products containing recycled materials,
are certified to be made in Australia, are health-conscious or offer support for
a charity. But eco-friendly products, non-certified Australian-made products,
and those that offer entry into a raffle have a negative impact on demand. La-
bels therefore seem to convey information that can affect the demand for the
labelled product. This also supports the position that trade marks have more
functions than indicating a product’s origin. Perhaps more relevant for the
discussion of the relation between trade marks and competition, however,
is another finding by these authors: up to a certain point, each additional
year a brand exists leads to an increase in the demand for that brand. Be-
yond that point demand decreases. Moreover, the more brands there are in
a given product category, the lower is demand for each brand in that cat-
egory. Although at first sight this speaks for healthy competition, it is not
clear whether we can make this connection. After all, several brands in one
category often belong to the same company and therefore only seemingly
compete against each other. An analysis of brand competition thus needs to
allocate brands to the relevant decision maker (which need not be the same
as the ultimate owner). Nevertheless, it is evident that the number and the
age of brands do affect competition. What does it take for a trade mark to
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achieve this function?
Trade marks can only serve as communication channel if their reliability
has been established over time. Even so, once a critical level of trustwor-
thiness is reached other parties have an incentive to ‘borrow’ an established
mark. They attempt to free-ride on the original firm’s reputation by signalling
to potential customers the information inherent to the ’borrowed’ mark. It is
often posited that if such unauthorized activity occurs frequently, the trade
mark will ‘dilute’, which means it slowly loses its informative value. Heald
and Brauneis (2011) conduct an empirical study on (involuntary) brand shar-
ing and potential trade mark dilution. These authors investigate whether the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA15) in the U.S. was a needed
response to frequent unauthorized use of famous brands for non-competing
products, or whether it was a result of extensive special-interest group lobby-
ing. They search evidence for brand-sharing of 33 selected famous brands in
corporation and trade mark registers, national newspapers and in recorded
dilution litigation. Their findings suggest that the unauthorized use of fa-
mous marks for non-competing products did indeed occur often. The vast
majority of those unauthorized uses, however, were used for local business
names, as for instance the CADILLAC Lounge, and not for products or busi-
nesses at the national level. Assuming consumers are capable of distinguish-
ing between different meanings of an expression, famous brands are deemed
immune to dilution through unauthorized use if it draws on the secondary
meaning of the brand. In the example of the CADILLAC Lounge, the unau-
thorized use refers to the quality aspect of the CADILLAC and not to the
origin-function. Their comprehensive investigation therefore does not find
any evidence that unauthorized use of famous marks was an issue before or
15The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 is a U.S. federal law that protects well known
trade marks from uses by others that could dilute their distinctiveness. This protection does
not require the presence of a likelihood of confusion. “[T]he potency of a [trade]mark may be
debilitated by another’s use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion leads to immediate
injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the
advertising value of the mark. –Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995” See Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 (citing Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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after the introduction of the FTDA.
2.4.2 Realising synergies
In addition to their direct contribution to firm value by appropriating rents
from innovation and brand building, trade marks might indirectly contribute
by generating complementarities with other types of intellectual property
rights. Following Somaya and Graham (2006), we distinguish between demand-
side effects, where the use of one IPR type affects the marginal revenue of
other IPR types, and supply-side effects, where the use of one IPR-type affects
the marginal costs of other IPR types. In this subsection we explore evidence
of such synergies between different types of IPRs starting with demand-side
effects.
We find the first joint analysis of patent and trade mark protection in
Parchomovsky and Siegelman (2002). These authors argue that building-up
brand loyalty can be an attempt to extend the patent lifetime. To maximise
profits over a product’s entire lifetime, the patent owner charges less than
monopoly prices during the patent period to encourage sales growth, but
can then charge more than marginal costs thereafter due to the brand loyalty
established during the patent period. To support their theoretical assertions,
these authors present five case studies in which firms successfully used the
patent period to build-up brand loyalty and reputation. This allows them
to charge a mark-up over their competitors’ prices after the patent period
without losing all their customers: Monsanto Roundup, Nutrasweet, GSK
Tagamet and Zovirax, and Bayer Aspirin.
In a similar vein, Davies and Maniatis (2010) discuss two cases in which
firms tried to use trade marks to protect what was previously protected by
a patent, namely Philips’ three-headed shaver and Dyson’s transparent vac-
cuum container. In both cases the firms argued that these distinctive features
of their products were unique and thus indicated origin, which is why they
should be protectable under trade mark law. Both attempts, however, failed:
a distinct feature that was patented is almost by definition also functional,
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that is, it is required to obtain a technical result. As outlined above, functional
features or marks are not eligible for protection under trade mark law. From
the two studies it seems that patents and trade marks can generate comple-
mentarities when firms use the temporary monopoly granted by the patent
to build-up brand reputation and consumer loyalty. Firms cannot, however,
use trade marks to simply replace a patent after its expiration date.
In contrast, Frey’s (2012) interviews suggest that combining trade marks
and patents to increase exclusivity, or the duration thereof, plays a secondary
role for firms. In fact, according to this latter study, most firms consider that
the trade marks’ function as a substitute for other IPRs is irrelevant for their
decision to trade mark. These differing findings stress the limited extent to
which results from case studies, interviews or small scale surveys can be gen-
eralized even within the same industry.
Cross-industry studies potentially provide more general insights. In a re-
cent study, Llerena and Millot (2013) investigate the interplay of patents and
trade marks by analysing French firm-level data to measure the impact of
different IPR strategies on firm performance. These authors argue that the
direction of the relationship between trade marks and patents depends on
industry characteristics: if the effects of advertisement are persistent but the
returns are difficult to appropriate, as for instance in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry once patent protection has lapsed or where it is not available, trade
marks can complement patents (as discussed by Parchomovsky and Siegel-
man (2002). These authors use data on 785 French publicly traded firms in the
year 2007 including their corresponding patent and trade mark applications
between 1998 and 2007. They estimate a market value equation containing
four dummy variables, each of which represented one possible patent - trade
mark strategy. As predicted, the results show that the sign of the relation-
ship between patents and trade marks depends on exogenous variables such
as advertisement depreciation and spillovers. In high-tech business sectors,
where effects from advertising are short-lived, these IPR types appear to be
substitutes. In contrast, the authors find complementary effects in more tradi-
33
Chapter 2. Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic
Literature
tional sectors such as the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors. These results
should be treated with caution, however. The complementarity effects in the
theory only occur after the patent expired. Assuming firms renew valuable
patents until the maximum duration is reached, the sample cannot include
cases in which a trade mark could act as complement, because the observa-
tion period does not contain patents older than nine years. One could argue,
however, that the stock market already values the future effect of the trade
mark complementing the patent before this actually occurs. But according
to their theory, the value added by the trade mark depends on the goodwill
built up during the patent period, which is a volatile process that is still on-
going at the time of observation. It is therefore likely that the complemen-
tary (substitutive) effects are underestimated (overestimated). This might
also explain why the results for the full sample indicate no interplay between
patents and trade marks with respect to market value. Moreover, using a
product-level approach, Helmers and Schautschick (2013) analyse 300 small
UK firms and show that of the firms that own both IPR types, only a small
share of about 5 percent use bundles to protect the same product or product
type. Results from empirical analyses should therefore be assessed critically
if ownership of both patents and trade marks is assumed to be equivalent to
an IPR bundling strategy by that firm. The evidence with regard to demand-
side complementarities between patents and trade marks is therefore incon-
clusive, and we now discuss a study analysing supply-side effects between
copyrights, patents and trade marks.
Somaya and Graham (2006) suggest that different types of IPRs act as
complements due to economies of scope. Complementarities between IPR
types in the form of economies of scope occur if the existing know-how and
experience with one IPR type makes it cheaper to introduce other types of
IPRs. These authors report on unstructured interviews with six employees
of five software firms who all indicate that economies of scope regarding IPR
types exist. Based on these interviews, the authors suggest that the more a
firm is aware of the importance of intellectual property protection and the
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more resources a firm allocates to IPR related matters, the more likely it is to
use more than one type of IPRs.
These authors use an original database of information concerning 85 of
the top 100 PC software firms in the U.S. over the time period 1985-1999. It
contains firms’ litigation and IPR activity matched with accounting data. By
using IPRs that have been subject of litigation, these authors ensure that the
IPRs under consideration were actually used and therefore of value to their
owner. Moreover, to take account of the significance of a particular copyright
or trade mark for the company, as dependent variables the authors calculate
copyright and trade mark years-in-litigation instead of mere counts of the
suits. Patent counts and the number of patent attorneys used by a company
serve as proxies for management attention to IPRs and IPR-related organ-
isational resources, respectively. The results suggest that the more a firm
is involved in trade mark litigation, the more likely it is to be involved in
copyright litigation, and vice versa. Moreover, patenting activity is highly
correlated with both trade mark and copyright litigation activity: filing an
additional patent or hiring an additional patent lawyer are both correlated
with a higher number of suit-days in copyright and trade mark litigation.
The authors repeat the analysis without Microsoft, by far the largest firm in
the sample. The complementarity between trade mark and copyright litiga-
tion remains statistically significant. This supports the view that concurrent
movements of different IPR types within a firm are often due to economies of
scope rather than demand-side synergies between the different IPR types.
2.4.3 Raising rivals’ costs
A number of legal cases presented in Greenhalgh (2012) suggest that owners
of strong brands with ’deep pockets’ seek to prohibit the use of any simi-
lar marks, even if the allegedly infringing product shows significant differ-
ences to those marketed under the strong brand. The cases discussed in-
clude Coca-Cola’s claim over the slogan “World Famous in New Zealand”,
the US-Australian “Ugh boots” dispute, Cadbury’s “purple” dispute in Aus-
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tralia, McDonald’s versus “MacTea” in Singapore and versus “McCurry” in
Malaysia. Courts in the various jurisdictions found differentially in favour
or against the complainant. While the true intent of these legal actions of-
ten remains blurry, it is clear that they raise the legal costs of the alleged in-
fringers. The following study presents empirical evidence that raising rivals’
costs could indeed be a strategic goal of some legal action.
Being at the receiving end of a trade mark opposition requires the re-
allocation of resources to the opposition proceedings and interrupts the mar-
keting process for the duration of the proceedings. The latter can even be
prolonged if one of the parties requests a delay. Collette (2012) presents a
new data set on completed trade mark opposition cases in Canada between
1996 and 2009. This author investigates whether incumbent firms with deep-
pockets use the possibility of opposing trade mark applications by rivals and
then also delays the proceedings to burden them. The sample consists of
2,575 opposition cases, for which both the applicant and the opponent could
be matched to a firm-level company accounts database. In this sample, com-
plainants use at least one delay 45 percent of the time, and the mean com-
plainant is 30 percent larger in terms of revenue than the mean applicant
($13.3 billion compared to $US 10.2 billion). Very large firms are 6 percent
more likely to delay the proceedings and 4 percent more likely to be suc-
cessful with their opposition. This effect is stronger for larger firms as well
as for incumbent firms. The more often firms start opposition proceedings,
however, the less likely they become to request more time, while they be-
come more likely to win the proceedings. Likewise, complainants are more
likely to request a delay, yet are less likely to win, if the defendant is more
experienced. The author argues that the results provide evidence that large
firms oppose and delay strategically. It might also be the case, however, that
the requirement of additional time depends on the experience of both parties
individually and perhaps the ratio thereof, too. Nevertheless, the study pro-
vides detailed insights into the patterns of use of oppositions, proceedings,
and their outcomes depending on firm characteristics such as size and expe-
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rience. Further investigation of litigation and opposition data is still needed
with a focus on oppositions to trade mark registrations for products that do
not compete with the products offered by the defendant.
The studies in this section are concerned with firms’ incentives to use
trade marks. The different contributions address three main themes - the use
of trade marks and labels to inform the consumer, to realise synergies with
other IPR types and to raise rivals’ costs. There is evidence that firms invest in
trade marks to inform their consumers, and that consumers respond to addi-
tional information about available products. Instead of investing in their own
trade marks, some firms try to free-ride on famous brands’ reputation. While
it is not clear whether this is a successful strategy, it does not seem to harm
the famous brand. The findings of the rare attempts to measure synergies
between different IPR types suggest weak but significant complementary ef-
fects between copyrights and trade marks, and the existence of both effects,
depending on the environment, between patents and trade marks. Strate-
gic behaviour might partly explain the observation that large firms are more
likely to start opposition proceedings and smaller new firms are significantly
more prone to lose them.
Putting aside the methodological issues, there is evidence that the trade
mark system does create incentives for firms to engage in costly actions tar-
geted at building or preserving market power. This leaves fewer resources
for optimisation and innovation. The impact of those actions, however, is
limited, because judges are well aware of the trade-off between protecting
valuable brands and preserving competition. Although only a fraction of
trade mark related legal disputes is taken to court, the interpretation and
application of the law by the judges in those cases most likely has a mod-
erating influence improving the net social value of trade marks through the
signalling function to all agents in the economy. More thorough investigation
of the impact of brands and trade marks on competition and the economy as
a whole will help the courts to make even better informed decisions.
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2.5 The relation between trade marks and firm perfor-
mance
Innovation activity is aimed at a temporary improvement in firm perfor-
mance, and we find positive associations between innovation and trade mark
activity in several of the studies reviewed above. Therefore, we expect to find
measurable positive impacts of trade-marking activity on firm performance.
We start this section with the review of studies investigating the role of
IPRs in firm survival. We then turn to studies analysing the links between
trade-marking activity and the stock market value of the firm. Market value,
however, is a forward-looking measure of performance, which depends on
investors’ expectations of firms’ future success. Productivity and profitability
are more immediate measures of performance, and we review studies inves-
tigating the link between trade marks and these measures to complete this
section.
Trade marks reduce search costs and asymmetric information, facilitate
product differentiation and incentivise investment in goodwill. These effects
should contribute to firm performance, regardless of whether they are linked
to innovative activity or not. Attributing positive associations found for trade
marks in performance studies to innovative activities might thus overstate
the impact of innovation on performance, or by the same logic, understate
the risk inherent to innovative activity. We therefore refrain from interpreting
effects found for trade mark activity in the studies reviewed below as effects
related to innovation, unless the link is clearly established.
2.5.1 Survival
Firm survival studies try to identify and measure the influence of firms’ de-
cisions, of firms’ characteristics and of the actions by their competitors on
the likelihood to survive. The existing studies that analyse the effect of in-
novation activity on survival using trade mark data differ in two important
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Figure 2.5.1: Timeline illustrating differences between observation periods
aspects: sample selection and estimation method.
Helmers and Rogers (2010) choose to observe for five years a cohort of
young firms established in the UK in 2001, and Jensen, Webster, and Bud-
delmeyer (2008) as well as Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster (2010) observe
entry and exit activity of all firms over fixed periods of time. Both approaches
must account for the fact that many firms survive beyond the end of the ob-
servation period (right-censoring). In addition, in studies that analyse not
only survival of young firms but also of existing firms must account for the
fact that many firms existed and also closed long before the start of the obser-
vation period (left-censoring).
The presence of left-censoring has implications for the interpretation of
the results. Suppose that most firms face some challenges throughout their
lifetime. We can measure the impact of firm, industry and competitor char-
acteristics on firms only during the period of observation, and we can only
measure them for the types of firms that entered during the observation pe-
riod and for those that survived previous challenges. The types of firms that
survived previous, unobserved challenges can differ from the types of firms
that survive the challenges to come. The timeline in figure 2.5.1 illustrates
such a situation.
Let event A occur only between [t-s,t] and significantly change the eco-
nomic situation of an industry. For the UK, the introduction of the Euro as
accounting currency in the Euro-zone on 1 January 1999 could mark such an
event. This put some UK firms at a disadvantage relative to firms in the Euro-
zone, because the trade between firms in the Euro-zone is no longer subject
to uncertainties due to fluctuations in the exchange rate. It is possible that
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among the firms that exited shortly after this event would have survived until
the beginning of the observation period if it had not been for this event. The
set of active firms in the observation period is therefore potentially different
from a set of firms of the same age that did not witness such an event. Hence,
the results of a survival analysis for firms that existed before the observation
period begins are only valid for these types of firms. More generally, unless
the challenges for firms established in t in the period [t, t+s] have the same
effect on the composition of firms in an economy as unobserved challenges
during the period [t-s, t], we cannot use the effects of x on survival that we
find in [t, t+T] for firms established in t-s to predict the effect of x on survival
in [t+s, t+s+T] for firms established in t.
All three papers estimate firms’ risk of exit in period t conditional on hav-
ing survived until period t, i.e. the hazard rate. The empirical models dif-
fer, however. Helmers & Rogers (2010) estimate a probit,model, while the
authors of the other two papers estimate a piecewise-constant exponential
function (PCEF). The two main differences are: i) the probit model explic-
itly accounts for the fact that survival time is measured in intervals, that is,
discretely, while the PCEF implicitly assumes survival time to be measured
continuously; ii) the PCEF is a semi-parametric model, in which the baseline
hazard is a non-specified function of time and is therefore a more general
version of the intercept in the fully parametric model.
Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster (2010) elaborate on the model under-
lying the basic hazard function they estimated in both papers. These au-
thors argue that firm exit occurs if revenues are insufficient to cover costs
and thus model the probability of a firm to de-register as a multiplicative
function of three components: the basic propensity to exit only depending
on firm age, h0(t); the firm specific, time-invariant characteristics (αi), which
cannot be observed but affect the basic hazard rate proportionately; and the
vector (x′itb) of explanatory variables that have an exponential impact on
the firm-specific baseline hazard. The estimated piecewise-constant expo-
nential function with proportional unobserved heterogeneity reads hi (t|x) =
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Figure 2.5.2: Survival rates for IPR-active and IPR-inactive firms
Source: Helmers & Rogers (2010), figure 2, p. 235
h0 (t)αiexp (x′itb).
One possibility of avoiding biases due to left-censoring is to select a cohort
of new firms at a given point in time and then follow their development for
some time. For a period of five years, Helmers and Rogers (2010) track the
development of the entire cohort of over 160,000 limited companies newly
incorporated in the UK in 2001. Registered IPRs are matched to firms using
the string match algorithm described in Helmers, Rogers, and Schautschick
(2011), and ownership structure is not accounted for, so that firms in the data
only have the IPRs they applied for or registered using their own name. First,
these authors compute non-parametric Kaplan-Meyer survival estimates for
the first five years of existence, distinguishing between IPR-active and IPR-
inactive firms. This yields two survival curves (figure 2.5.2), which show the
rate of survival as a function of time. In every year, the survival rate of IPR-
active firms lies strictly above that of IPR-inactive firms.
To take advantage of the firm- and industry level variables at hand, the
relationship between them and the risk of a firm exiting a market can be anal-
ysed. Of relevance for such an analysis are variables that represent the firms’
41
Chapter 2. Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic
Literature
ability to compete successfully and others that reflect the conditions in which
the new firms operate. To characterise each firm sufficiently, the authors in-
clude counts of firms’ patent and trade mark applications, total assets, a vari-
able indicating whether it is part of a group and if so, whether it is owned
by a domestic or a foreign entity. Including a measure of the competitive
conditions and of growth for each industry, the authors account for the in-
dustrial environment of each firm. Moreover, regional unemployment rates
and house prices are included, as well as a dummy variable indicating if a
firm is located close to a university, to control for spatial effects.
The results at the firm level suggest that new firms that applied for at least
one trade mark (patent) had a 16% (14%) lower probability of exiting during
the observed 5-year period compared to IPR-inactive firms. A more disag-
gregated regression using patent and trade mark counts reveals that regis-
tering national trade marks is correlated with a lower likelihood of exit than
registering Community trade marks. By contrast, a patent filed at the EPO
is correlated with a higher increase in the expected life span of a new firm
than a national patent. This might reflect the fact that firms wish to protect
more promising inventions at a larger scale. Trade marks, however, can differ
across countries, so that wider protection is considered necessary at the early
stage of an innovation. Community trade marks thus often follow national
trade marks instead of replacing them, as is the case with EPO patent.
The base for the analyses in (Jensen et al., 2008) and (Buddelmeyer et al.,
2010) is the stock of registered Australian companies in 1997 where all data
were available, which left 229,869 companies or roughly 65% coverage. In
their two papers these authors track all incumbents as well as new-firm regis-
trations and de-registrations during the period 1997-2005 (Jensen et al., 2008)
and 1997-2003 (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010), respectively. In their 2008 paper,
the authors distinguish between new firms and incumbents by defining as
incumbents all firms that were already registered in 1988. However, firms of
different ages and sizes react differently to macroeconomic fluctuations and
business cycles, which is why some economy-wide indicators are included to
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separate the impact of innovation from that of the general environment. In
these studies, renewed patents are associated with a lower probability of exit,
while applying for a patent increases the risk of de-registration significantly.
In addition, distinguishing between new firms and incumbents shows that
patent applications only affect incumbents, while they have no significant ef-
fect on new firms. Both findings are in contrast to those in Helmers & Rogers
(2010). Recent IPR applications are proxies for more risky innovation than es-
tablished IPRs. For the median firm of the 1997-2003 sample the calculations
show that registering for a patent decreases the expected life span of an Aus-
tralian firm by 7.6 years on average, while increasing the stock of renewed
patents from zero to five years increases it by 13.5 years.
The findings related to trade marks are even more pronounced. Apply-
ing for the first trade mark prolongs the expected life span of the median
firm, on average, by 6.6 years, while extending the incremental innovation
capital by five years, that is, the stock of renewed trade marks, yields 19.5 ad-
ditional operating years for the median firm. However, neither the impact of
design right stocks, nor that of recent design right applications is a significant
contributor to firm survival. The results in both papers by Jensen et al. and
Buddelmeyer et al. are very similar. Overall, the authors show in a novel way
that innovative activity associated with trade marks is less risky than that as-
sociated with patents, and that renewed IP rights, which are proxies for solid
innovation capital increases the expected life span of an average Australian
firm. So far, it appears as if firms that engage in successful or incremental in-
novation fare better, or at least live longer, than their IPR-inactive peers. Per-
haps this can be interpreted as a direct effect of innovation, which implies that
it might be worthwhile to also look at indirect effects. For instance, how does
innovation by one firm affect the survival chances by other firms? Because it
might not be possible to ever measure direct spill-over effects or externalities,
a picture of the general nature of these effects can be drawn by looking at the
industry level. In other words, do firms survive longer in highly innovative
industries, and does this hold for new as well as for incumbent firms? To this
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end, Helmers & Rogers (2010) include the share of trade-marking and patent-
ing firms in a sector as a measure of industry innovativeness. A higher share
of trade-mark-active firms within an industry is correlated with a higher risk
of exit, while a higher share of patent-active firms is correlated with a lower
risk of exit. As interpretation of this result, the authors suggest that a more
patenting intensive sector is one that is subject to rapid technological change.
This makes survival of new firms more likely, because it reduces incumbents’
ability to displace the new entrants. More trade mark activity, on the other
hand, could be a result of more marketing intensive industries where repu-
tation plays an important role, which is difficult and costly for a new firm
to build up and maintain. The estimated exit propensities at the sector level
reveal significant heterogeneity across sectors. For instance, while in all but
three sectors trade-marking is associated with a statistically significant drop
in risk of exit, the same can be said for only four out of ten sectors with re-
gard to patents. These results thus show that the roles played by the different
types of innovativeness vary significantly across industries.
Jensen et al. (2008) construct as an innovation index at the industry level a
weighted average of R&D intensity, R&D employment, patents, trade marks,
resources allocated to organisational change, and productivity. Including this
measure in the regressions has virtually no effect on the coefficients of the re-
stricted regressions summarised above. The main findings of the three stud-
ies are that innovation as measured by trade marks at the firm level increases
the likelihood of survival for new firms significantly, while it appears that ad-
ditional patent applications decrease incumbents’ expected life span. More-
over, as often assumed, the researchers suggest that a more inventive and
more competitive environment benefits the survival chances of new firms at
the cost of incumbents’ propensity to survive.
2.5.2 Market value
The relationship between a firm’s stock market value and its underlying in-
tangible assets is explored in a literature that goes back a long way - for a
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useful discussion of the underlying theory and empirical methodology, and
a survey of pre-existing studies at that date see Hall (2000). The empirical
equation specified in these studies reflects the idea that both the book value of
tangible assets (known from firm accounts) and the value to firms of a range
of intangible assets (not formally assessed by accountants) contribute to the
determination of the stock market value of the firm. Thus the market value
(V) of the firm is given by V = q (K1 +K2)σ, whereK1 is the book value of to-
tal tangible assets of the firm, K2 is the stock of intangible assets not included
in the balance sheet, q is the ‘current market valuation coefficient’ of the firm’s
total assets, and σ allows for the possibility of non-constant returns to scale
in the market valuation of assets. By taking natural logarithms and using the
approximation of ln
(
1 + K1K2
)
≈ K1K2 , this equation can be rearranged to the
following for estimation: ln
(
V
K1
)
= ln (q) + (σ − 1) ln (K1) + σK2K1 .
At the time of Hall’s survey, the measures used to proxy the intangible as-
sets were solely R&D and patents. In addition, almost all of the studies used
US data on manufacturing firms for their investigation (see Hall, 2000, Table
7.1). As noted by Hall, the stock market value of the firm offers a measure by
which we can observe the changes in the overall price of the firm caused by
rises in assets that are not generally traded separately in the market. Even so,
the analysis has to be limited to private firms that are listed on the stock mar-
ket, so this is still rather restrictive compared with the whole range of firms
operating in the economy.
A paper by Bosworth and Rogers (2001) marks an early attempt to inves-
tigate the impact of trade marks on market value. The authors use data for a
small sample of 60 large Australian firms observed in 1994-1996 and include
an exploration of the value of trade marks and design rights in addition to
the value of R&D and patents. In their first analysis of market value using all
firms in the sample, whether in manufacturing or other sectors, and including
as explanatory variables both R&D and patents, the effects of trade marks and
designs are positive but not statistically significant. Limiting their analysis to
non-manufacturing firms partly reverses their results, as there is a statisti-
45
Chapter 2. Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic
Literature
cally significant positive impact for trade marks, but not for R&D, patents, or
designs. Even so, the coefficient magnitudes suggest that the value of a trade
mark (to a non-manufacturing firm) is less than half the value of a patent as
recorded for all firms (with this result having been clearly dominated by re-
turns to manufacturing firms). Nevertheless, it is likely that the R&D cost of
developing what is eventually patented is much higher than the design and
marketing activities leading to the trade mark, so the net return for each type
of IPR investment is unknown.
The early positive findings by these authors encouraged the development
of more extensive firm-level databases, both in the UK at Oxford University’s
Intellectual Property Research Centre (OIPRC) and in Australia at Melbourne
University’s Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia (IPRIA). In
both centres the IPR activity of larger samples of firms could be catalogued
through several years, giving rise to panel data. Two studies published in the
same volume by Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) and by Griffiths and Webster
(2006) present further evidence of the positive value investors assign to the
acquisition of trade marks by firms.
The sample analysed by Greenhalgh and Rogers (2006) of over 670 UK
firms is sufficiently large to be able to compare results for manufacturing
firms with two sets of non-manufacturing firms: firstly a group of financial
services (finance, insurance, and real estate), and secondly a broad utilities
sector (transport, communications, gas, electricity, and water), all observed
from 1996 to 2000. Like the earlier study by Bosworth and Rogers (2001), the
benefit effect of applying for UK trade marks is weaker for the whole sam-
ple than for the financial service sector, whose use of trade marks had been
growing very strongly and where the stock market return to trade marks is
high. However, despite a high level of use of trade marks by the utilities sec-
tor, firms in this sector do not show any significant increase in market value
for acquiring any type of IPRs, so the results are not uniform across the two
service sectors. For manufacturing firms, the key variables are doing R&D,
acquiring European patents, and buying intangible assets such as goodwill
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through takeovers.
The study by Griffiths and Webster (2006) analyses around 300 publicly
listed Australian companies from 1989 to 2002. As well as exploring the ex-
istence of significant positive returns to Australian trade marks and patents,
they also investigate whether these returns are rising or falling over this pe-
riod. These authors go to some lengths to remind the reader that, without
full costing of different types of innovative activity, the analysis cannot tell
us whether or not the investment in inventive activity is profitable. How-
ever, they are confident that their estimates of the trends in the average net
present value accorded by the stock market to a patent or trade mark are reli-
ably estimated (but again making no claims that the net returns have risen or
fallen, as this would depend on costs). Their finding is that the average value
accorded to trade marks was rising over the 1990s, whereas that for patents
was falling over the same period, and that there is no discernible trend for
design rights. They speculate that the rise in the value of trade marks may
reflect the increasing extent to which new brands are seen as critical to the
marketing and commercialisation of product lines.
Sandner and Block (2011) developes a multi-country database of around
1,200 large firms observed for the period 1996-2002 yielding nearly 7,000 data
points. Their sample selection is based on the requirement that all the firms
being analysed are trade mark active in Europe at some point in this seven
year period. Their analysis focuses on the impact of European Community
trade marks applied for by these firms, but does not include any analysis
of their domestic trade marks. As well as recording the instances of Euro-
pean trade-marking over this period (which coincides with the start-up of
the European mark in 1996 and thus reflects the firms’ entire stocks of these
assets), the authors develope four value indicators to try to differentiate be-
tween high and low value trade mark activity by firms. These measures are
i) the breadth of the trade mark, measured by the number of classes applied
for; ii) the seniority of the mark claimed at the time of registration; iii) oppo-
sitions to other firms’ marks made by the firm; and iv) oppositions received
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by the firm to its own marks.
In this study the stock of Community trade marks exerts a strongly signif-
icant positive impact on stock market value of these firms. Of the four ‘value’
indicators, two show positive significance - the holding of senior trade marks
and the conducting of oppositions against other firms’ trade marks. Insignifi-
cant results can be seen for the other indicators - the breadth of the trade mark
and opposition activity received by the firm from competitors. The authors’
comment on this that trade marks appear to differ from patents, where the
level of opposition has been found to be informative about the value of the
patent.
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2012) put together a database for the period 1996-
2000 covering 1,600 large and medium-sized firms operating in all economic
sectors of the UK. This large sample of more than 6,000 observations permits
them to break down the statistical analysis to compare firms in the manufac-
turing and service sectors. The extent of trade mark activity via the domestic
application route and the European route are both monitored. They also in-
vestigate trends in returns over the late 1990s. Here, the impact of doing any
trade mark activity in a given year is positive on market value in the full
sample, with a slightly bigger impact of taking out a Community trade mark
compared with just a UK mark. Comparing sectors, these ‘news’ effects of
new trade marks on stock market value are much larger and more signifi-
cant in services than in manufacturing, where news about patents and R&D
is already doing the job of informing stock markets.
In addition to studying the effect of doing any trade-marking, these au-
thors also look at what impact arises from taking out more trade marks in
a given year (relative to the size of the firm) - this variable is termed the in-
tensity of trade mark activity. In the data as a whole there is no rise in stock
market value associated with higher intensity, but this finding for the whole
sample conceals a more complex story. When trade mark intensity is inter-
acted with a time trend, initial gains from higher trade mark intensity surface.
These higher gains, however, are eroded by a falling trend in this value over
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time. This is in sharp contrast to the results by Griffiths and Webster (2006)
for Australia where the market value of trade marks is rising. We know from
section 1 that trade mark activity was rising strongly in both countries, hence
the UK result conforms to economic expectations that the marginal value of
each extra trade mark would fall as their number increased. It is thus the
contrary Australian result that remains to be investigated further.
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2012) also show that an increase in trade-marking
by other firms in the same four-digit industry reduces a firm’s value-added,
confirming the immediate effect of innovation by competitors on a non- in-
novating incumbent. At the same time, this rise in industry trade-marking
intensity yields an increase in the market-to-book value ratio, which indi-
cates that investors expect the losing firms to respond by engaging in more
intense innovation in order to generate higher future returns.
Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009) study this effect of rivals’ innovation and
advertisement activity on firms’ market value in more detail. These authors
argue that product innovation as well as advertising by one firm not only
affects that firm’s market value, but also that of their rivals. They hypothe-
sise that the business stealing effect outweighs the market expansion effect of
product innovation, such that rivals’ market value decreases after the intro-
duction of a new product or an incremental product innovation. In contrast,
new advertisement is expected to increase overall demand and thus all firms’
market value. To test their hypotheses, these authors regress firms’ market
value as well as their market-to-book value on product innovation and new
advertisement as well as a number of control variables. The study focuses on
the U.S. carbonated soda drink (CSD) industry during 1999-2003, in particu-
lar, on Coca Cola and Pepsi, as these firms account for more than 50% total
CSD sales. In contrast to most of the other studies using trade mark data,
here trade mark filings at the USPTO serve as proxy for new advertisement.
Data on product innovations stem from a commercial database containing
information on announcements in trade journals, magazines, and other spe-
cialised publications around the world. Their results match the findings from
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Greenhalgh & Rogers (2012): new trade marks by either firm increase the
market and market-to-book values of both firms. Product innovation, how-
ever, increases own market values, while it decreases the rival’s market val-
ues. Additional regressions analysing the channels through which each ac-
tion affected firms’ market value reveal that product innovations generate
their impact through market shares but not through changes in total demand,
whereas total demand is increased by new trade marks and market shares re-
main unaffected.
While these results confirm the positive impact of trade marks on all
firms’ market value, their choice of interpretations of the proxies’ functions is
not compelling. Intuitively, firms would protect the name of a new product
before they announce it. It seems thus more likely that trade marks in fact
proxy new product innovation which expands demand for all firms, while a
product announcement may indicate the innovating firm is going to market
soon, shifting some of the existing demand from the rivals to the innovative
firm. This interpretation would also be more in line with the findings in sec-
tion 2) and by Greenhalgh and Rogers (2012).
2.5.3 Trade marks, productivity, and profitability
While studies of stock market value are useful in reflecting the estimated
future profits from innovative activity, it is also of interest to examine the
actual observed returns. Studies of productivity and profitability can show
how far trade mark activity is affecting the immediate performance of firms.
Furthermore, these studies can include observations on firms that are not
listed on the stock market. Therefore, they are more general in terms of the
sample of firms that can be studied, although they are partial in terms of
the time over which the benefits of trade marks are observed. Using a stan-
dard production function relating output to inputs such as Y = ALαKβ1 , this
can be linearised in natural logs to the following for estimation: ln (Y ) =
ln (A) + αln (L) + βln (K1), where Y is value added, L is labour (total em-
ployment), K1 is the stock of tangible capital and A represents knowledge
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and ability to produce high quality output. There is a large range of factors
affecting the level of A, including intangible assets, K2.
An early study of the impact of trade marks on productivity is that of
Greenhalgh and Longland (2005), who use this approach to examine whether
trade marks were associated with increases in the real value of firms’ output
for given factor inputs, i.e. with higher productivity. The sample of firms
analysed contains 740 manufacturing firms observed from 1988 to 1994. For
these firms the records of R&D (if reported) as well as patent and trade mark
applications are observed, together with information on real net output (mea-
sured as the value added by the firm to material inputs) and inputs of labour
and capital. Given that this database contains repeated observations on firms,
it is possible to differentiate the short term impact of new trade marks on
productivity within the firm and the longer term contribution of trade mark
activity to persistent differences in productivity between firms.
The study finds that increasing the intensity of trade mark activity (i.e.
the number of trade marks relative to the size of the firm as measured by em-
ployment) for the whole sample of firms has a significant positive impact on
next years’ output. This result holds when the researchers control for both
UK and EU patents as well as firm-level R&D intensity. The results also re-
main significant when persistent productivity differences between firms are
eliminated using appropriate statistical methods. When these persistent dif-
ferences are examined in a separate cross-section analysis, trade mark activ-
ity is also shown to be correlated with permanent productivity differences
between firms.
Nevertheless, when the full sample of firms is split into high-tech and
low-tech industry sectors, the analysis reveals significant differences between
sectors - in particular, trade marks are important in influencing both short
and long term productivity in the low-tech sector, whereas for high-tech firms
their R&D activity is the most telling factor followed by patents. This sample
does not include service firms so the study does not permit exact comparison
with the later stock market studies described above. Even so, the differences
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between high- and low-tech manufacturing suggest that stock markets are
right to value R&D and patents for those sectors where these are important
types of intangible investment, but also that they can draw useful inferences
about firm productivity from the trade mark activity of firms in other sectors.
In their later work, Greenhalgh and Rogers (2012) examine the produc-
tivity of a broader sample of firms, covering both manufacturing and service
firms. In this paper, direct comparison between productivity changes and
stock market valuation are possible as these authors provided both types of
analysis. Trade mark activity shows a large value-added premium for firms
that applied for trade marks in the previous year, by between 10 per cent and
30 per cent, depending on the type of trade mark averaged across all firms.
For service firms that applied for both UK and European Community trade
marks in a given year, their value-added is around 47 per cent higher than
that of other firms. The value-added premium for manufacturing firms that
were also seeking both UK and Community trade marks in the previous year
is lower (at 16 per cent) than that for service firms. These authors conclude
that:
“In the analysis of the firm’s net output, the results were broadly
consistent with those derived using the market value approach,
suggesting that stock markets are efficient in estimating the likely
benefits of new intangible assets and that managers do not seek
trade marks to follow a management fad, but can expect to receive
real returns from innovative activity.”
Turning now to the issue of how much intangible assets can enhance firm
profitability, Griffiths, Jensen, and Webster (2011) analyse the determinants
of financial profitability for a sample of nearly 2,700 mainly public and pri-
vate Australian firms observed from 1990 to 2006. In this study, the authors
are able to measure each firm’s stocks of registered patents, trade marks, and
designs, as well as several other control variables, such as tangible capital
and the age of the firm. While the ultimate focus of the paper is to exam-
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ine the determinants of persistent excess profits, distinguishing between in-
nate cost advantages and artificial barriers to market entry, their empirical
analysis begins with an estimating equation relating actual gross profits to
both tangible and intangible capital stocks. This shows that both patent and
trade mark stocks are key contributors to profits, although rather surprisingly
design rights are not significant determinants. These authors conclude that
firms and regulators ought to collect better data on intangible assets, so that
the returns to intangibles can be monitored alongside the returns to tangible
assets.
So far most of the empirical analyses of share prices and productivity that
we have quoted are conducted using data on large firms. Studies of small
firms are rare, but that undertaken by Rogers, Greenhalgh, and Helmers
(2007) covers UK registered small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a
population of around 140,000 firms, observed over the period 2001-2004. This
study relates firm profitability over the three years 2002-2004 to the acquisi-
tion of a new trade mark during 2001. It is posited that, because of investment
in launching an innovation, profits may be low or even negative for a number
of years, even if the new product is ultimately successful. The findings show
that, in comparison with firms not acquiring any marks, trade mark active
firms are more concentrated in the lowest and highest quartiles of the profits
distribution. The negative effect is particularly strong for those acquiring a
European Community trade mark, where the proportion falling into the low-
est quartile of profits is 44% compared with 25% of inactive firms. Also, this
hollowing out of the profits distribution is most pronounced for the youngest
firms aged less than five years old; it continues for firms aged five to ten, but
virtually disappears for trade mark active firms aged more than ten years.
2.5.4 Employment and wages
Firms that innovated and marketed successfully can invest some of their pre-
mium profits into their workforce, either via higher wages to keep the exist-
ing staff motivated, or by hiring more skilled personnel for future research,
53
Chapter 2. Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic
Literature
development, and marketing. In other words, a link is likely to exist between
a firm’s innovative activity and the size and remuneration of its workforce.
In their early study, Greenhalgh and Longland (2001) are the first to model
UK employment as a function of a firm’s sales, industry levels of wages, costs
of capital and materials, R&D expenses, and a range of IPR variables (includ-
ing trade marks) to proxy innovation. These authors analyse a panel of about
500 large UK production firms operating between 1986 and 1995. In the ini-
tial regression, firm specific time-invariant effects are included, showing no
effect of trade marks on the number of jobs in a firm. However, a supplemen-
tary analysis of the firm specific effects shows that there are persistent differ-
ences between trade-marking firms and those that never register trade marks.
In particular, trade-mark-active firms consistently employ significantly more
workers than firms without trade marks. Further analysis of the impact of
trade marks on firm wages shows that registering trade marks is also signif-
icantly associated with rising wages. Viewing these results together shows
that innovative activity is associated with more jobs at higher wages, albeit
unclear to the researchers whether the extra returns are being shared with the
existing workforce, or whether higher wages are paid to attract better skilled
personnel.
These results are confirmed in the UK IPO report on trade mark incentives
mentioned above. In this report, Greenhalgh et al. (2011) essentially repeat
these analyses using more recent ONS-ARD data, which then includes service
firms as well as Community trade marks. The results suggest that trade mark
active firms employ, on average, 20% more workers than trade-mark-inactive
firms with the level of sales held constant, implying that trade-marking firms
are more labour intensive than their non-trade-marking counterparts. More-
over, wage regressions show that trade marks alone imply a 0.7% wage pre-
mium and trade marks in conjunction with patents a 2% wage premium over
and above industry average wages. Similar to the earlier results, including
firm fixed-effects left trade marks and patents insignificant indicators of wage
differences. This confirms that the higher levels of employment and wages
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are time-persistent characteristics of IPR-active firms.
Taken as a whole, this developing literature indicates that stock market
analysts take note of trade mark activity and value firms more highly as a
result. This news about the firm appears to be more important in the ser-
vice sector, where investors often lack the information provided by R&D and
patent activity available in manufacturing. Where the studies make com-
parisons over time, we see conflicting evidence about the trends in rewards
between countries.
The findings from the productivity and profitability studies are consis-
tent with the results from the studies on market value. Both patent and trade
mark stocks are key contributors to profits, but the results of these investi-
gations also emphasise the risks of innovation for smaller firms, especially
the youngest ones that are likely to have less experience and resources, by
showing that there are losers as well as winners from attempts to innovate.
2.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to collect and summarise the existing body of
descriptive and inferential economic empirical analyses of trade mark data
and to identify what is needed from future research. Despite the widespread
perception that trade marks and trade mark data have received little attention
by economists, we find that this body of literature addresses a broad range
of questions using trade mark data at all levels of aggregation from different
countries.
In table 2.6.1 we summarise the findings of 46 empirical studies of trade
mark data, covering the UK (13 studies), Australia and the U.S. (8), France
(5), Germany (4), as well as Canada, Benelux countries, and Sweden. The
majority of these studies use firm-level data (29), followed by country-level
studies (7), and a few that look at specific trade marks or products (3). We
summarise the main findings at the end of each section. We want to use this
section to emphasise common weaknesses and to give some first ideas how
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to overcome them in future research.
First, some studies use trade mark applications and others use trade mark
registrations. Although the type of trade mark data required may vary with
the question, using different types limits the comparability of the results
across studies.
Second, only few studies concerned with countries within the EU, where
supra-national trade marks compete with national trade marks, take expli-
cit account of the differences between the effects of Community trade marks
(CTM) and national trade marks. Analysing only the use of CTMs leaves the
impact of national trade marks unaccounted for. This exclusion can lead to
biased results, as small and young firms using only national TMs are shown
to be significantly more productive and profitable than firms that use only
CTMs.
Third, different studies use different approaches to allocate trade marks
to industries: some use NICE classes, some match trade marks to their own-
ers at the firm level and use the firms’ standard industry classification (SIC),
and a recent approach is to create a NICE-SIC concordance through matching
trade mark descriptions to keywords for each industry. To this date, there is
no work comparing the effects of the different allocation mechanisms. Un-
dertaking such an exercise could guide the decision which approach to use
for what type of study.
Fourth, in assessing the suitability of trade marks as proxies for innova-
tion activity, researchers should clearly state what makes a “good” proxy for
innovation. In our opinion, a trade mark is a good proxy for innovation activ-
ity if trade mark using firms are innovation active and innovation active firms
are using trade marks. Hence, to test the suitability of trade marks as a proxy
for innovation activity, the data used must include all trade marks of firms,
related to innovation or not, and all firms, innovative or not.
Fifth, the results concerning the incentives to trade mark are at times weak
and speculative. The root causes for the different results of case studies, in-
terviews, surveys and cross-section studies are the lack of a common set of
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hypotheses and the corresponding empirical methodology. Some authors de-
rive their hypotheses from the management and marketing literature, some
from the law and economics literature and others from the international trade
literature. The empirical methods include ordinary least square, logit and
seemingly unrelated regressions, and often only measure an ad-hoc linear re-
lationship between IPRs and other firm variables. A successful investigation
should follow certain qualitative and quantitative guidelines. Qualitative re-
quirements include that the methodology is capable of disentangling supply-
and demand-side effects of IPRs on firm performance. Also, interview and
survey questions need to clearly ask for either effect, in a way that an IPR-
expert without training in economics understands it. With regard to quanti-
tative requirements, firm-level IPR-databases need to contain sufficient data,
in terms of subjects and duration, so that the conjectured effects can actually
occur.
Neither the list of papers reviewed in this survey nor the range of ques-
tions addressed thus far is exhaustive. Nevertheless, the work done using
trade mark data in a time-span of just over a decade has vastly contributed to
a better understanding of the use of intellectual property by firms, its impact
on firm behaviour and thus on the economy as a whole. It is most likely that
new insights will appear as more data from more countries become available.
Moreover, not all possibilities of the existing IPR data have yet been ex-
ploited, but a need for more specific product- and case-level data has become
apparent. This would help not only to better understand and underpin some
of the findings of the aggregate studies, but also to answer questions regard-
ing the misuse of IPRs and the success of the regional harmonization of the
law.
The review also makes apparent at least two gaps in the literature - there are
no studies investigating the impact of trade mark use on the firm entry rate,
and only few studies that investigate the impact of patent and trade mark
patterns on post-entry survival in Germany. The rest of this thesis addresses
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these two gaps, starting with an analysis of the relationship between IPR
activity and firm entry at the German industry-region level in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 2. Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing Economic
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Chapter 3
The Effect of IPRs and Different
Knowledge Types on Firm Entry
3.1 Introduction
An old controversy in economics is the nature of the effect of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) on competition and welfare. IPRs can be associated
with monopolistic elements (Chamberlin, 1933), because they can be used
to increase consumers’ willingness-to-pay by changing their perception of a
brand (Scherer, 1980). IPRs can also constitute barriers to entry due to cost ad-
vantages (Bain, 1956). In contrast, IPRs are also said to stimulate competition
in innovation (Chamberlin, 1933), reduce information asymmetries (Akerlof,
1970; Shapiro, 1982), lower search costs for consumers (Landes and Posner,
1987), and incentivise investment in goodwill (Economides, 1988). To date,
empirical studies on the effect of IPRs on competition are rare (for surveys,
see Griliches, 1990; Hall and Harhoff, 2012 and chapter 2).
IPRs incentivise firms to create specialised knowledge and they can ad-
vance the diffusion thereof. The generation and the diffusion of knowledge
stimulates new innovative ideas (Arrow, 1962; Winter, 1984), and new ideas
often lead to the foundation of new firms. As entry by new firms in the
long run is one of the essential requirements for markets to be competitive, it
provides the link between IPRs and competition that I analyse in this chapter.
To this end, I created the German Firm-Level Intellectual Property data-
base (GFLIP) of German firms between 2002 and 2012. Using ordinary least
squares (OLS) techniques and generalized method-of-moments (GMM) for
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static and dynamic linear panel models, I measure whether varying access
to specialised knowledge across industries affects competition, whether the
anti-competitive effects of patents and trade marks diminish or even out-
weigh the pro-competitive effects, and whether export-active industries offer
more opportunities for new firms to enter than less-export-active industries.
As a measure of competitiveness, I use the firm entry rate at the industry-
region level, and I interpret IPRs as proxies for innovation related activities
as they can be means to reduce the market failures stemming from the public
good properties of explicit knowledge and from the information asymmetries
due to tacit knowledge. Therefore, I use the shares of national-patent- and
national-trade-mark-active (NP- and NTM-active) firms at the industry level
as measure of the requirements of and access to specialised knowledge in an
industry, and the flows and stocks of NPs and NTMs at the industry-region
and industry level, respectively, to measure the effect of innovation related
activities on competition. Furthermore, I use the share, the stocks and the
flows of European patents and Community trade marks (EPs and CTMs) as
proxies for the extent of export-activity in an industry.
Gort and Klepper (1982) and Winter (1984) put forward the hypothesis
that the technological regime as defined in Nelson and Winter (1974) deter-
mines the ease of entry and innovation. Following Audretsch (1991), I in-
vestigate the effect of the technological regime on firm entry by separately
analysing innovation related activities by young firms.
I intend to contribute to the literature by providing evidence for the sig-
nificance of access to knowledge for firm entry as a guide for future research
that investigates whether limited access to the different types of knowledge
can lead to an under-provision of firm entry relative to the socially desir-
able level. If it turns out that limited access to some types of knowledge
suppresses a priori socially desirable firm entry, we should ask whether the
limitations can be justified a posteriori. This could be the case if profits with
free entry did not provide the necessary incentives to operate and invest in
these industries in the first place. The findings can then be used as input
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to evidence-based policies that address issues of accessibility to knowledge
such as the EU’s scientific information package adopted in June 2012 as part
of the Digital Agenda For Europe,16 or programmes of organisations such as
the Global Knowledge Initiative that “help partners access the global knowledge,
technology, and human resources needed to sustain growth and achieve prosperity
for all.”17
In section 2, I introduce the different types of knowledge and establish the
theoretical link between knowledge, innovation related activities and their
effect on competition. In section 3, I explain the regression strategies, and in
section 4 I describe the methods and sources used to create the GFLIP data-
base and discuss the variables used. I present descriptive statistics in section
5. Section 6 contains the results and a discussion thereof, and I conclude in
section 7.
3.2 Theory
Firm entry directly affects the degree of competition in the long run. Suc-
cessful entry intensifies competition either because the new firm replaces a
less efficient existing firm, or because it increases the number of competit-
ors. Unsuccessful entry still positively affects the degree of competition by
reminding the incumbents that there are firms waiting to enter in case they
become less competitive. Hence, firm entry seems to be a good indicator of
the degree of long-run competition.
The recipe for firm entry, successful or not, is complex. Winter (1984)
posits that the supply of potential entrants depends on the union of entre-
preneurial traits and a relevant innovative idea. According to Winter, the
occurrence of the latter is roughly proportional to the number of people ex-
posed to the knowledge that is required to have an innovative idea. To ad-
16This package consists of a Communication "Towards better access to scientific in-
formation: Boosting the benefits of public investments in research" and a Recom-
mendation to Member States “on access to and preservation of scientific informa-
tion (EC, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/open-access-scientific-information, last ac-
cessed 27/11/2014)”.
17http://globalknowledgeinitiative.org/, last accessed 27/11/2014
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dress the diffusion of knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish between the
different types of knowledge. Access to knowledge varies with type and af-
fects the diffusion of it. Knowledge diffusion in turn determines the supply
of potential entrants and thus firm entry (Winter, 1984).
On one end of the spectrum is knowledge that can only be transferred
by showing or teaching someone how something is done, e.g. producing a
particular wine or cheese. On the other end of the spectrum is knowledge
that can be transferred without any interaction, such as putting together an
Ikea table. Polanyi (1958) refers to these knowledge types as tacit and ex-
plicit knowledge, respectively. In addition to this distinction, Winter (1984)
separates specialised from generic knowledge. As knowledge becomes more
specific for individual tasks, the less transferable it is to other tasks. For in-
stance, the knowledge that is required to put together an Ikea table is more
specialised than that required to use a screwdriver, and the knowledge re-
quired to build a hybrid-car engine is more specialised than that required to
sell hybrid-cars. I combine both notions so that there are four types of know-
ledge - explicit and tacit generic knowledge, and explicit and tacit specialised
knowledge.
Most individuals are exposed to the knowledge that is relevant for op-
erating in an industry if an industry’s activities involve generic knowledge.
Fewer individuals are exposed to the relevant knowledge if an industry’s
activities do involve explicit or tacit specialised knowledge that is freely ac-
cessible. The least individuals are exposed to the relevant knowledge if an
industry’s activities do involve explicit or tacit specialised knowledge that is
not freely accessible.
In this chapter I use the proportion of firms that use national patents (NP)
or national trade marks (NTM) in an industry as indicators of the degree of
explicit and tacit specialised knowledge, respectively, that is required to oper-
ate in an industry. Patents seem suitable because their application is required
to contain explicit specialised knowledge about the invention they protect.
A larger share of NP-active firms in an industry then indicates the degree to
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which explicit specialised knowledge is required to operate in an industry. A
larger extent of explicit specialised knowledge required to operate in an in-
dustry reduces the exposure of individuals to knowledge that is relevant for
an innovative idea, and fewer innovative ideas lead to less firm-entry activity.
This implies the following testable hypothesis:
H1a: The share of NP-active firms in an industry is negatively correlated with
the firm entry rate into that industry.
Firms file not only NPs, but also European patents (EP). However, most firms
that file EPs also file NPs.18 NPs thus capture the effect of the degree of expli-
cit specialised knowledege required to operate in an industry. The share of
EP-active firms in an industry is then informative about the degree to which
firms in an industry are (or intend to be) export-active. Being able to export
increases the number and the size of potential markets for firms’ products,
and thus the number of opportunities for new firms to enter. Hence, the
share of EP-active firms in an industry indicates the level of opportunities for
firm entry due to the demand for national technologies from abroad, leading
to hypothesis H1b:
H1b The share of EP-active firms in an industry is positively correlated with
the firm entry rate into that industry.
Parallel to the use of NPs, the use of NTMs in an industry implies the pres-
ence of tacit specialised knowledge. The presence of tacit knowledge poten-
tially leads to information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Trade
marks can reduce information asymmetries because consumers remember
the attributes of products of firms they recognize, and consumers recognize
firms that can reliably signal their identity. Trade marks allow firms to re-
liably signal their identity, so firms can signal which products truly contain
the promised attributes. This is possible even if they do not reveal the true
attributes (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Shapiro, 1982). As the tacit (or hid-
den explicit) knowledge relevant in an industry becomes more specialised,
18See table A.2.5 in appendix.
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more firms will be trade mark active to signal the origin of their products
without disclosing their knowledge. The share of NTM-active firms in an in-
dustry thus indicates the degree to which tacit (or hidden explicit) specialised
knowledge is required to operate in that industry. Hypothesis H2a posits the
corresponding testable implication.
H2a: The share of NTM-active firms in an industry is negatively correlated
with the firm entry rate into that industry.
Just as most EP-active firms are also NP-active, most Community-trade-mark-
active (CTM-active) firms are also NTM-active. Thus, the share of NTM-
active firms captures the negative effects of tacit-knowledge requirements on
firm entry, so that the share of CTM-active firms in an industry is informative
with regard to the export activity of the firms in that industry. The argument
made above is still valid: the ability to export products opens up more and
potentially larger markets, which creates more opportunities for new firms to
enter. But the presence of tacit-specialised-knowledge requirements implies
the presence of information asymmetries. The ability to sucessfully signal
the true origin strongly depends on reputation, which takes time and signif-
icant investments to be established. For new firms it might be harder to set
foot in export-active industries that involve a high degree of tacit specialised
knowledge, which is stated in hypothesis H2b:
H2b: The share of CTM-active firms in an industry is negatively correlated
with the firm entry rate into that industry.
The role of patents and trade marks is not restricted to making available or
signalling knowledge, respectively. Recall that explicit knowledge has a pub-
lic good character, and that the appropriability of public goods is limited
(Arrow, 1962). The benefits from generating explicit knowledge can there-
fore often not be internalised by the inventor. However, generating explicit
knowledge is costly. If all the costs of the knowledge generation are borne
by the inventor, too little explicit knowledge will be generated. As expli-
cit knowledge is part of many innovations, an under-production of explicit
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knowledge will lead to an under-provision of innovation. Patents are a par-
tial remedy for the under-provision of innovation stemming from the public
good character of explicit knowledge.
Patent holders obtain the legal right to temporarily exclude anyone from
using or selling their inventions within the designated geographic area, so
they temporarily limit the public good character of newly generated expli-
cit knowledge. The benefits from inventing can be internalized during that
period, so patents can reward inventors for successful invention and thus
provide incentives to conduct research and development (R&D). Innovation
then follows discovery and invention.
Critics of the patent system argue that exclusive access to explicit know-
ledge might increase the price of using it for others. A higher price of using
knowledge inhibits competition and diffusion. But diffusion of knowledge
stimulates innovation, so critics conclude that patents could stifle competi-
tion and innovation (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010). Nevertheless, everyone
can use the information disclosed in a patent to invent around the protec-
ted matter or identify additional applications of it. Thus, patents can also
lower the price of access to specialised explicit knowledge, thereby fostering
competition and innovation. Proponents of the patent system argue that the
disclosure and the incentive functions of patents counterbalance the adverse
effects.
While there is little evidence for or against the posited importance of dis-
closure, theoretical considerations indicate that the social value from disclo-
sure is likely to be small (Hall and Harhoff, 2012). The two main tools to
protect a (patentable) invention are patents and secrecy, and inventors are
more likely to choose patents if the invention can be re-engineered from the
end-product. In that case, the patent does not reveal much that cannot be
inferred from the end-product. If, by contrast, the patent reveals much of
the invention, secrecy as method of protection will becomes more attractive
(Levin et al., 1987; Moser, 2005).
With regard to the innovation-incentive function of patents, Hall and Har-
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hoff (2012) conclude that patents are important and essential as innovation
incentive only to a small set of industries, mainly pharmaceuticals. Yet, firms
may have patents for strategic reasons, for instance to prevent competitors
from using a technology that could be a substitute for the actually used pat-
ented technology (Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel, 2003).
In industries where patents are necessary for strategic but not for incen-
tive reasons, it is likely that their negative effects on competition and inno-
vation dominate, while in industries where they provide essential incentives
to innovate, these positive effects outweigh the negative effects. As the posit-
ive effects only occur in a small set of industries, the overall effect of patents
on competition is likely to be negative. The average patent intensity, that is,
the average number of patents per firm in an industry, indicates to what ex-
tent patents are deemed necessary either to protect inventions or for strategic
reasons. Together with the preceding discussion, this motivates the following
hypothesis:
H3a: More NPs per firm are negatively correlated with the firm entry rate.
Again, NPs capture the negative effects on firm entry. EPs per firm, by con-
trast, again signal the degree to which foreign markets are addressed. Hence,
EPs are a simple proxy for the potential market size and thus for opportun-
ities for new firm entry. Moreover, even if the disclosure effect of patents
is small, its cumulative effect across markets might be significantly larger,
because market size stimulates the diffusion of innovation (Griliches, 1957;
Moser, 2005). Hypothesis H3b states:
H3b More EPs per firm are positively correlated with the firm entry rate.
Trade marks can reduce information asymmetry and search costs stemming
from the presence of tacit knowledge. Owners and licensees of trade marks
have the right to prohibit others to sell the same or similar products using
the protected mark. This ensures that trade marks signal the true origin of a
product.
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Recall that consumption decisions are based on tastes for explicit (search)
and tacit (experience, credence) product attributes. Consumers can inform
themselves at low costs about explicit product attributes (Nelson, 1970; Darby
and Karni, 1973), so they can easily distinguish between different products
and lookalikes with only explicit attributes. The search or information costs
to find out about tacit attributes can be much higher. Consider production
methods and technologies that cannot or shall not be codified explicitly, e.g.
Bavarian beer-brewing traditions or the Coca-Cola recipe. Competitors of a
firm that uses the technology most valued by consumers could simply claim
that they are using the same technology, even if that were not the case. It
would be very tedious and perhaps even impossible for consumers to find
out about the true product attributes. To prevent such a situation where in-
formation is asymmetrically distributed between producers and consumers,
firms use trade marks to differentiate their products from competing products
(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Shapiro, 1982).
With a few exceptions, the nature of the effect of trade marks on competi-
tion and innovation is less controversial than that of patents. Adverse effects
of trade marks on competition can result from the strategic use of trade marks
to weaken competitors or from trade marks’ function to facilitate product dif-
ferentiation.
Strategic uses predicated on observation are firms’ attempts to raise rivals’
costs by opposing competitors’ trade mark applications or by delaying op-
position proceedings beyond necessity (Collette, 2012). Other observed at-
tempts to reduce competition include the proliferation of brands to foreclose
competitors (Schmalensee, 1978; Scherer, 1982; Economides, 1988). While
consumers can benefit from product differentiation, it can lead to market
power in the short run by creating monopolistic niche markets (Chamberlin,
1933; Economides, 1988) and in the long run by hampering new firm entry
(Bain, 1956).
Trade marks, however, can stimulate competition in industries that re-
quire tacit or hidden explicit specialised knowledge by providing incentives
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to generate knowledge. Trade marks also enable firms to build a reputation
or to otherwise differentiate their products, both of which can lower compet-
itive pressure. Reduced competition allows firms to charge a higher price,
which in the long run attracts new firms to enter so they can also benefit from
the higher profits. This motivates hypothesis H4:
H4 In industries that require tacit knowledge, and where trade marks are
a suitable tool to reduce information asymmetries between buyers and
sellers, more trade marks per firm are positively correlated with the firm
entry rate.
In the next section, I discuss the methods used to test hypotheses H1-H4.
3.3 Empirical methodology
I estimate two types of firm entry models - a static linear model and a dy-
namic linear model. In the static linear model I assume that each period, the
firm entry decision is made independently of previous firm entry and only
depends on the independent variables observed in the previous period in
addition to a contemporaneous idiosyncratic shock. In the dynamic linear
model, I explicitly allow for inter-temporal dynamics so that the firm entry
decision in period t can also depends on the firm entry decision in t-1. The
unit of analysis is the two-digit level industry at the two-digit postal code
level.
A static linear model
Within their region, potential entrants observe the industry of interest in
period t and make their decision whether to enter in t + 1 or not. Actual
entry occurs in t + 1. I assume the number of new firms in an industry i
in a particular region r per period t, nir,t, to be a linear function of the size
of an industry in a region (in terms of number of firms) in addition to a set
of observable variables at the industry level and the regional-industry level,
denoted by the vectors Ki,t−1 and Xir,t−1, respectively. Some fixed region
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and industry-specific variables are observed by the firms but not by the re-
searcher, CIi , C
R
r , and a contemporaneous idiosyncratic shock is observed by
neither the firms nor the researcher, Uir,t:
nir,t = αNir,t + βKi,t−1 + γXir,t−1 + C
I
i + C
R
r + Uir,t (3.1)
Dividing (3.1) by the number of active firms in each industry yields the
firm entry rate and the following static estimation regression
rir,t = α+ βki,t−1 + γxir,t−1 + νir,t (3.2)
where rirt = nirtN , νir,t = c
I
i + c
R
r + uir,t, and lower-case letters represent
their upper-case counterpart divided by the total number of active firms in
the industry-region in t, Nir,t. The (K × 1) vector ki,t−1 contains K lagged
proxies for specialised knowledge at the industry level, the (L× 1) vector
xir,t−1 contains L lagged variables of patent and trade mark applications and
other control variables for each industry-region unit. The (1×K) and (1× L)
parameters β and γ, respectively, are the parameters of interest. cIi and c
R
r are
industry and region dummies, capturing the unobserved fixed effects across
industries and across regions.
Next, I assume
E[uir,t] = E[c
I
i uir,t] = E[c
R
r uir,t] = 0 (3.3)
E[uir,suir,t] = 0, for s 6= t (3.4)
E[rir,suir,t] = 0, for s < t (3.5)
E[ki,suir,t] = E[xir,suir,t] = 0, for s < t (3.6)
Equation (3.3) implies mean-zero idiosyncratic shocks and zero correla-
71
Chapter 3. The Effect of IPRs and Different Knowledge Types on Firm Entry
tion with unobserved fixed industry and region effects, (3.4) rules out serial
correlation of the idiosyncratic shocks, and (3.5) rules out feedback from cur-
rent or past realisations of the firm entry rate to future shocks. Moreover,
past realisations of the independent variables do not feed into future shocks
(expression (3.6)). Given these assumptions, I estimate equation (3.2) using
ordinary least squares methods.
A potential issue arises if there are unobserved fixed effects that are spe-
cific to an industry but vary across regions, or fixed effects that are specific to
a region but vary across industries. Then the industry and region dummies
alone do not capture them and the estimated parameters will be biased and
inconsistent. The traditional approaches to resolve this in panel data sets are
to use a fixed-effects estimator or equivalently, allowing for a unit-specific
constant by including a dummy per industry-region observation (dummy
variable estimator). An alternative transformation is to take first-differences
of all variables, as this would also eliminate the fixed terms. This comes at
a cost, however. De-meaning or first-differencing removes not only unob-
served fixed effects, but also observed fixed effects. If the knowledge require-
ments in industries change only very little over time, the fixed-effects or the
first-differences estimators might no longer identify the parameters on the
knowledge variables.
I therefore explicitly account for fixed industry-region effects and for pos-
sible feedback effects from past decisions to current decisions by including a
lagged dependent variable to model firm entry as a dynamic process.
A dynamic linear model
The dynamic linear equation based on (3.1) reads
rdir,t = α0 + α1r
d
ir,t−1 + βki,t−1 + γxir,t−1 + c
IR
ir + νir,t (3.7)
and I impose the following assumptions
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E[rdir,t−1νir,t] 6= 0 (3.8)
E[xir,tc
IR
ir ] = σir 6= 0, for all t (3.9)
in addition to (3.3) to (3.6).
Note that E[rdir,t−1νir,t] 6= 0 by definition as rdir,t−1 contains cIRir + νir,t−1 =
cIRir +c
I
i +c
R
r +uir,t−1, and I am explicitly allowing for the industry-region vari-
ables to be correlated to the unobserved, fixed industry-region fixed effects,
but assume that this correlation is constant over time (expression (3.9)). Nick-
ell (1981) shows formally that in this case the OLS and the fixed-effects estim-
ators are likely to be biased (upwards and downwards, respectively), and
that the fixed-effects estimator would in addition be inconsistent, because
the number of periods available is not large. First-difference OLS is also not
consistent under these assumptions, because the first difference of the lagged
dependent variable is negatively correlated with the first difference of the
contemporaneous shock, i.e., E
[(
rdir,t−1 − rdir,t−2
)
(uir,t − uir,t−1)
]
< 0 .
Under additional assumptions, general method-of-moments (GMM) can
overcome these obstacles. The general method-of-moments formulates a set
of orthogonality restrictions (moment conditions) related to the econometric
model. These conditions are then used to find parameter estimates that come
as close as possible to achieving these orthogonality properties in the sample.
The formulation of the moment conditions has to account for the endoge-
nous variables on the right hand side. As the share of IPR-active firms and
the IPR-stocks in an industry are not likely to be endogenous with respect
to the idiosyncratic shocks, I only need to find valid and informative instru-
ments for the lagged dependent variable and the patent and trade mark flow
variables. With the additional assumptions that
E
[
(xir,t − xir,t−1) cIRir
]
= 0 (3.10)
73
Chapter 3. The Effect of IPRs and Different Knowledge Types on Firm Entry
and
E
[
(rir,2 − rir,1) cIRir
]
= 0 (3.11)
the problems stemming from (3.8) and (3.9) can be overcome. Assumption
(3.10) follows from (3.9) and implies that first-differencing the explanatory
industry-region variables eliminates the component that is potentially cor-
related to the unobserved industry-region fixed-effect. This approach goes
back to Hausman and Taylor (1981) and is further elaborated in Arellano
and Bover (1995). Assumption (3.11) is a restriction on the initial values of
the time series - if the same process has generated the firm entry rates long
enough, it is probable that the first difference of the dependent variable is in-
dependent of the fixed industry-region effect. Equations (3.10) and (3.11) can
thus be used to formulate a set of linear moment conditions, and the lags of
the first-differences can be used as instruments. Based on these additional as-
sumptions, I use lagged first-differences of the explanatory industry-region
variables as instruments for their current first-differenced values, and lags
of the lagged first difference of the dependent variable as instrument for its
current values on the right hand side of (3.7). I use the robust two step estim-
ation method yielding Windmeijer’s corrected finite sample standard errors
(Windmeijer, 2005).
3.4 Data and variables
The German Firm-Level Intellectual Property database (GFLIP) is an integ-
rated database consisting of two components from four sources: a firm-level
data set and IPR data.19 The source of the firm-level data is the commercial
database AMADEUS provided by Bureau van Dijk. This database contains
structural and financial information on firms from 24 European countries. I
extracted data covering the population of limited corporate enterprises (AG,
19In creating the database for this thesis, I could rely on the cooperation with Heike Mit-
telmeier at the LMU-ifo EBDC, Gabriele Niggebaum at the DPMA, Georg von Graenenitz,
Michał Kazimierczak at OHIM, and Peter Evans at the UK IPO.
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GmbH, KGaA) in Germany for the years 2002-12. Unlimited companies as
well as banks and insurances are not included.
The exclusion of unlimited companies must be considered when inter-
preting the findings. Establishing a limited company (GmbH) requires a min-
imum of €25,000 as liable capital (§5 (1) GmbHG), and establishing a public
limited company (AG) requires a minimum of €50,000 as share capital (§7
AktG). Limiting ownership liability comes at the cost of increased tax liability
and potentially higher costs due to the additional legal requirements for op-
eration and transaction costs (Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode, 1998). In 2010,
limited companies accounted for approximately 19 percent of all companies
in Germany, and about 55 percent of all employees were employed by lim-
ited companies (Rink, Seiwert, and Opfermann, 2013). Limited companies
also account for 14 percent of all new companies and for 44 percent of em-
ployment created by new companies. While focussing on limited companies
does not give a full picture of the economy, it is yet informative of a very
important part of it in terms of employment and economic activity.
In AMADEUS, the term “firm” represents a registered legal entity which
organises operations. Census-type data, by contrast, often is collected at
the level of the plant or production unit. In Germany, the firm-level data
is retrieved from the private credit rating agency CREDITREFORM and
CREDITREFORM RATING AG. To construct the latest version of the data-
base, I used thirteen versions of AMADEUS: October 2002 through 2013 and
AMADEUS April 2014.
There are two main reasons for using multiple annual versions. First,
AMADEUS versions before 2006 keep details of ’inactive’ firms only for two
years, and later versions for a period of four years. The term ’inactive firms’
includes firms that are bankrupt, in liquidation or dissolved. Note, however,
that bankruptcy and liquidation does not necessarily imply that these firms
are economically inactive. Amadeus is available prior to 2000, but I use data
starting in 2002 because some of the relevant variables are not available for
years before 2002, and coverage is significantly restricted. As there are report-
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ing delays of up to a year by firms, using the AMADEUS April 2014 version
means that the latest year for which I can use firm-level data reliably is 2012.
I match the financial data to patents and trade marks using a string match
algorithm outlined in Helmers, Rogers, and Schautschick (2011). The Ger-
man Patent and Trade Mark Office (DPMA) provided raw national trade
mark (NTM) data, and the Office for Harmonisation for the Internal Market
(OHIM) made available raw Community trade mark (CTM) data. I down-
loaded raw information on patent publications by German entities from the
international patent database maintained by the European Patent Office, PAT-
STAT, version April 2014. Between the filing and the publication of a patent
is a delay of at least 18 months, which implies that firms become aware of pat-
ents filed by (potential) competitors long after the filing date. In this thesis
I am concerned with firm entry and exit, which are arguably related to pat-
ents filed by potential competitors. The relevant date for a patent to show
up in the regression is therefore its publication date. As I am using lags of
IPR flows and stocks, using the April 2014 version of PATSTAT allows me
to include the year 2012 in my firm entry analysis in this chapter and in the
survival and performance analyses in the next chapter.
I deflated all monetary values with base year 2010 using two–digit in-
dustry deflators obtained from the OECD STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DATA-
BASE (STAN).
Firms are allocated to industries according to the two-digit level Statisti-
cal Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community from
2007 (NACE Rev. 2).20 Because industrial activity varies a lot across regions,
I am not aggregating at the industry level, but at the regional level within
an industry. I use the first two digits of firms’ postal codes to allocate firms
to regions. The advantage of the postal codification is that it covers the en-
tire country. Its borders are usually real borders such as rivers, roads or the
20The NACE classification is used by Eurostat, and it classifies economic
activity into 21 sections, which comprise 88 divisions (the “two-digit level”),
272 groups (“three-digit level”), and 615 classes (“four-digit level”). See
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nace_rev2/introduction, last ac-
cessed 27/11/2014
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outskirts of a city, and the regions are often similar in population and eco-
nomic activity. There are 95 regions and 87 economic divisions without the
insurance industry, leading to a maximum of 8,265 observations per year and
90,915 for the whole period. However, not all industries are active in all re-
gions in all years,21 so that the total number of observations in the original
database is 83,155. Next, there are 13,290 industry-region observations for
which values of either turnover, employment or total asset are missing. The
average number of firms is much smaller in the regions with missing obser-
vations than in those where observations on turnover, employment, and total
assets are available, so the results might not be applicable to regions in which
a particular industry is not well represented. Omitting observations with
missing values leaves 69,865 observations for 7,352 industry-region units of
analysis.
3.4.1 Construction of variables
Dependent variable
The dependent variable of interest is the gross entry rate of new firms at the
industry-region level. While there exist databases tracking mergers and ac-
quisitions, the current data set only contains the incorporation date of legal
entities. Therefore, I do not observe firm entry by brand extension, acquisi-
tion, or merger that does not result in a new legal entity. While these cases
often involve large and well–known firms, the total number of this type of
21Industries that are not active in all regions: Forestry and logging; Fishing and aquacul-
ture; Mining of coal and lignite; Extraction of crude petroleum; Mining of metal ores; Other
mining and quarrying; Mining support service activities; Manufacture of beverages; Manufac-
ture of tobacco products; Manufacture of wearing apparel; Manufacture of leather and related
products; Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum; Manufacture of basic pharmaceuticals;
Manufacture of basic metals; Water collection, treatment and supply, Sewerage; Remediation
activities; Retail trade w/o motor vehicles; Water transport; Air transport; Programming and
broadcasting activities; Telecommunications; Information service activities; Advertising and
market research; Veterinary activities; Human health activities; Creative, arts and entertain-
ment activities; Libraries, archives, museums and other; Activities of professional and other
membership organisations; Activities of households as employers; Undifferentiated products;
Activities of extraterritorial organisations
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entry is negligible relative to the number of observable entry at the two–digit
industry level (Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer, 2008; Helmers and Ro-
gers, 2010). Thus, I define gross entry as the number of legal entities that are
new in industry i in region r in time t. The gross entry rate is then the ratio
of new firms to the total number of active firms in period t and is denoted as
rirt =
entryirt
Nirt
× 100.
Proxy variables
Patent families (equivalents): I first identify the priority applications of
patents that German applicants or entities filed in Germany and then allo-
cate to the owners of these priority applications all patents related to these
priorities. The set of patents related to the same priority patent(s) is known
as patent equivalents, which is a more restrictive definition of patent families
(OECD, 2009, p.72). Patent families account not only for patents filed in the
domestic country or at the EPO, but also for patents filed in other jurisdic-
tions. Using patent equivalents yields a better representation of the value of
an invention than individual patent counts. The equivalent patents are al-
located to firms in the publication year of the priority application, which is
usually 18 months after the priority application was filed.
Next, I assume patent stocks depreciate at a rate of 15 percent per year to
reflect the decreasing value of the protected knowledge over time, which is
in line with the literature using stocks of patents as proxy for knowledge (see
for instance Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005).
PATSTAT also makes available legal events related to a patent, from which
I derive patent lifetime data. If a patent is withdrawn, cancelled, suspended
or not renewed, its depreciated value is deducted from the firm’s stock of
patents in the year of the event.
Neither the extent to which industry entry and activity requires explicit
knowledge, nor the the stock of knowledge available in an industry varies
across regions. By contrast, the extent to which firms are R&D or innovation
active may vary across regions. On the one hand, firms located in an R&D
79
Chapter 3. The Effect of IPRs and Different Knowledge Types on Firm Entry
and innovation active region benefit more from knowledge spillovers, but on
the other hand, employees with more exposure to knowledge might be more
likely to leave to competitors or to establish their own business. The effect of
a firm’s proximity to R&D and innovation active regions is therefore ambigu-
ous (Silva and McComb, 2012) and varies across regions. I thus calculate the
flow of patents per firm at the industry-region level. To capture the stock of
knowledge available in an industry, I calculate patent stocks at the industry
level. Moreover, I use the proportions of patent-active firms at the industry
level as proxies for the prevalence of specialised knowledge.
Trade marks: A novelty of this database is that NTM data in addition to
CTM data are available for Germany. I follow the reasoning above and cal-
culate trade mark stocks and activity variables at the industry level, and
trade mark flows at the industry-region level. Renewal data is available for
both types of trade marks, so I consider only new or renewed trade marks
in the analyses. The value of trade marks can increase or depreciate over
time, depending on the owner’s investment and the success of trade marked
products. Therefore, I do not depreciate firms’ trade mark stocks.
Control variables
Firm size and age: To account for “conventional [...] measures of entry barri-
ers” (Geroski, 1995, , p.430), I compute average firm age in addition to average
firm size in terms of total assets, turnover, and employment and capital in-
tensity as the ratio of assets to labour. I compute these variables within each
industry-region to account for geographical differences in industry structure.
For instance, renting or buying space is more expensive in and around cities
than it is in the countryside. It is therefore likely that the concentration of
large firms (in terms of assets) is higher in remote areas than in cities, and
that more small firms set shop in or near big cities.
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Legal form: Without having data for unlimited firms, the firms in the data-
set at hand fall into two categories (following Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode
(1998)). The first category, Limited liability, contains private limited liability
firms (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH) and limited commer-
cial partnerships joint with a limited liability firm (GmbH & Co. KG). The
second category, Stock companies, contains public limited companies and part-
nerships limited by shares (Aktiengesellschaft und Kommanditgesellschaft
auf Aktien).
Ownership: A firm is marked a subsidiary if more than 50 percent of it is
owned by another firm. A firm is marked a group if it holds more than 50
percent of any other firm. A group can also be a subsidiary. A firm is marked
foreign owned more than 50 percent of it are owned by a foreign firm.
Diversification: A dummy variable indicates whether a firm operates in in-
dustries other than its primary industry of economic activity. A higher share
of diversified firms in an industry could indicate a higher degree of competi-
tiveness or uncertainty, because focussing on one economic activity might be
too risky or volatile, respectively.
Economy: Global effects such as the dot.com bubble and the financial crisis
affect more than one industry. The effect of such crises on the general eco-
nomic environment is captured by the inclusion of time dummies and the
rate of real GDP growth.
3.5 Descriptive statistics
3.5.1 Sample composition
The top panel of table 3.5.1 contains the distribution of firms over size (left
panel) and age (right panel) within a sector and the last column contains the
distribution of firms across sectors. Service firms account for 48 percent of
all firms, followed by trade firms (22 percent) and manufacturing firms (11
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percent). Construction firms make up almost 10 percent, ICT firms 6 percent,
agricultural firms 2 percent and electricity, gas, water (EGW), R&D and min-
ing the rest. Size is measured in terms of turnover, total assets and employees,
following the Eurostat definition. The majority of firms (87 percent) are micro
firms, accounting for particularly large shares in the service, trade, EGW and
ICT sectors. Small firms are most common in the agricultural, manufactur-
ing and construction sectors (14, 14 and 12 percent). Medium and large firms
have the largest shares in the manufacturing sector (6 and 2 percent), and
the lowest share in the service sector (one percent each). It thus seems that
there are sector-specific characteristics that affect the optimal size of a firm.
In contrast, the distribution of firm age varies less across sectors. In manufac-
turing, trade, construction and mining sectors, more than 60 percent of firms
are more than ten years old, half of which are 25 years and older. Roughly
a quarter of all firms are five to ten years old, and 20-30 percent of firms are
less than five years old. The second panel presents firms’ IPR activity in each
sector.
3.5.2 IPR activity
Service and trade firms are least likely to use IPRs of some sort (table 3.5.1,
second panel). Only 14 percent of service firms are trade mark active, and
4 percent are patent active. 24 percent of trade firms are trade mark active,
and 8 percent applied for at least one patent. A quarter of firms in manu-
facturing owns only trade marks, 4 percent only use patents and 10 percent
use both. Over 50 percent of R&D and mining firms use trade marks, and
about a quarter applied for at least one patent. Overall, firms are more likely
to use patents in addition to trade marks rather than only patents. The share
of firms using only patents ranges from 1 to 6 percent (service and mining,
respectively), and the share of firms using both, patents and trade marks,
ranges from 3 to 22 percent (also service and mining).
Looking at firms’ IPR-activity in the two years following establishment,
we can see that the overall IPR-activity pattern across and within sector does
82
3.5. Descriptive statistics
Size Age Share
Sector Micro Small Medium Large 0-1 2-4 5-10 11-24 25+ %
Agriculture 87 14 2 0 14 18 22 36 11 1.82
Manufacturing 78 14 6 2 7 9 17 34 34 10.95
Service 94 4 1 1 13 18 27 27 15 48.56
Trade 90 8 2 0 9 12 20 32 29 21.41
Construction 86 12 2 0 7 11 21 33 27 9.52
EGW 90 6 3 1 19 22 28 23 8 1.60
ICT 91 7 2 0 15 20 28 28 9 5.52
RD 89 8 3 1 14 21 33 26 5 0.44
Mining 78 18 5 1 6 8 16 29 43 0.18
Weighted average 90.19 7.16 1.99 0.72 11.11 15.21 23.8 29.6 20.77
IPR activity all firms IPR activity young firms
Sector No IPRs Patents only TMs only Both No IPRsPatents onlyTMs only Both
Agriculture 51.1 4.4 33.3 11.2 88.6 1.4 9.5 0.5
Manufacturing 60.0 4.1 25.7 10.3 72.5 5.7 16.6 5.2
Service 84.4 1.3 11.3 2.9 92.6 1.0 5.5 0.9
Trade 73.4 2.3 18.6 5.7 92.1 1.5 5.1 1.2
Construction 60.6 3.5 26.6 9.2 92.8 1.5 4.6 1.1
EGW 51.5 3.6 34.2 10.8 92.2 1.2 5.7 0.9
ICT 55.7 3.6 30.8 9.9 85.9 1.7 10.7 1.7
RD 36.3 6.2 36.5 21.0 61.1 12.3 16.6 10.0
Mining 32.7 6.4 39.3 21.6 93.8 1.1 3.9 1.1
Weighted average 73.98 2.29 17.97 5.71 89.70 1.77 6.97 1.53
IPR use all IPR users IPR use young IPR users
Sector National TM OHIM TM National PatentsEP Patents
Agriculture 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Manufacturing 2.0 1.5 5.7 6.2 0.9 0.8 2.0 2.2
Service 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5
Trade 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
Construction 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
EGW 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
ICT 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2
RD 1.2 1.1 6.6 8.8 0.6 0.8 3.0 3.9
Mining 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Weighted average 1.03 0.69 1.44 1.85 0.56 0.41 0.59 0.61
Number of industry-region observations 69,865
Source: Own calculations based on BvD Amadeus, DPMA, OHIM and PATSTAT data
Table 3.5.1: Distribution of firm characteristics across sectors
Top panel: Statistics for German firms, 2002-2012. Left panel: Average shares of firms in
respective size category. Right panel: Average shares of firms in respective age category. The
rows in each panel add up to 100 percent. The last column shows the shares of each sector in
the economy in terms of numbers of firms.
Middle panel: Left panel: Average shares of all firms in respective IPR-activity category.
Right panel: Average shares of firms that were less than two years old on entering the
respective IPR-activity category. Rows in each panel add up to 100 percent.
Bottom panel: Left panel: Average number of patent applications or trade mark registrations
by IPR-activity types. Right panel: Average number of patent applications or trade mark
registrations by young IPR-active firms.
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not emerge early on. Young manufacturing and R&D firms are most likely to
use some form of IPRs (27 percent and 39 percent, respectively), compared to
roughly 10 percent of firms in the other sectors. Most of the IPR-active firms
use only trade marks, specifically, 17 percent of the manufacturing and R&D
firms and 4-11 percent of the firms in the other sectors. R&D and manufac-
turing firms are most likely to use only patents (12 and 6 percent) or patents
in addition to trade marks (10 and 5 percent).
IPR intensity, which is defined as the number of IPRs per firm, can be
described by three categories: manufacturing and R&D firms are most IPR
intensive, with 2 and 1 NTMs, on average, 1.5 and 1 CTMs, 6 and 7 national
patents, and 6 and 9 European patents, respectively (table 3.5.1, third panel).
The average IPR-active service or trade firm owns one national and 0.6 CTMs
in addition to 1 national and 2 European patents. IPR-intensity is lowest for
agriculture, construction, EGW, ICT and mining industries. Firms file about
half of their national IPRs in the first two years of their existence, and slightly
more than half of their regional IPRs.
Thus, the extensity and the intensity of IPR activity differs across sectors
but not so much between old and young firms. More old firms are IPR ac-
tive, and IPR-active firms file half of their IPRs in their first two years after
establishment.
3.5.3 Firm entry
The sector-specific difference are also reflected in the average annual entry
rates. Figure 3.5.1 shows average entry rates for all sectors over the period
2002 and 2012. There appear to be three types of sectors in terms of entry -
high, medium and low entry rate sectors. Entry rates are lowest in the min-
ing sector, medium in construction, manufacturing and trade sectors, and
highest in service, ICT, EGW, R&D and agriculture sectors. With the excep-
tion of EGW industries, firm entry rates follow a similar pattern across sec-
tors - following the dot.com crisis, the entry rates slowly decline between
2003 and 2008, after which they peak in 2010 at levels above the 2003 levels
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Figure 3.5.1: Average gross entry rates across sectors
Gross entry is calculated as the proportion of new firms in a given industry and region.
Industries and regions are weighted by their relative size (in terms of number of firms)
within a sector.
and then sharply decline as a consequence of the Euro crisis. The EGW sec-
tor marks an exception for two reasons: first, entry rates are higher than in
other sectors because the number of firms was relative small at the turn of
the millennium. Second, in 2000, the German government passed the Ger-
man Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), with amendments in 2004, 2009
and 2012 that significantly affected firm entry into these industries (Rink, Sei-
wert, and Opfermann, 2013, footnote 22). I therefore exclude this sector from
the regression analyses. Moreover, firm entry activity is almost static in the
mining sector, so that after the fixed-effect or the first-difference transforma-
tions hardly any observations are left. Hence, I also exclude the mining sector
from the firm entry regressions.
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3.6 Results
In this section, I first discuss the different estimations and then summarise
them jointly. I start with OLS and GMM regression results across all sectors,
before I break up the sample by sectors.
3.6.1 Cross-sector regressions
Columns 1 and 2 in table 3.6.1 contain the results of estimating the static and
the dynamic model, respectively, using the OLS fixed-effect method. In the
static model, capital intensity and firm age, which are often associated with
lower entry rates, are significantly negatively correlated with the firm entry
rate. Economic growth, the share of firms with subsidiaries, and the squared
firm age are positively correlated with the firm entry rate. In column 2, I
include the previous gross entry rate, assuming that previous entry also ef-
fects current entry. Indeed, the coefficient is significantly negative. Note that
the inclusion of the lagged gross entry rate hardly affects any of the coeffi-
cients or the significance of the other explanatory variables. This suggests
that the fixed effect transformation of the data successfully removed unob-
served fixed effects that were potentially correlated to the explanatory vari-
ables. The tests for joint validity of the three sets of IPR variables, i.e., the
activity rate, the stocks and the flows, all suggest that the variables in each
set are jointly significant at the 1 percent significance level. The tests for joint
validity of turnover and capital intensity, as well as for other controls (share
of holdings in the industry-region and the real growth rate) also indicate joint
significance of these variables at the 1 percent level. Even so, these models ex-
plain only a fraction of the variation over time. Columns 3 to 5 present results
of the difference GMM regressions. Here, the variables are in first-differences
rather than in levels.
In column 3, I estimate the static model using GMM methods.22 Under
22The industry-level variables, the year dummies and the control variables act as instru-
ments for themselves, yielding 12 instrument variables. In addition, I am using further lagged
differences of the flows of IPRs and the gross entry rate as instruments for the first lag of the
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OLS - fixed effects Difference GMM
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Young IPR activity
Dep. var.: Log of gross entry rate
Lag-logarithmic gross entry rate −0.0177∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗
(0.00715) (0.140) (0.136)
Industry-region level effects
Lag-log of turnover 0.00720 0.00721 −0.222 −0.188 −0.162
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.217) (0.192) (0.194)
Lag-log of capital intensity −0.0330∗∗∗ −0.0332∗∗∗ −1.123∗ −1.062∗∗ −0.969∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.576) (0.470) (0.466)
Lag-log of national TM apps per firm −0.0247 −0.0249 −0.158 −0.0154 0.127
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.377) (0.361) (0.366)
Lag-log of CTM apps per firm −0.0106 −0.0107 −0.463 −0.566∗ −0.483
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.328) (0.292) (0.308)
Lag-log of national patent apps per firm 0.00286 0.00288 0.194 0.0412 −0.208
(0.0157) (0.0158) (0.205) (0.225) (0.200)
Lag-log of EP apps per firm −0.0147 −0.0151 −0.456∗∗ −0.293 −0.161
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.204) (0.204) (0.187)
Industry effects:
Lag-log of national TM stock per firm −0.146 −0.146 −0.467∗ −0.372 −0.258
(0.119) (0.120) (0.265) (0.237) (0.164)
Lag-log of CTM stock per firm 0.384∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.0626) (0.0633) (0.187) (0.171) (0.104)
Lag-log of national patent stock per firm −0.202∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.0271 0.00957 −0.0966
(0.0396) (0.0398) (0.0952) (0.0837) (0.0635)
Lag-log of EP stock per firm 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.0617 0.0217
(0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0481) (0.0488) (0.0468)
Lagged national TM-activity rate −0.0162∗ −0.0156∗ −0.0308 −0.00445 0.00343
(0.00832) (0.00837) (0.0212) (0.0190) (0.00899)
Lagged CTM-activity rate 0.00631 0.00553 −0.0454 −0.0741∗∗ −0.0614∗∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0442) (0.0362) (0.0162)
Lagged national patent-activity rate −0.100∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.0807∗∗ −0.0700∗∗ −0.0121∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0362) (0.0310) (0.00488)
Lagged EP-activity rate 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.0332∗
(0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0552) (0.0485) (0.0175)
Control variables
Lag-log of age −0.334∗ −0.365∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 1.176 0.975
(0.202) (0.205) (0.749) (0.748) (0.720)
(Lag-log of age)2 0.158∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.183 0.157∗ 0.169∗∗
(0.0385) (0.0389) (0.138) (0.0861) (0.0792)
Holding rate 0.843∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 2.447∗∗∗ 1.552∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.206) (0.558) (0.563) (0.554)
Real growth rate 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.00566) (0.00569) (0.0555) (0.0521) (0.0435)
Constant 1.976∗∗∗ 2.094∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.332)
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
TM use F-stat 9.71 9.74
PAT use F-stat 7.11 7.09
Industry IPR activity 9.96 9.85
Size F-stat 5.28 5.28
Controls F-Stat 25.1 24.2
Year F-stat 35.9 35.5
R2 .0252 .0255
Sargan J p-value .0788 .149 .0665
Hansen robust p .277 .357 .343
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p 2.49e−31 .0452 .0704
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p .393 .0061 .00249
Arellano-Bond AR(3) p .124 .344
χ2 1, 094 1, 839 2, 085
Number of instruments 72 81 81
Obs 53, 127 53, 127 45, 744 45, 744 45, 744
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.6.1: Firm entry all sectors, OLS and GMM
Summary of results from estimating equations (3.2) and (3.7). Standard errors in the OLS
models are robust and clustered at the industry-region level. Standard errors in the GMM
models are Windmeijer’s robust finite sample errors (Windmeijer, 2005).
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strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables and no unobserved fixed ef-
fects, the coefficients should not change from one method to the other. The
results suggest the presence of unobserved effects or endogeneity of some of
the explanatory variables. The coefficient for capital intensity increases more
than 30 fold. The magnitude of the coefficients for the average age, the share
of firms with subsidiaries and the real growth rate also increase manifold.
The panel bias stemming from unobserved fixed effects and endogeneity of
some of the explanatory variables tends to lower the value of the fixed-effect
estimators (Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2009). Seemingly consistent
and unbiased coefficients with values smaller than the fixed-effects coeffi-
cients should thus be viewed with suspicion.
Neither the Sargan-J tests (1956) nor the robust Hansen tests of over-
identifying restrictions reject the validity of the additional moment condi-
tions used for these two models. The Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests
indicate that the first-differenced shocks are serially correlated at order 1
without the inclusion of the lagged entry rate, and at order 2 with the inclu-
sion of the lagged entry rate. I use the third and fourth lag of IPR flows and
the fifth and sixth lag of the firm entry rate as instruments, so no endogeneity
should occur from these variables.
3.6.2 Young firm IPR activity
Column 5 presents results from estimating the same model as in column 4,
but only accounts for IPR-activity in the first two years after a firm was estab-
lished. The Sargan-J test accepts the validity of the over-identifying restric-
tions at the 5 percent significant level, but rejects the validity at the 10 percent
significant level. The robust Hansen test statistic confirms the validity of the
over-identifying restrictions.
first-differences, because these variables likely violate the strict-exogeneity assumptions. In
particular, I am using the 3rd and 4th lag of the differenced IPR flow variables as instruments,
which yields 15 instruments for each of the four variables (the first instrument is available in
t=6), and the 5th and 6th lag of the gross entry rate, which yields an additional 9 instrument
variables.
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3.6.3 Sector-level regressions
To further investigate the nature of the effect of IPRs on firm entry, I repeat
the difference GMM estimations including the lagged dependent variable at
the sector level (table 3.6.2). Table 3.6.3 summarises the effects of IPRs on firm
entry.
3.6.4 Summary and discussion of findings
Industries with a higher share of NP-active firms are predicted to have
lower entry rates, while industries with a higher share of EP-active firms are
predicted to have higher entry rates. Both findings confirm hypothesis H1a
and H1b. The quantity of knowledge generated and made available, as meas-
ured by patent stocks and flows, appears to have no robust effect on firm
entry, rejecting hypothesis H3a and H3b for the full sample.
The extent to which tacit specialised knowledge is required to operate in
an industry at the national level, measured by the share of NTM-active firms,
does not appear to restrict the generation of new ideas and thus firm entry.
By contrast, the degree to which firms in an industry are export-active lowers
firm entry. Thus, hypothesis H2a cannot be confirmed, but hypothesis H2b is
supported.
At the national level, the pro-competitive effects of trade marks seem to
be diminished by their anti-competitive effects. CTMs, on the contrary, ap-
pear to be able to significantly reduce asymmetric information, and thereby
attract more new firms. Presumably, CTMs are used when a minimum level
of reputation has been established, at which point they have a stronger sig-
nalling function than NTMs without a regional counterpart. Trade marks
with a stronger signalling function perform better at reducing information
asymmetries, and so for CTMs, the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-
competitive effects and thus support hypothesis H4.
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GMM
Manufacturing Service Trade Construction ICT + R&D Agriculture
Dep. var.: First-differenced log of gross entry rate
Lag-logarithmic gross entry rate −0.415∗∗∗ −0.224∗ −0.249∗ −0.577∗∗∗ −0.163 −0.356∗
(0.137) (0.126) (0.146) (0.162) (0.164) (0.216)
Industry-region level effects
Lag-log of turnover −0.232 −0.321∗ −0.179 −0.112 −0.213 −0.231
(0.238) (0.194) (0.289) (0.350) (0.292) (0.352)
Lag-log of capital intensity 0.172 0.242 −0.912∗ −0.129 0.0274 −0.0338
(0.516) (0.296) (0.538) (0.391) (0.252) (0.263)
Lag-log of national TM apps per firm 0.149 0.0480 −0.414 −1.004∗ −1.008∗ −0.144
(0.286) (0.239) (0.317) (0.568) (0.578) (1.003)
Lag-log of CTM apps per firm −0.0800 0.0104 0.154 −0.159 −0.458 0.713
(0.247) (0.176) (0.134) (0.210) (0.465) (0.597)
Lag-log of national patent apps per firm 0.0456 −0.00427 −0.0371 −0.235 −0.540∗∗ 0.0310
(0.234) (0.155) (0.0930) (0.182) (0.254) (0.213)
Lag-log of EP apps per firm −0.151 −0.144 −0.0779 −0.0521 0.538∗∗ 0.0576
(0.222) (0.111) (0.0618) (0.178) (0.224) (0.404)
Industry effects:
Lag-log of national TM stock per firm 0.355 −0.967∗∗∗ 2.713 −0.819 0.550 0.653
(0.466) (0.266) (2.208) (1.716) (0.683) (2.320)
Lag-log of CTM stock per firm 0.00299 −0.0444 −0.0726 −0.479 0.179 −0.488
(0.329) (0.134) (0.464) (0.847) (0.183) (0.588)
Lag-log of national patent stock per firm −0.117 0.0108 0.416∗ 0.988∗ 0.123 0.0782
(0.167) (0.0518) (0.217) (0.559) (0.183) (0.531)
Lag-log of EP stock per firm 0.182∗ −0.0561∗∗ −0.449 −0.195 0.0124 −0.188
(0.108) (0.0268) (0.314) (0.207) (0.129) (0.351)
Lagged national TM-activity rate −0.0363 −0.0691 0.140 0.901 0.103 −0.257
(0.0250) (0.0470) (0.162) (0.660) (0.0749) (0.714)
Lagged CTM-activity rate −0.00337 0.108 −0.398 −2.836∗ −0.472∗∗ 2.018
(0.0779) (0.158) (0.679) (1.518) (0.206) (4.135)
Lagged national patent-activity rate 0.0157 −0.608∗∗ 0.592 −0.598 0.330 1.358
(0.0704) (0.249) (1.250) (1.329) (0.654) (1.858)
Lagged EP-activity rate −0.0195 0.263 −1.469 0.348 0.293 −2.527
(0.105) (0.316) (1.894) (2.708) (1.029) (2.493)
Control variables
Lag-log of age 0.299 2.565∗∗ −5.789∗ −4.528∗∗ 3.315∗ 0.449
(0.972) (1.084) (3.028) (1.875) (1.751) (0.907)
(Lag-log of age)2 0.297∗∗ 0.0668 1.380∗∗ 1.056∗∗ 0.0783 0.115
(0.138) (0.170) (0.639) (0.466) (0.309) (0.249)
Holding rate 0.856 1.479∗∗ 6.494∗∗∗ −2.577 0.543 −0.684
(0.654) (0.608) (2.449) (2.936) (1.221) (2.200)
Real growth rate 0.0868 0.0131 0.0296 0.155 0.217∗∗∗ 0.00234
(0.0692) (0.0422) (0.0585) (0.128) (0.0739) (0.195)
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Sargan J p-value .000793 .921 .0827 .0834 .595 .192
Hansen robust p .0958 .722 .488 .718 .619 .0918
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p .164 .0299 .0378 .0857 .00228 .207
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p .00119 .172 .268 .00334 .336 .192
Arellano-Bond AR(3) p .968 .889 .743 .87 .495 .786
χ2 817 1, 267 495 281 382 93.3
Number of instruments 81 81 81 81 81 81
Obs 14, 743 20, 457 2, 463 2, 281 3, 320 1, 112
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.6.2: Firm entry by sector, Difference GMM
Results from estimating equation (3.7) for each sector. Standard errors in the GMM models
are Windmeijer’s robust finite sample errors (Windmeijer, 2005).
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Summary of results
Impact on firm entry rate Significant positive Significant negative
All sectors European patent activity National patent activity
Community trade mark stocks Community trade mark activity
Manufacturing European patent stocks
Service National patent activity
European patent stocks
National trade mark stocks
Trade National patent stocks
Construction National patent stocks Community trade mark activity
National trade mark applications
ICT & R&D European patent applications National trade mark applications
National patent applications
Community trade mark activity
Table 3.6.3: Summary of results - Firm-entry estimation
The specialised knowledge required to operate in an industry varies across
industries, but more so across sectors. The variation in the use of patents and
trade marks across sectors confirms this. The positive effect of more EPs in
the manufacturing sector supports hypothesis H3b: even within a sector that
requires significant specialised knowledge, producing for a larger market can
stimulate more ideas.
The findings for the service sector confirm commonly known patterns -
knowledge is more difficult to keep from others, so overall more ideas are
generated and relatively more firms enter. In cases where it is possible to ex-
clude competitors through patents or where reputation matters as signalled
by the use of trade marks, the firm entry rate is significantly lower, rejecting
hypothesis H3b and H4 for service sectors.
The trade and the construction sectors benefit from newly generated know-
ledge published in NPs (rejecting H3a). In addition, the construction sector
appears to be marked by significant tacit knowledge requirements to oper-
ate at the regional level, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the share
of CTM-active firms (rejecting H4). Some fields of the construction business
might be characterised by higher transaction costs than others, so that it is
more difficult to enter. An established reputation helps to reduce these trans-
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action costs, giving the owners of the reputation a comparative advantage
over new firms. Facing such a disadvantage makes entry less attractive for
new firms.
Some areas in ICT and R&D are also subject to long contract durations and
high transaction costs, e.g. due to confidentiality requirements, so that again
firm entry might be reduced where reputation can lower these costs (reject-
ing H4). ICT and R&D are also fast moving sectors in terms of technological
evolution. The generation of new knowledge by competitors can thus reduce
the value of existing technologies and set back potential new firms (confirm-
ing H3a). Again, larger markets due to demand from abroad appears to offer
significant opportunities for firm entry, confirming H3b.
Table 3.6.4 lists the top ten industries in terms of IPR use and activity to-
gether with average entry rates for those industries. The last panel lists the
top and bottom ten industries in terms of firm entry. A close analysis reveals
that the industries that are either very NP-active, NTM-intensive or CTM-
active (lowering factors) and at the same time not EP-active or CTM-intensive
(increasing factors) have,23 on average, lower firm entry rates than indus-
tries that have lowering as well as increasing factors,24 which in turn have
lower firm entry rates than industries that exhibit only firm-rate-increasing
factors.25 Full lists of IPR-activity and use in addition to firm entry rates by
two-digit NACE Rev. 2 industries are provided in tables A.2.2, A.2.3 and
A.2.4 in the appendix.
23Manufacture of fabricated metal products; Manufacture of rubber and plastic products;
Remediation activities, other waste management services; Water collection, treatment and
supply; Air transport; Manufacture of beverages; Manufacture of electrical equipment; Man-
ufacture of paper and paper products; Programming and broadcasting activities.
24Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products; Manufacture of chemicals and chemical
products; Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products; Manufacture of electrical
equipment; Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers; Manufacture of other transport equipment; Postal and courier activities; Scientific
research and development; Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; Manufacture of
coke and refined petroleum products; Manufacture of tobacco products; Mining of coal and
lignite; Mining of metal ores; Mining support service activities; Other mining and quarrying;
25Other professional, scientific and technical activities
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Top ten two-digit industries: IPR activity and entry rates
Top ten national TM active two-digit industries Top ten Community TM active two-digit industries
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 3.2
Manufacture of tobacco products 3 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3
Telecommunications 13 Telecommunications 13
Manufacture of beverages 3.4 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 3.2 Air transport 3.7
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6 Postal and courier activities 9.6
Manufacture of food products 3.3 Manufacture of paper and paper products 2.7
Postal and courier activities 9.6 Manufacture of beverages 3.4
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 5 Programming and broadcasting activities 6.3
Air transport 3.7 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 5
Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.3
Top ten national patent active two-digit industries Top ten European patent active two-digit industries
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 3.2 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 3.2
Manufacture of other transport equipment 4.9 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3
Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.3 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6 Manufacture of other transport equipment 4.9
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3 Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.3
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products3.9 Scientific research and development 7.1
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4.2 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 3.9
Scientific research and development 7.1 Postal and courier activities 9.6
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4.2
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 3.1 Other professional, scientific and technical activities 7.3
Top ten national patent using two-digit industries Top ten EP using two-digit industries
Mining of coal and lignite 0 Mining of coal and lignite 0
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6.8 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6.8
Mining of metal ores 0 Mining of metal ores 0
Other mining and quarrying 1.7 Other mining and quarrying 1.7
Mining support service activities 11.3Mining support service activities 11.3
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products3.9 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3
Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.3 Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.3
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4.2 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4.2
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 3.2 Scientific research and development 7.1
Scientific research and development
Top ten national TM using two-digit industries Top ten CTM using two-digit industries
Mining of coal and lignite 0 Mining of coal and lignite 0
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6.8 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6.8
Mining of metal ores 0 Mining of metal ores 0
Other mining and quarrying 1.7 Other mining and quarrying 1.7
Mining support service activities 11.3Mining support service activities 11.3
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6 Manufacture of tobacco products 3
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 5
Water collection, treatment and supply 2.7 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6
Remediation activities, other waste mgmnt services 7.9 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3
Scientific research and development 7.1 Scientific research and development 7.1
Top ten average entry rates 2002-2012 Bottom ten average entry rates 2002-2012
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 13.9Mining of coal and lignite 0
Financial service activities w/o insurance 13.8Mining of metal ores 0
Telecommunications 13 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 1
Information service activities 11.9Other mining and quarrying 1.7
Mining support service activities 11.3Manufacture of other non 2.6
Employment activities 10 Manufacture of paper and paper products 2.7
Postal and courier activities 9.6 Water collection, treatment and supply 2.7
Office administrative activities 9 Manufacture of tobacco products 3
Social work activities without accommodation 9 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3
Other personal service activities 9 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 3.1
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 3.1
The numbers next to the industries indicate that industry’s firm entry rate in percent.
Table 3.6.4: Top ten industries: IPR-activity and firm-entry rates
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3.6.5 Robustness
Tables A.2.6 and A.2.7 in the appendix present OLS and GMM estimations for
the stepwise inclusion of the right-hand-side variables. They reveal that the
effect of the number of IPRs per firm is related to the share of IPR-active firms
in an industry. In particular, the trade-mark-intensity effects are significant in
their own right (column 5), while the shares of CTM- and patent-activity in
the GMM estimations are only significant after the inclusion of the intensity
variables (compare columns 4 and 8). The joint inclusion of the intensity
and the activity variables reduces the magnitude of the effect of the intensity
variables, but does not change the sign of the coefficients.
The EGW sector is not part of the regression analysis for reasons ex-
plained in section 3.4. Robustness regressions including the EGW sector
show that the coefficients on the IPR variables are robust to the inclusion.
The coefficients on firm age change, however, indicating a positive relation-
ship between average firm age and firm entry even after including the lagged
dependent variable.
The set of potential instruments offered by the generalised method-of-
moments can lead to “over-fitting”, which is a situation in which too many
instruments are used relative to the sample size. As the period of obser-
vation grows longer, this becomes more likely, because the number of pos-
sible instruments grows rapidly with the time dimension (Roodman, 2009).
Over-fitting gives a downward finite sample bias, in the direction of the fixed-
effects estimator. If the coefficients of the fixed-effects and the GMM regres-
sions are too close, one can reduce the number of instruments to reduce the
extent of the bias. Tables A.2.7, A.2.8, A.2.9 and A.2.11 in the appendix to this
chapter present results from estimating variations of the models specified in
table 3.6.1. The results concerning the IPR variables are robust to variations
in the specification with regard to the dependent variable and with regard to
the number of instruments used.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigated the role of tacit and explicit specialised know-
ledge in firm entry, and how innovation related activities measured by in-
tellectual property rights (IPR) affect this role. The marginal effects on the
firm entry rate I found for these variables are small. Considering the range of
values of the knowledge and IPR-variables across industries, however, these
indicators explain a significant proportion of the variation of firm entry rates
across industries. They should therefore be added to the list of informative
indicators of firm entry.
The results give a picture of the current relationship between firm entry
rates, knowledge and innovation related activities at the industry-region level.
They cannot be used to assess whether firm entry rates are above or below a
socially desirable level. But they inform the analysis of this question by point-
ing out that some of the differences in firm entry across industries are due to
knowledge, innovation related activities, and the suitability of IPRs to reduce
market failures. These factors need to be taken into account in deriving the
socially optimal firm entry rate for each industry. Focussing on selected in-
dustries to better understand the role of knowledge and diffusion could thus
be another avenue for future research. The findings in this chapter support
the use of the degree of IPR activity in an industry as selection criterion for
industries to focus on.
Firm entry may be necessary for competition, but it is certainly not suffi-
cient. It may well be that more firms are attracted by supra-normal profits in
concentrated industries than by competitive profits in other industries, but
this does not imply that the industry becomes more competitive as a con-
sequence. Attractive profits might be a result of entrants failing to survive
after entry, in which case high firm entry rates could imply concentration
and barriers to survival.
In the next chapter, I analyse whether high entry rates are correlated with
low survival rates, whether firm innovation related activity contributes to the
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probability of successful entry and how survival is affected by competitors’
innovation related activity. Moreover, I show that the effects of knowledge
and innovation related activities are small compared to the effect of the fi-
nancial crisis.
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Chapter 4
The Role of Innovation and the
Financial Crisis in New Firm Sur-
vival and Employment Growth in
Germany
4.1 Introduction
The recent crises and resulting job losses worldwide add relevance to the
research of the firm creation and employment generating processes in the
economy. Despite the inherent risk, innovation activity is frequently found
to increase firms’ expected lifetime26 and employment.27 In this chapter I
provide a first analysis of the effects of innovation related activities on young
firm survival in Germany to follow-up on the findings on the role of know-
ledge and innovation related activities in firm entry in chapter 2. In addition,
I investigate the effect of the financial crisis on young firm survival and em-
ployment growth in Germany, thereby providing a framework that can be
used to find unobserved determinants of young firm survival.
Firms starting a business in 2006 did not know that the financial crisis of
2007-08 was about to happen. In economic terms, the financial crisis there-
fore presents a natural experiment for young firms. By comparing survival
26E.g. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995); Pérez, Llopis, and Llopis (2004); Cefis and Marsili
(2005); Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer (2008); Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster (2010);
Helmers and Rogers (2010); Colombelli, Krafft, and Quatraro (2013)
27E.g. Van Reenen (1997); Greenhalgh and Longland (2001); Greenhalgh et al. (2011)
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patterns between firms that were hit by the financial crisis in their first year
firms that had four years time to establish themselves, I can identify further
unobserved variables that determine young firm survival. To this end, I fol-
low two cohorts of new German firms for seven and ten years after establish-
ment. In particular, I use the German Firm-Level Intellectual Property data-
base (GFLIP) and focus on 45,186 and 53,593 new German firms established
in 2003 and 2006, respectively.
The results confirm previous findings that innovation related activities
significantly affect survival and employment growth. Compared to the ad-
verse effect of the financial crisis on young firm survival, however, the effects
of knowledge requirements and innovation related activities are small.
In section 4.2, I outline the findings in the related literature and motivate
the methodology, and in section 4.3, I compare the samples used in the ana-
lysis. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 contain the survival and employment analyses,
respectively, and I draw conclusions from this and the previous chapter in
section 4.6.
4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 Survival
The surveys by Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) in addition to the special edi-
tion of the International Journal of Industrial Organisation edited by Mata
and Audretsch (1995) present marking points in the post-entry performance
research literature. Since then the following statistical regularities are com-
monly accepted:
• The probability to survive increases with the size and age of firms.
• The relationship between age and survival is non-monotonic.
• Growth rates decrease as firms become larger and older, thus refuting
Gibrat’s ’law’ of the independence between growth and size.
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• As industries evolve, the number of producers first increases, reaches a
peak, and then decreases to a level below the initial level, manifesting
the existence of industry-life-cycles.
Several authors have since extended this literature by studying the impor-
tance of controlling for sample composition with respect to firms’ self-selection
into full and limited liability ownership forms (Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode,
1998), innovation-active and innovation-inactive firms,28 and their geograph-
ical or technological location decision (Colombelli, Krafft, and Quatraro, 2013).
To date, we can roughly separate the post-entry performance literature into
four themes: the role of the life-cycle of firms and industries; the role of own-
ership and exit decisions; the role of spatial effects; and the role of innovation
and technology.
The role of the life-cycle of firms and industries: Learning-by-doing models
predict that a firm’s chance of survival increases with longevity (Jovanovic,
1982; Pakes and Ericson, 1998). Most studies of firm survival confirm this
relation between firm age and survival; however, studies that include all
firms, in particular firms older than ten years, show that this relation is non-
monotonic. After a certain age, a firm’s risk of exit increases again (Evans,
1987; Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Pérez, Llopis, and Llopis, 2004). Firms that
fail to keep up with important changes in technology and business models
will fall behind and be replaced by new entrants (Jovanovic and MacDonald,
1994; Christensen, 2013). Controlling for innovation capital and investment,
in addition to the conventional variables, age ceases to be a significant deter-
minant of survival (Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster, 2010). This U-shaped
relationship between the risk of failure and age (or the variables correlated to
age) represents the life-cycle of a firm.
At the industry level, most entrants enter during the formative stage of
an industry. At this stage, firms with a larger start-up size have a lower
propensity to exit than firms starting out small (Agarwal and Audretsch,
28Pérez, Llopis, and Llopis (2004); Cefis and Marsili (2005); Jensen, Webster, and Buddel-
meyer (2008); Helmers and Rogers (2010)
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2001; Agarwal and Gort, 2002). This size-premium, however, vanishes for
firms entering during a more mature phase of an industry.
The role of ownership and exit decisions: Post-entry performance also de-
pends on the type of entrant and the type of exit under consideration. New
firms that are subsidiaries are larger on average and account for a larger share
of entrants’ output and employment, but are also more prone to exit (Caves,
1998). Young subsidiaries benefit from experience, endowment, and a wider
relational network compared to their independent counterparts; however,
continuance of their operation is more dependent on their performance re-
lative to the targets set by the parent company. In as much, subsidiaries are
often deprived of the option to fight for survival until the very end. Most
studies show that the latter effect is dominant and that subsidiaries are on
average more likely to exit in general29 and voluntarily rather than through
bankruptcy in particular (Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode, 1998).
Entrants are also distinct with regard to their degree of owner liability.
Voluntary exit is more common under full ownership compared to limited
liability firms (Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode, 1998). If the proportion of lim-
ited and unlimited firms varies across industries, this has implications for
the interpretation of the results from cross-industry studies. For instance, it
seems reasonable to assume that firms reduce assets and employment before
they exit (Almus, 2004). Studies that distinguish between voluntary exit and
bankruptcy, however, reveal that this is mainly the case if firms exit voluntar-
ily (Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode, 1998).
The role of spatial effects: Although scarce, existing survival literature on re-
gional effects clearly demonstrates that locating within an area that is spatially-
concentrated with firms in the same industry significantly decreases young
firms’ life expectancy (Fritsch, Brixy, and Falck, 2006; Silva and McComb,
2012). However, young firms can benefit from locating near, rather than
within, a cluster of rivals due to positive externalities (e.g., existing infra-
29E.g. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988b); Audretsch and Mahmood (1995); Jensen,
Webster, and Buddelmeyer (2008); Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster (2010); Helmers and
Rogers (2010)
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structure and presence of skilled labour). Close proximity to universities
is also shown to reduce the likelihood of exit (Helmers and Rogers, 2010).
When the geographic source of input goods is relevant, e.g. for the produc-
tion of wine or cheese, small firms can benefit from signalling place-of-origin
via protected labels such as geographical indications, regardless of their age
(Bontemps, Bouamra-Mechemache, and Simioni, 2013).
The role of innovation and technology: Manufacturing firms are more prone
to exit if their plants employ more advanced technologies (Doms, Dunne,
and Roberts, 1995). Likewise, conducting more R&D and employing more
marketing personnel than the average firm of the same size decreases the
chances of survival (Agarwal and Gort, 2002). High-tech industries attract
more entrants than other industries (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001; Saman-
iego, 2009), and the survival prospects of small firms, regardless of age, are
significantly higher, while there is no difference for large firm survival be-
tween low- and high-tech industries (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001; Cefis
and Marsili, 2005). Despite the inherent risk often associated with innovation,
several authors find an innovation premium for young firms in terms of sur-
vival.30 In particular, process innovation - in contrast to product innovation
- seems to drive this innovation premium in the manufacturing sector (Cefis
and Marsili, 2005). Firms re-allocate resources away from product innovation
over time: older firms apply for and hold more trade marks.31 Both measures
are associated with an increase in companies’ expected lifetime, with process
innovation, and with innovation in service industries (see chapter 2).
Innovation activity affects not only the performance of companies but
also that of their rivals. A high degree of small firm innovation in an in-
dustry seems to constitute a barrier to survival for new firms in the first years
after establishment Audretsch (1995). However, firms that manage to keep
pace and to adapt benefit from a more innovative environment. In contrast,
30E.g. Pérez, Llopis, and Llopis (2004); Cefis and Marsili (2005); Jensen, Webster, and Bud-
delmeyer (2008); Colombelli, Krafft, and Quatraro (2013)
31E.g. Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer (2008); Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster (2010);
Helmers and Rogers (2010)
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in many industries, a larger share of IPR-active firms decreases incumbent
firms’ chances of survival, while it increases the expected lifetime of younger
firms (Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer, 2008; Helmers and Rogers, 2010).
Why do these studies predict a different effect of innovation for new firm
survival? The answer could be in the data. Audretsch uses the U.S. Small
Business Administration Innovation Database to obtain data on innovation
introduced by U.S. firms. These data probably consist mainly of product in-
novations. Jensen et al. and Helmers & Rogers use patent and trade mark
data from Australia and the UK, respectively. Counts of IPRs include product
and process innovations. This broader definition of innovation better cap-
tures the degree of non-price competition in an industry. IPRs might thus be
better proxies for the competitive effect of innovation activity.
A thorough firm-survival analysis needs to account for innovation related
activities at the firm and the industry level, industry life-cycle effects, regional
effects, and ownership effects. The GFLIP database allows me to control for
these characteristics, so I can identify the effects of innovation related activ-
ities and the financial crisis. Using IPRs as indicators for innovation related
activities implies that I adopt the broader definition of innovation, including
at least product and process innovation, and perhaps even marketing and
organisation innovation (see 4.2.3).
4.2.2 Innovation and employment
A further dimension of the performance of firms in relation to innovation
activity is its ability to create or sustain jobs. Such analysis of employment can
give us metrics to assess some of the benefits to households from innovation
activity.
The introduction of new technology (process innovation) can have pos-
itive and negative effects on employment. Some jobs will be destroyed by
new techniques, while the demand for those with newer skills will tend to
rise. At the same time, the introduction of new products into the marketplace
(product innovation) will generally increase the demand for at least part of
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a firm’s output, thus sustaining or increasing employment. Harrison et al.
(2008) conduct a cross-country study using data from four European Com-
munity Innovation Surveys to model the general effect of innovation on em-
ployment. They estimate that, in 1998-2000, the effect of process innovation
was usually negative for manufacturing but positive for services, although
all these effects were very small in each country. In contrast, their estimates
suggest that the effect of product innovation was uniformly large and pos-
itive in France, Germany, Spain and the UK. A fuller survey of these issues
and the relevant literature can be found in Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010). As
their survey shows, there have only been a handful of studies using UK firm-
level data to explore the effect of innovation activity on jobs and wages, and
very little attention has been paid to the role of trade mark activity within
these studies. To the best of my knowledge, there are no such studies using
German firm-level data to date.
4.2.3 Patents and trade marks
Section 2 of chapter 2 in this thesis discusses the use of trade marks as proxies
for innovation. The survey by Griliches (1990) provides an excellent and still
current discussion of the use of patents as an economic indicator, which is
complemented by an overview of recent patent research in Hall and Harhoff
(2012) and by a review of the literature concerned with the trade-off between
formal and informal IPRs by Hall et al. (2014). The findings common to all
these surveys are that there is substantial heterogeneity across sectors in the
use and the perceived importance of patents and trade marks as instruments
to appropriate returns from innovation. In fact, with the exception of phar-
maceutical and chemical industries, and to some extent medical instrument
industries, patents are not considered useful means to appropriate rents from
innovation in most industries, and particularly not in isolation. Trade marks,
however, are used more widely, and the empirical evidence suggests that
trade marks are informative with regard to product and process innovation
activity in manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service industries, and
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with regard to market innovation across industries. Using both patents and
trade marks as indicators thus allows me to capture new firms’ ability to offer
innovative or differentiated goods and services, which is an important part
of new firms’ success (Spulber, 2009; Helmers and Rogers, 2010).
4.3 Data
I am using the German Firm-Level Intellectual Property (GFLIP) database,
which is described in detail in chapter 3. GFLIP contains data on 1,481,112
limited corporate enterprises (AG, GmbH, KGaA) in Germany for the years
2002-2012. As I measure the effect of IPRs on new firm survival and growth
conditional on the economic environment, I create two survival samples: the
first sample contains ten years of data on all limited firms incorporated in
2003 (45,392 firms), just after the dot.com crisis, and the second survival
sample contains seven years of data on all limited firms created in 2006 (53,634
firms), just before the financial crisis. Moreover, because not all firms report
employment, for each sample I create a subsample containing only firms that
do (32,254 and 41,429 firms, respectively).
Table 4.3.1 presents the distribution of firms within and across the four
subsamples. Across all samples, service firms make up for 59.8 percent of all
firms, followed by trade, construction and manufacturing firms (15.5, 7.3 and
7 percent). The distribution of firms does not vary systematically across the
survival and the employment samples or across the 2003 and 2006 samples.
There are, however, differences in the characteristics of the firms in the
respective samples. Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 show the results of mean compar-
ison tests between the subsamples. The last three years of the 2003 samples
are excluded from this test to avoid biased results due to the additional time
these firms had to grow. Fewer firms were created in 2003 compared to 2006,
but firms established in 2003 are larger and more IPR-active on average. In
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Agriculture 54.8% 23.5% 15.3% 6.4% 100.0% 2.1% 1.1% 2.2% 1.0% 1.7%
Manufacturing 47.0% 26.0% 16.3% 10.7% 100.0% 7.6% 5.3% 9.8% 7.0% 7.0%
Service 41.9% 37.5% 9.8% 10.8% 100.0% 57.7% 65.6% 50.3% 60.0% 59.8%
Trade 44.5% 30.1% 14.2% 11.2% 100.0% 15.9% 13.7% 19.0% 16.2% 15.5%
Construction 45.5% 27.6% 15.6% 11.3% 100.0% 7.6% 5.9% 9.8% 7.7% 7.3%
EGW 35.0% 44.2% 6.9% 13.8% 100.0% 1.8% 2.8% 1.3% 2.8% 2.2%
ICT 49.0% 28.9% 13.3% 8.8% 100.0% 7.3% 5.5% 7.4% 5.3% 6.5%
Mining 50.3% 32.3% 9.3% 8.1% 100.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Total 43.5% 34.2% 11.6% 10.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 455,858 358,515 121,656 112,552
Table 4.3.1: Distribution across sectors
particular, the ratio of total assets to employment (capital intensity) is smal-
ler for firms established in 2003, indicating that these firms hired more work-
ers per unit of assets than their 2006 counterparts. Omitting firms with mis-
sing employment observations biases the sample towards larger firms (table
A.3.2), which is a direct consequence of the fact that smaller firms are not
required to report employment.
4.4 Survival analysis
In this section I start with a univariate description of young firm survival in
Germany to reveal systematic patterns between different types of firms that
motivate the semi-parametric analysis in the second part of this section.
4.4.1 Non-parametric analysis
Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 contain firm mortality rates after two and five years
of existence for different types of firms established either in 2003 or in 2006.
Wagner (1994) reports an average mortality rate of 20 percent for the cohorts
of less than two year old manufacturing firms established in Lower-Saxony,
West Germany between 1979-1982. Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) re-
port a 24 percent average mortality rate for two-year old West-German man-
ufacturing firms established between 1987 and 1989. Fritsch, Brixy, and Falck
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(2006), however, report mortality rates between 25-35 percent for West-German
firms established between 1983-2000. The average mortality rate of firms after
two years of existence in this sample is 17.6 percent in manufacturing, which
is not far off from the values reported in Wagner (1994) and Harhoff, Stahl,
and Woywode (1998). The sample used by Fritsch, Brixy, and Falck (2006) ex-
cludes firms with more than 20 employees in their first or second year, which
leaves out many subsidiaries and potentially high-growth firms, but explains
the higher mortality rates. The mortality rate after five years of existence is
35 percent in this sample compared to 29 percent in Wagner (1994).
The difference between the mortality rates reported here and in Wagner
(1994) and Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) are small enough to be ex-
plained by this chapter’s focus on firms with limited liability and perhaps
by the inclusion of firms established in the new federal states of Germany
(former East-Germany).
With the data at hand I can compute mortality rates depending not only
on the IPR-type used by firms, but also on the regional scope and on the
success of patent applications.
The mortality rate of firms using any type of IPRs two years after estab-
lishment is lower than for IPR-inactive firms. For firms using patents in ad-
dition to trade marks, the two-year-mortality rate is lowest. After five years,
however, mortality rates for patent or trade-mark-active firms established in
2003 are higher than for IPR-inactive firms or for firms that use both IPR-
types. For firms established in 2006, this pattern is exactly reversed, perhaps
indicating an adverse effect of the financial crisis on IPR-inactive firms and
on those using patents and trade marks.
Similarly to the results found for patent activity, trade mark activity of
any kind is associated with lower mortality rates. In particular, firms that use
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4.4. Survival analysis
both national and Community trade marks (NTM and CTM, respectively)
show the lowest mortality rates, while the difference between firms using
either NTMs or CTMs is negligible.
The effect of patent activity might also depend on its outcome. A patent
application that is not granted reveals the invention but does not protect it.
It is thus not likely to contribute to firm survival. In table 4.4.2 I distinguish
between granted and non-granted patents. Patent-active firms that did not
manage to obtain a patent grant within the observation period have a sys-
tematically higher mortality rate after five years than firms without patents
or with both, granted and non-granted patents. Only very few firms have
only granted patents, and their mortality rate is rather high. It is possible
that these firms were acquired by another firm due to their success and this
was not reflected in the database. It could also be a result of a measurement
error, but this should not affect the analysis much due to the small number
of such observations. Most patent-active firms have non-granted as well as
granted patents, and their mortality rates are the lowest of all firms.
Within the group of firms that owns at least one granted patent, the mor-
tality rate for firms owning only European patents (EP) is higher than for
those owning only national patents (NP), which in turn is higher than own-
ing both EPs and NPs. If successful, EPs may become more valuable than
NPs, but on average they appear to be associated with a higher risk of fail-
ure.
The pattern observed for the whole sample by and large corresponds to
the effects at the sector level. Construction and trade firms established in
2003 have lower mortality rates than their counterparts in other sectors when
they use patents, but higher mortality rates when they use trade marks. This
pattern can also be observed for service firms established in 2006.
Overall, mortality rates vary across sectors and cohorts, but less so across
manufacturing, service, trade and construction sectors. The variation ap-
pears to be systematic within a given cohort. This variation can can be ac-
counted for in a semi or full-parametric analysis by the inclusion of the re-
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Figure 4.4.1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves by incorporation date and IPR-activity
spective controls. The log-likelihood tests and the log-rank tests suggest that
the differences between the cohorts are significant.
Systematic differences between different types of firms over time can bet-
ter be illustrated using Kaplan-Meier survival curves. The Kaplan-Meier es-
timator is of the following form:
Ŝ (t) = Πti≤t
(
1− di
ni
)
The number of firms that exit in period t is represented by di , and ni is the
total number of firms in t including those that exit during that period. In
other words, the estimated probability of surviving t periods solely depends
on the share of surviving firms in each period before and during period t.
As indicated by the mortality table, both cohorts of young IPR-active
firms are systematically more likely to survive than their non-IPR-active peers
(figure 4.4.1). Firms established in 2006 were clearly negatively affected by
the financial and the Euro crisis: in 2009, three years after entry, their sur-
vival probability drops from a level just above that of firms at the same age
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Figure 4.4.2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves by sector
established in 2003 far below that level. Thereafter it continues to decline at a
faster rate. Throughout the whole period, the curves of the IPR-active firms
remain in proportion to those of their IPR-inactive peers. Innovation activity
thus seems neither to protect nor to aggravate the effect of the financial crisis
on firm survival.
Figure (4.4.1) reveals little but persistent heterogeneity across sectors. Sur-
vival probabilities are lowest in the agriculture, ICT and R&D sectors, but
there is little difference between the other sectors. The survival curves in
figure (4.4.1) confirm the results found for young UK firms in Helmers and
Rogers (2010), while the heterogeneity across sectors is less pronounced in
Germany than that reported by these authors for the UK.
The Kaplan-Meier frequency measure discloses only little about the sources
of these differences. A parametric analysis of firm survival is better suited to
disentangle the effects of different firm characteristics on firm survival.
4.4.2 Semi-parametric analysis
(Cox, 1972; 1975) develops an estimation model that takes into account subject-
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specific variables. This model is later extended to capture time-varying com-
ponents. Variations of this method are frequently used in economic survival
analyses.32 I follow this approach and estimate a piecewise-constant propor-
tional hazard function. This type of model is called a semi-parametric model
because it assumes a non-parametric basic hazard for each time interval. The
basic hazard is then shifted proportionately according to each subject’s char-
acteristics.
To characterise each firm sufficiently, I include firms’ lagged patent and
trade mark flows and stocks as proxy for innovation related activities, fol-
lowing (Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer, 2008; Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and
Webster, 2010; Helmers and Rogers, 2010). A more inventive and more com-
petitive environment benefits the survival chances of new firms. In contrast,
industry size and age indicate later stages in the life-cycle, when entry is less
common and young firm survival more difficult. Hence, I include industry
IPR activity, age and size variables to control for the industry life-cycle effects.
Following Helmers and Rogers (2010), I include region dummies at the two-
digit postal code level to account for spatial effects. The GFLIP database only
contains limited liability firms and information on firms’ ownership struc-
ture. With this information I can identify parent firms, subsidiaries and subsi-
diaries owned by foreign parents. I account for the industrial environment of
each firm by including the mean capital intensity and the lagged gross entry
rate as well as industry dummy variables at the two-digit industry level. The
lag of the real GDP growth rate acts as proxy for the macroeconomic environ-
ment. The model takes the following form:
hi (t|xi,t) = hCjr,0 (t) exp {βCki,t−1 + γCxij,t−1} (4.1)
or in logs
ηi,t = ηCjr,0,t + βCki,t−1 + γCxij,t−1
32E.g. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998), Jensen, Web-
ster, and Buddelmeyer (2008), and Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster (2010)
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where ηi = log (hi (t|xi,t)) and ηC,0 = log (hCjr,0 (t)). The left hand side
variable, hi (t|xi,t) is firm i′s hazard rate, i.e. the probability that it will exit
in t, given that it has not exited as of time t, and hC,0 (t), is the base level
hazard each firm in a given cohort C is exposed to in period t in the two-
digit level industry j in the two-digit postal code region r. The row vectors
βC and γC are the coefficients for the vector xij,t−1, which contains lagged
variables of patent and trade mark activity and other control variables at the
industry level, and the vector ki,t−1 contains lagged proxies for innovation
activity, i.e., patent and trade mark stocks and flows, in addition to the other
conventional firm-level variables.
The unit of analysis is the age of the firms, so that survival probabilities
can be compared across the two cohorts. For non-IPR firm level variables, I
fix the values at the time of firm establishment to avoid endogeneity issues.
For the same reason, I use first lags of IPR-related variables. Buddelmeyer,
Jensen, and Webster (2010) show that using first or second lags affects the
results only marginally. I can confirm this for the 2003 sample, but not for
the 2006 sample, as too few IPR-active observations are left after calculating
second lags.
In columns 1-5 of table 4.4.3 I present the results of estimating equation
(4.1) for different specifications. All specifications include region, industry
and year dummies. The lifetime-increasing effects found for NTM and CTM
applications are similar in all specifications and to the robust findings in the
literature, but the effects of patents for new firm survival differ. Recent EP
applications and stocks of NPs have no significant individual effect on sur-
vival. Current NP applications and stocks of EP applications significantly
reduce the expected lifetime of young firms. These effects only surface after
the inclusion of other firm-level variables. In contrast to trade marks, patent
activity therefore seems to vary systematically with other firm-level charac-
teristics.
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Est. 2003 or 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: Hazard rate
Est. in 2006 1.395∗∗∗ 1.395∗∗∗ 1.395∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗
(−0.00923) (−0.00924) (−0.00924) (−0.00922) (−0.00933)
Firm-level IPR-variables
Lag-log of count of national TM registrations −0.0787∗∗ −0.0774∗ −0.101∗∗ −0.100∗∗
(−0.0397) (−0.0457) (−0.0465) (−0.0465)
Lag-log of count of CTM registrations −0.130∗ −0.200∗∗ −0.198∗∗ −0.196∗∗
(−0.0676) (−0.0832) (−0.0828) (−0.0828)
Lag-log of count of national patent applications 0.0494 0.087 0.154∗∗ 0.154∗∗
(−0.0453) (−0.0657) (−0.0674) (−0.0674)
Lag-log of count of EP applications 0.0511 −0.0726 −0.0445 −0.0462
(−0.0556) (−0.082) (−0.0825) (−0.0824)
Lag-log of stock of national TM registrations −0.0199 −0.00509 0.0157 0.0196
(−0.0163) (−0.0187) (−0.0189) (−0.0189)
Lag-log of stock of CTM registrations 0.00468 0.0574 0.128∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(−0.031) (−0.038) (−0.039) (−0.039)
Lag-log of stock of national patent applications −0.00722 −0.0519 −0.0625 −0.0617
(−0.0331) (−0.0477) (−0.0486) (−0.0486)
Lag-log of stock of EP applications 0.0800∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(−0.0413) (−0.0592) (−0.0596) (−0.0595)
Firm-level variables
Firm est. with at least one subsidiary −1.506∗∗∗ −1.517∗∗∗
(−0.0153) (−0.0155)
Firm est. as a subsidiary (−0.0156) (−0.0157)
−0.0156 −0.0157
Firm est. owned by foreign parent (−0.0285) (−0.0285)
−0.0285 −0.0285
Firm est. diversified (−0.00711) (−0.00711)
−0.00711 −0.00711
Initial value of total assets (−0.00523) (−0.00525)
−0.00523 −0.00525
(Initial value of total assets)2 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(−0.000538) (−0.000539)
Industry-level variables
Lagged national TM-activity rate −0.0381∗∗∗
(−0.0058)
Lagged CTM-activity rate 0.112∗∗∗
(−0.0225)
Lagged National patent-activity rate 0.00932
(−0.0187)
Lagged EP-activity rate −0.0392
(−0.0292)
Initial value mean log of industry capital intensity 0.00371
(−0.00485)
Initial value logarithmic gross entry rate 0.00804
(−0.00848)
Lagged real growth rate GDP 0.235∗∗∗
(0)
Two-digit industry dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Region dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subjects 99, 026 99, 026 99, 026 99, 026 99, 026
Observations 582, 596 582, 596 582, 596 582, 596 582, 596
Log-Likelihood −1170661 −1170664 −1170658 −1161185 −1161154
χ2 46, 939 46, 931 46, 939 58, 907 59, 044
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.4.3: Stepwise estimates for a piecewise-constant exponential hazard function
Results from estimating equation (4.1).
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It is not clear why NP applications have a similar effect as EP stocks. The
average age of a firm filing the first NP is 4.1 years, and the average age of a
firm filing the first EP is 4.3 years. The correlation between NP applications
and NP stocks is 0.29, and that between EP applications and stocks is 0.27
(table A.2.5 in the appendix). It is unlikely that the stock variables capture
the application effects or vice versa.
Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer (2008) find no effect of patent flows
or stocks for new firms, but significant lifetime-decreasing effects of pat-
ent flows for incumbent firms. In contrast, Helmers and Rogers (2010) find
strictly life-time-increasing effects of flows of NP and EP applications for a
cohort of UK firms established in 2001. The observation period in the latter
study is shorter than in this and the 2008 study. As new patents are associ-
ated with a higher probability of exit for incumbent firms and with a lower
probability of exit for young firms, the relationship between firm age and the
effect of patent applications on firm survival appears to be non-linear.
Larger start-up size, being a parent firm or being foreign-owned decreases
the risk of exit, as commonly found in the literature (e.g. Helmers and Rogers
2010). Firms with a very large initial size, however, are exposed to a higher
risk of exit, also confirming the non-linearity of the size effect found in previ-
ous studies (Evans, 1987; Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Pérez, Llopis, and Llopis,
2004).
Subsidiaries are often found to be at more risk of exit (Caves, 1989), while
the findings here suggest the contrary. Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998)
find that subsidiary firms are less likely to exit via insolvency, and these au-
thors also report that insolvencies are much more likely to occur among lim-
ited liability firms. The fact that I am only analysing limited liability firms
could thus explain the lower risk of exit for subsidiaries. Likewise, diversifi-
cation is often assumed to pool firm risk and thus to reduce the risk of failure.
The findings here suggest that it increases the risk of exit for limited liability
firms. In this regard, Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) also find that di-
versification has no significant effect on firm insolvency. Again, the sample
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composition might explain this deviation from previous studies that use all
types of firms.
Column 5 shows the results for the full model. The full model includes
firm-level IPR variables in addition to other firm-level and industry-level
characteristics. The inclusion of industry-level effects does not affect the coef-
ficients or the significance of the firm-level variables. Only industry-level
trade mark activity significantly affects firms’ hazard rates. The share of
NTM-active firms increases firms’ expected lifetime, while the share of CTM-
active firms decreases it. Patent activity, mean capital intensity and the gross
entry rate appear to have no effect on firm survival in the full sample.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 4.4.4 report results for separate estimations of the
2003 and the 2006 cohorts of new firms. For the 2003 sample, the findings at
the firm-level are identical with those in the full sample. At the industry level,
more firm entry or a higher average capital intensity reduce the likelihood of
survival. This result confirms the commonly accepted view that higher asset
requirements make entry more difficult and that higher entry rates are correl-
ated with higher exit rates (Geroski, 1995; Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer,
2008; Helmers and Rogers, 2010).
Individually analysing the 2006 sample reveals significant differences be-
tween the two samples. IPR flows no longer significantly affect firm survival,
while the effects for the stock variables remain significant at lower precision.
The effects of firm-level characteristics also remain unchanged with one ex-
ception: diversification reduces the risk of failure for firms created just before
the financial crisis. At the industry level, a higher capital intensity also re-
duces the risk of exit, indicating that these industries were less affected by the
financial crisis. Likewise, a higher firm entry rate is also significantly associ-
ated with a lower risk of exit. Industries that were less affected by the crisis
may have attracted more new firms than others. In this case, the effect of
gross entry must not be attributed to increased competition but to new firms’
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Est. 2003 Est. 2006
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: Hazard rate
Firm-level IPR-variables
Lag-log of count of national TM registrations −0.103∗ −0.0868
(−0.0602) (0.0725)
Lag-log of count of CTM registrations −0.248∗∗ −0.111
(−0.112) (0.123)
Lag-log of count of national patent applications 0.187∗∗ 0.0963
(−0.0861) (0.108)
Lag-log of count of EP applications −0.0512 −0.0487
(−0.107) (0.128)
Lag-log of stock of national TM registrations 0.0104 0.0106
(−0.023) (0.0331)
Lag-log of stock of CTM registrations 0.135∗∗∗ 0.109∗
(−0.0492) (0.0642)
Lag-log of stock of national patent applications −0.0644 −0.0358
(−0.062) (0.0781)
Lag-log of stock of EP applications 0.172∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(−0.0768) (0.0948)
Firm-level variables
Firm est. with at least one subsidiary −1.429∗∗∗ −1.633∗∗∗
(−0.0205) (0.0235)
Firm est. as a subsidiary −0.375∗∗∗ −0.737∗∗∗
(−0.0199) (0.0259)
Firm est. owned by foreign parent −0.101∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗
(−0.0387) (0.0428)
Firm est. diversified 0.195∗∗∗ −0.0350∗∗∗
(−0.0102) (0.0104)
Initial value of total assets −0.101∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗
(−0.00727) (0.00771)
(Initial value of total assets)2 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(−0.000761) (0.000778)
Industry-level variables
Lagged national TM-activity rate −0.0314∗∗∗ −0.0442∗∗∗
(−0.00787) (0.00965)
Lagged CTM-activity rate 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0907∗∗
(−0.0314) (0.0370)
Lagged national patent-activity rate 0.000262 −0.0300
(−0.0244) (0.0333)
Lagged EP-activity rate −0.0301 0.0378
(−0.0377) (0.0516)
Initial value mean log of industry capital intensity 0.0224∗∗∗ −0.0792∗∗∗
(−0.00623) (0.00938)
Initial value logarithmic gross entry rate 0.0300∗∗ −0.0290∗∗
(−0.0117) (0.0125)
Initial value real growth rate GDP 0.230∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(−0.0117) (0.00916)
Two-digit industry dummies Y es Y es
Region dummies Y es Y es
Year dummies Y es Y es
Subjects 45, 392 53, 634
Observations 322, 823 259, 773
Log-Likelihood −629, 626 −495, 771
χ2 20, 497 62, 870
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.4.4: Estimates by cohorts for a piecewise-constant exponential hazard function
Results from estimating equation (4.1) by cohorts.
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self-selection into “safer” industries. The observation that neither capital in-
tensity or gross entry affects firm survival in the full sample is therefore a
result of the different effects of these variables in the two individual samples.
The different effects can be explained with the start of the financial crisis,
which hit the 2006 cohort of new firms much harder than the 2003 cohort:
in all full specifications, the dummy marking the 2006 cohort of new firms
indicates a large significant negative effect on survival for these firms: a firm
established in 2006 is roughly four times more likely to exit than a firm estab-
lished in 2003.33
Table 4.4.5 summarises the competing risk estimates at the sector level by
cohorts (tables A.3.5 and A.3.6 in the appendix to this chapter). The effects
of innovation activity within each sector can differ from that across sectors,
because these effects are relative to firms operating in the same sector, while
the effects in the full analysis reflect effects of innovation relative to all firms.
The effects vary considerably across sectors and between the two samples.
Some robust patterns emerge nonetheless.
Trade mark and NP applications are associated with significant effects
only for firms established in 2003. In particular, only manufacturing firms be-
nefit from NTM activity, and only service firms expose themselves to a higher
risk of failure by filing NPs. The effect of EP applications is only significant in
electricity, gas and water (EGW) and agriculture sectors and shows no clear
pattern.
In contrast, NTM stocks reduce the risk of failure of manufacturing firms
established in 2003, but increase it for firms established in 2006. EGW related
firms as well as trade firms experience opposite effects. For the majority of
firms, CTM stocks lower the expected lifetime. The exceptions are the man-
ufacturing and service firms in the 2003 cohort. The stock of NPs lowers the
risk of failure of service and agriculture firms founded in 2003, but increases
33The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating the 2006 sample is identical to the log
ratio of the hazards of the 2006 sample and of the 2003 sample, respectively.
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it in EGW and ICT and R&D industries. With the exception of the 2003 cohort
of EGW firms, the stock of EPs increases the risk of failure for firms in most
sectors.
At the industry level, the share of NTM-active firms generally lowers the
risk of failure, the share of NP-active firms lowers the risk of failure for man-
ufacturing, service and construction firms established in 2006, and the share
of CTM-active firms increases the risk of failure for most firms.
On average, IPR-activity thus appears to be associated with a higher prob-
ablity to survive. To find out more about the correlation of IPR-activity and
the success of a firm, we need to look beyond survival data. In the next sec-
tion, I analyse whether IPR-activity can also be linked to higher employment
growth rates.
4.5 Employment analysis
Table 4.5.1 shows mean logarithmic employment growth rates for different
size categories by cohort and IPR-activity. IPR-active firms have higher em-
ployment growth rates on average than IPR-inactive firms. Firms in the 2006
cohort grow faster, partly because they started out smaller. For firms in the
2003 cohort, the growth rates seem to increase until firms reach a size of 50-
99 employees. Firms larger than that show declining growth rates as they
grow larger. This pattern can also be observed for firms in the 2006 cohort,
although here the rates increase only until firms reach 20-49 employees. The
growth rates therefore clearly refute Gibrat’s ‘law’ (Gibrat, 1931) that growth
rates are independent of firm size.
Analysing the growth rates of firms tends to follow Gibrat’s methodology.
This regresses the growth rate of a factor like employment on the log of the
initial value (i.e. the log of employment) and further variables. If the coef-
ficient on the log of employment is negative, larger firms will grow slower
than smaller firms. If the coefficient is positive, larger firms will grow faster
than smaller firms. Gibrat’s ‘law’ asserts that the coefficient should be zero:
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Mean logarithmic employment growth rate
(Standard deviation)
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1-19 5.6% 6.7% 6.9% 6.7% 9.6% 12.8% 12.4% 10.9% 8.2%
(19.30) (21.78) (19.78) (21.31) (29.48) (31.31) (31.21) (29.24) (25.75)
17793 636 4665 1427 21919 625 5013 1527 53605
20-49 9.5% 5.9% 10.7% 11.9% 14.3% 9.7% 18.7% 18.7% 12.0%
(21.93) (13.24) (19.37) (25.27) (30.13) (22.26) (30.52) (37.16) (25.48)
1298 59 504 148 861 49 302 79 3300
50-99 9.0% 8.7% 8.0% 10.2% 12.8% 2.7% 13.3% 5.6% 10.0%
(20.63) (22.97) (20.83) (17.31) (27.50) (15.25) (28.68) (14.41) (23.04)
463 40 179 48 259 10 102 32 1133
100-500 8.9% 11.1% 9.5% 5.6% 10.3% -1.2% 11.6% 14.5% 9.4%
(26.52) (14.52) (20.62) (23.49) (24.65) (11.78) (24.78) (42.41) (25.35)
325 19 126 76 224 10 69 33 882
>500 4.7% -6.0% 2.2% 4.3% 5.7% 3.7% 3.7% 9.5% 4.6%
(19.43) (15.17) (16.76) (4.18) (10.65) (6.92) (9.92) (16.84) (14.89
79 4 32 12 80 4 22 9 242
Total 6.0% 6.8% 7.3% 7.2% 9.8% 12.1% 12.7% 11.3% 8.5%
(19.68) (21.12) (19.81) (21.65) (29.41) (30.36) (31.03) (29.73) (25.66)
19958 758 5506 1711 23343 698 5508 1680 59162
Table 4.5.1: Average logarithmic employment growth rates by sector and IPR-type
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company growth is independent of company size. There is a large literature
on this approach and I follow this here.34
The basic equation to be estimated is
glij,t = αjr,t + βli,t−1 + γIPRi,t−1 + θXij,t−1 + εi,t (4.1)
where αjrt is the time t, industry j and region r specific intercept, li,t−1 is
firm i′s last period’s employment in logs, the vector IPRi,t−1 contains firm i′s
patent and trade mark flow and stock variables, respectively, and the vector
Xij,t−1 contains the firm- and industry-level variables such as size, age, own-
ership, mean industry capital intensity, the gross entry rate and IPR-activity
variables. εi,t is an i.i.d. firm-idiosyncratic error term with mean zero. As
growth rates can vary considerably, I follow standard practice and exclude
growth values above the 99th percentile, or below the 1st percentile, of the
growth distribution. The summary statistics for the regression samples are
shown in the appendix in table A.3.4.
Because the observations of firms not reporting employment are not “mis-
sing at random,” it is likely that selecting only firms reporting employment
introduces a selection bias. The mean comparison tests in table A.3.2 show
that the employment sample is slightly but significantly biased towards lar-
ger firms. Therefore, I am using the Heckman estimation method to correct
for the sample selection bias.
The results of estimating equation (4.1) are presented in table 4.5.2. Col-
umn 1 and 2 show simple OLS estimates pooling both cohorts of firms. Col-
umns 2-4 contain results using the Heckman-selection model. The coeffi-
cients hardly differ between the ordinary least square (OLS) and the Heck-
man regressions, indicating that the selection bias is negligible for the ques-
tion at hand. The results suggest that trade-mark-active firms enjoy a growth
premium compared to other firms, and this effect is confined to national trade
mark (NTM) flows and stocks. This corresponds to the findings for UK firms
34See Sutton (1997), Geroski (1999), or Audretsch et al. (2004) for surveys.
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Chapter 4. The Role of Innovation and the Financial Crisis in New Firm
Survival and Employment Growth in Germany
in Greenhalgh and Longland (2001) and in Greenhalgh et al. (2011). Firms
using European patents (EP), in contrast, grow slower on average.
Firms in industries with higher shares of NTM and EP-active firms also
grow faster, while firms in industries with high shares of Community-trade-
mark and national-patent-active (CTM-active and NP-active) firms grow slower.
Breaking up the full sample into the two cohorts (column 7 and 8) show that
only the effects of the shares of trade-mark-active firms are significant.
With regard to firm-level variables, the coefficients on firm size clearly
suggest that growth does depend on size. The coefficients on firm size and
age are negative and significant, and the coefficients for the respective squared
terms are positive and significant, as is common in the literature. Subsidiaries
grow faster because some receive support from their parent company. Par-
ent firms and diversified firms appear to grow slower. These firms are often
larger firms, and so the coefficients likely capture some of the size effects,
too.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I investigated whether innovation related activities by new
firms contribute to the probability of successful entry, how survival is affected
by knowledge and competitors’ innovation related activities, and how these
activities are correlated with employment growth. I followed two cohorts of
new firms that went through substantially different macroeconomic devel-
opments in their first years of existence. Viewing the results in this chapter
together with the findings in chapter 3, the following patterns emerge:
Firms using national trade marks (NTM) face a lower risk of exit and
grow faster than firms using other or no IPRs. Firms that are active in an
industry in which many firms use NTMs also grow faster while being at a
lower risk of failure. At the same time, service, construction and ICT in-
dustries in which firms register many NTMs have lower entry rates on aver-
age. Together this indicates that innovation related activities and the ability
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4.6. Conclusion
to overcome adverse effects from asymmetric information using NTMs in-
creases firms’ expected lifetime. Even so, some of this effect might stem from
reduced competition, because not all firms can overcome the obstacles posed
by asymmetric information if tacit specialised knowledge is prevalent in an
industry. Nonetheless, for national trade marks, the pro-competitive effects
appear to outweigh the anti-competitive effects.
In contrast, firms using national patents (NP) grow slower on average
and expose themselves to a higher risk of failure. Industries in which many
firms use NPs have lower entry rates, and the firms in such industries grow
at a slower pace. The degree of specialised knowledge required in these in-
dustries appears to hamper entry and success for some firms. As regards
the direct effect of patents, the literature on industry-life-cycles suggests that
product innovation is the more common form of competition at the early
stage of an industry, while process innovation becomes the dominating form
of competition at later stages. If patents are mainly used to protect inven-
tions that lead to process-innovations, these findings are in line with the
industry-life-cycle literature. If, however, patents are mainly used to protect
product-innovation related inventions, the findings suggest that it is either
the nature of the innovation activity, or the anti-competitive effects of patents,
rather than the competitive pressure from new entry that makes survival and
growth for NP-active-firms less likely.
Industries in which Community-trade-mark-active (CTM-active) firms have
many CTMs attract more entry, but firms grow slower and are more likely to
exit. CTMs are consistently associated with performance premiums, which
potentially stem from increased export activity. Industries characterised by
concentrated and intense CTM use might be highly profitable, which attracts
many new firms. Firm exit rates are high, however, so it seems as if these
industries are characterised by a competitive fringe and only a few firms that
reap high profits. But this circle of successful firms needs not be fixed: firms
with large stocks of CTMs are also more likely to exit.
Firms using European patents (EP) are at higher risk of failure than IPR-
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inactive firms, and industries with many EP-active firms attract more new
firms than other industries. These industries therefore appear to be charac-
terised by more promising opportunities for new firms, potentially due to
demand from abroad. These new firms then often replace existing firms.
Without further analysis it is not clear whether the higher exit rates are
due to barriers to survival (Audretsch, 1995) or due to a dynamic industry
composition. Future research could investigate whether the circle of success-
ful firms in industries characterised by intense trade mark and patent use is
stable, or whether the high profits for some firms only last until new firms
replace them.
The financial crisis had the largest significant effect on firm survival. It
clearly affected young firms more in terms of survival prospects and employ-
ment than firms that had more time to establish their business. The adverse
effect of the financial crisis hit IPR-active and IPR-inactive firms equally hard.
It thus reveals the existence of other determinants of young firm survival. The
effect of these determinants, which are unobserved in this analysis, is clearly
stronger than that of IPR-activity. The GFLIP database and the methodology
applied in this chapter can be used to identify these unknown determinants.
Candidate variables such as access to finance or proxies for demand can be
added to the analysis to test whether they explain the shock, which in this
analysis is captured by the 2006-cohort dummy. In addition to informing fu-
ture entry and survival analyses, this could also enrich studies measuring
the indirect effect of the crisis on economic growth through the destruction of
young firms.
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Postface
At the end of the 80s, Schmalensee (1989) writes “cross-industry studies are
out of fashion.” Yet, every day we can observe that fashion repeats itself. In
the search for statistical regularities in industry dynamics and market struc-
ture, cross-industry studies are still fashionable because more and better data
become available. The ongoing refinement of methods to analyse ’big data’
make not only cross-industry, but also cross-country comparisons at the firm
level more valuable. Moreover, the efforts by policy makers worldwide to
create a more integrated global market make these analyses ever more im-
portant.
I chose to analyse the effect of patents and trade marks on the economy
because there seemed to be a bias towards patents in the economic literature
on intellectual property. This bias can no longer be justified by data avail-
ability, and the results in this thesis clearly show that trade marks are also
relevant to economic activity and performance as patents.
It turns out that trade marks are not as neglected in the economic liter-
ature as it appeared and as is still often suggested. The empirical economic
research of the last decade using trade mark data has vastly contributed to a
better understanding of the use of intellectual property by firms, its impact
on firm behaviour and thus on the economy as a whole. The results attracted
attention by academics and policy makers alike. WIPO dedicated the 2013
World Intellectual Property Report to trade marks in general and brands in
particular. Also in 2013, the European Observatory on Infringements of IPRs
and the European Patent Office published the first study on the overall con-
tribution of IPR-intensive industries in Europe. A more focussed study on
the impact of IPRs on firm performance in Europe will follow this compre-
hensive investigation in 2015.
The database created for this thesis can be used to repeat the analyses for
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other countries, eventually culminating in a cross-country comparison that
could reveal unknown weaknesses and strengths, or do away with persistent
stereotypes, of cross-country differences regarding the role of knowledge and
IPRs in entrepreneurial activity. For critics of the institution of intellectual
property rights, it will become ever more difficult to ignore its crucial role in
economic growth. Even for those that think “[i]ntellectual property has the
shelf life of a banana - Bill Gates.”
128
A
Appendix
A.1 Technical notes and definitions
Country income groups
In this thesis I adopt the World Bank classification of 2013 to categorise coun-
tries into four groups based on the gross national income per capita.35 The
groups are: low-income countries (per capita income up to USD 1,025), low
middle-income countries (per capita income between USD 1,026 and USD
4,125), upper middle-income countries (USD 4,126 to USD 12,745 income per
capita) and high-income countries with more than USD 12,745 gross national
income per capita.
Firm size
Unless stated otherwise, I use the Eurostat definition of small and medium-
sized enterprises:36 A firm is considered Micro with fewer than 10 employees
and either less than €2 million turnover or less than €2 million total assets;
small with fewer than 50 employees and turnover or total assets are less than
€10 million; medium with fewer than 250 employees and less than €50 million
turnover or € 43 million total assets; large in all other cases.
The term “product” and the different types of innovation
I follow the OECD Oslo Manual definitions of a product and the different
types of innovation: the term product covers both, goods and services, and a
35http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, last accessed 27/11/2014
36http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-
definition/index_en.htm, last accessed 27/11/2014
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product innovation includes the introduction of new goods and services at least
to the firm, as well as significant improvements over existing goods and ser-
vices. A process innovation refers to the introduction of new (or the significant
improvement of existing) production or delivery methods. Marketing inno-
vation refers to new methods of (or changes to existing) product designs or
packaging, product placement, product promotion or pricing. Organisational
innovations include the introduction of new (or significant changes of exist-
ing) business practices, workplace organisation or external relations (OECD
and Eurostat, 2005, p. 45-51).
IPR activity
A firm is patent-active if during the observation period it either applied for at
least one patent or owned for at least one period at least one patent or the
depreciated value of it. A firm is trade-mark-active if during the observation
period it registered at least one trade mark or owned for at least one period
one trade mark. A firms falls into the both IPR-active category if it is patent
and trade mark active.
IPR firm types
I distinguish between four IPR firm types: IPR-inactive firms, patent-only firms,
trade-mark-only firms and both-firms. A patent-only firm is only patent active,
a trade-mark-only firm is only trade mark active, and a “both”-firm is patent
and trade mark active.
IPR timing
I refer to the subset of the IPR-active firms that was IPR-active in the first two
years after incorporation as young IPR-active firms.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A.2.1 shows summary statistics for German firms, 2002-2012. In the
left panel are average shares of firms in respective size category. In the right
panel are average shares of firms in respective age category. The rows in each
panel add up to 100%.
Table A.2.2 summarises the distribution of firm IPR activity. In the left
panel are average shares of all firms in respective IPR-activity category. In
the right panel areverage shares of firms that were less than two years old on
entering the respective IPR-activity category. Rows in each panel add up to
100%. A firm is patent-active if it applied for at least one patent, trade-mark-
active if it registered at least one trade mark, and both-active if it applied for
or registered at least one patent and one trade mark, respectively.
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Size Age Share
NACE Rev. 2 division Micro Small Medium Large 0-1 2-4 5-10 11-24 25+ %
Crop and animal production 0.81 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.42 0.16 0.83
Forestry and logging 1.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.29 0.08 1.39
Fishing and aquaculture 0.72 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.34 0.10 0.01
Mining of coal and lignite 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.35 0.13 0.00
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 0.53 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.00
Mining of metal ores 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.20 0.00
Other mining and quarrying 0.75 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.16
Mining support service activities 0.55 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.01
Manufacture of food products 0.77 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.30 0.42 0.88
Manufacture of beverages 0.78 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.26 0.49 0.30
Manufacture of tobacco products 0.77 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.26 0.52 0.03
Manufacture of textiles 0.79 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.31 0.38 0.30
Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.88 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.34 0.33 0.25
Manufacture of leather and related products 0.96 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.53 0.29 0.20
Manufacture of wood and of products 0.81 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.30 0.41 0.51
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.68 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.31 0.42 0.17
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.84 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.34 0.37 0.72
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.60 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.02
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.76 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.30 0.35 0.29
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 0.77 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.32 0.10
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.71 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.33 0.38 0.50
Manufacture of other non 0.80 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.31 0.41 0.54
Manufacture of basic metals 0.70 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.31 0.33 0.23
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 0.76 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.34 0.34 1.91
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 0.79 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.22 0.38 0.21 0.75
Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.75 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.37 0.31 0.41
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.74 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.33 0.32 1.28
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 0.72 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.35 0.29 0.16
Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.81 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.20 0.12
Manufacture of furniture 0.78 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.31 0.37 0.25
Other manufacturing 0.86 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.39 0.29 0.89
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.83 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.33 0.17 0.23
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.94 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.05 0.98
Water collection, treatment and supply 0.75 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.04
Sewerage 0.82 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.26 0.39 0.14 0.07
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities 0.81 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.26 0.42 0.12 0.42
Remediation activities, other waste mgmnt services 0.82 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.30 0.32 0.04 0.03
Construction of buildings 0.87 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.24 0.34 0.24 2.22
Civil engineering 0.71 0.21 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.34 0.24 0.49
Specialised construction activities 0.86 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.33 0.28 6.83
Wholesale and retail trade 0.85 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.34 0.29 2.89
Wholesale trade w/o motor vehicles 0.89 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.25 9.46
Retail trade w/o motor vehicles 0.92 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.32 9.13
Land transport and transport via pipelines 0.81 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.31 0.30 1.43
Water transport 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.06 0.43
Air transport 0.85 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.34 0.16 0.03
Warehousing and support for transportation 0.83 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.30 0.23 1.18
Postal and courier activities 0.85 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.04 0.12
Accommodation 0.82 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.75
Food and beverage service activities 0.88 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.27 0.13 1.24
Publishing activities 0.88 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.27 0.59
Motion picture, video and TV programme production 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.13 2.00
Programming and broadcasting activities 0.83 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.25 0.37 0.05 0.08
Telecommunications 0.91 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.16 0.02 0.16
Computer programming and related activities 0.91 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.31 0.31 0.04 2.71
Information service activities 0.94 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.17 0.05 0.20
Financial service activities w/o insurance 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.12 1.24
Activities auxiliary to financial services 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.14 1.68
Real estate activities 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.18 8.04
Legal and accounting activities 0.92 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.36 0.17 0.85
Activities of head offices and consultancy activities 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.29 0.25 0.15 13.82
Architectural and engineering activities 0.91 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.10 2.76
Scientific research and development 0.88 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.05 0.43
Advertising and market research 0.92 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.36 0.14 1.14
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.11 2.59
Veterinary activities 0.53 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.01
Rental and leasing activities 0.93 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.19 0.84
Employment activities 0.83 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.24 0.05 0.43
Travel agency, tour operator and related activities 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.37 0.16 0.63
Security and investigation activities 0.78 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.33 0.13 0.15
Services to buildings and landscape activities 0.83 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.33 0.20 0.98
Office administrative activities 0.94 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.09 2.20
Public administration and defence 0.87 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.33 0.11 0.13
Education 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.08 0.68
Human health activities 0.80 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.55
Residential care activities 0.70 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.33 0.13 0.37
Social work activities without accommodation 0.81 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.22 0.08 0.34
Creative, arts and entertainment activities 0.89 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.28 0.28 0.11 0.14
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 0.84 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.15 0.05
Gambling and betting activities 0.92 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.38 0.17 0.28
Sports activities and Amusement 0.90 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.10 0.52
Activities of prof and other membership org, trade unions 0.87 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.15
Repair of computers and personal equipment 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.35 0.22 0.20
Other personal service activities 0.93 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.12 1.88
Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 0.38 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.00
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.00
Total 0.81 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.30 0.20 1.16
Industry level observations 86
Source: Own calculations based on BvD Amadeus data
Table A.2.1: Size and age distribution across industries
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IPR activity all firms IPR activity young firms
NACE Rev. 2 division National TM OHIM TM National Patents EP Patents National TM OHIM TM National Patents EP Patents
Crop and animal production 58.3 2.0 32.0 7.7 98.9 0.1 1.0 0.0
Forestry and logging 53.9 1.9 35.2 9.0 93.2 0.1 6.6 0.1
Fishing and aquaculture 42.4 2.2 39.9 15.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mining of coal and lignite 28.9 0.0 0.0 71.1
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 42.8 0.0 38.4 18.9 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mining of metal ores 45.6 21.3 12.8 20.3
Other mining and quarrying 33.8 3.9 42.4 20.0 97.5 0.0 2.1 0.4
Mining support service activities 35.4 5.1 32.2 27.4 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Manufacture of food products 63.7 0.6 30.8 4.9 93.5 0.1 6.3 0.2
Manufacture of beverages 55.3 0.1 41.5 3.1 87.7 0.0 12.1 0.2
Manufacture of tobacco products 56.0 2.0 38.6 3.3 94.4 0.0 5.6 0.0
Manufacture of textiles 63.5 1.2 27.8 7.5 94.0 0.2 5.2 0.6
Manufacture of wearing apparel 63.5 0.6 32.8 3.1 95.0 0.1 4.9 0.1
Manufacture of leather and related products 71.2 0.7 25.4 2.7 98.4 0.0 1.6 0.0
Manufacture of wood and of products 72.1 1.4 21.8 4.7 97.5 0.2 2.1 0.3
Manufacture of paper and paper products 60.7 2.4 26.4 10.5 92.1 1.0 6.7 0.2
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 69.4 1.4 25.1 4.2 96.9 0.2 2.9 0.1
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 45.5 6.7 35.6 12.2 91.4 6.3 0.0 2.3
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 47.3 1.6 35.7 15.4 88.8 0.5 8.4 2.4
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 38.9 1.5 41.6 18.0 88.9 0.0 9.0 2.1
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 57.0 4.8 24.7 13.6 91.7 1.4 5.2 1.7
Manufacture of other non 65.8 1.6 24.7 8.0 94.1 0.4 4.9 0.7
Manufacture of basic metals 65.8 2.9 21.8 9.5 95.3 0.8 2.9 1.1
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 65.4 3.4 22.4 8.7 96.3 0.7 2.3 0.7
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 54.4 4.3 27.0 14.4 91.1 1.4 5.7 1.8
Manufacture of electrical equipment 56.7 4.1 23.8 15.3 93.1 1.7 3.6 1.7
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 55.3 6.7 22.0 16.0 92.0 2.4 3.7 1.9
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 60.0 4.7 20.5 14.8 94.6 0.9 3.2 1.4
Manufacture of other transport equipment 63.4 2.6 24.2 9.8 96.7 0.2 1.9 1.2
Manufacture of furniture 65.3 2.0 23.4 9.2 94.8 0.8 3.8 0.6
Other manufacturing 64.4 1.8 26.0 7.8 92.9 0.6 5.6 0.8
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 70.5 1.5 23.0 5.0 98.3 0.1 1.5 0.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 53.5 1.7 35.1 9.7 99.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
Water collection, treatment and supply 49.2 0.7 42.8 7.3 89.5 0.0 8.8 1.8
Sewerage 60.8 1.3 31.3 6.5 97.5 0.0 2.5 0.0
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities 54.8 1.6 35.4 8.2 97.5 0.1 2.1 0.3
Remediation activities, other waste mgmnt services 56.7 1.2 32.5 9.7 97.0 1.2 1.8 0.0
Construction of buildings 62.2 2.6 27.1 8.1 98.7 0.1 1.1 0.1
Civil engineering 63.5 2.6 26.6 7.3 98.3 0.2 1.5 0.0
Specialised construction activities 61.0 3.2 26.5 9.2 98.5 0.2 1.1 0.1
Wholesale and retail trade 78.6 1.7 15.3 4.4 98.2 0.1 1.6 0.1
Wholesale trade w/o motor vehicles 70.6 2.4 20.7 6.3 95.2 0.4 4.1 0.3
Retail trade w/o motor vehicles 75.7 1.8 17.5 5.0 96.4 0.1 3.3 0.1
Land transport and transport via pipelines 89.9 0.6 7.8 1.7 99.1 0.0 0.9 0.0
Water transport 75.0 1.7 17.4 5.9 99.6 0.0 0.4 0.0
Air transport 80.7 1.2 15.3 2.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Warehousing and support for transportation 85.2 0.9 11.5 2.4 98.6 0.0 1.3 0.1
Postal and courier activities 89.8 0.7 8.5 1.1 98.7 0.0 1.2 0.1
Accommodation 87.4 0.6 10.1 2.0 98.6 0.0 1.4 0.0
Food and beverage service activities 86.3 0.7 10.5 2.4 98.3 0.0 1.7 0.0
Publishing activities 57.5 1.5 32.9 8.1 94.0 0.1 5.9 0.1
Motion picture, video and TV programme production 61.9 2.3 27.8 8.0 96.1 0.2 3.6 0.2
Programming and broadcasting activities 51.4 1.8 39.8 6.9 91.0 0.0 8.7 0.3
Telecommunications 55.6 2.2 33.3 9.0 91.8 0.1 7.8 0.3
Computer programming and related activities 54.3 2.7 33.1 9.9 93.3 0.2 6.2 0.3
Information service activities 57.9 1.1 32.9 8.1 92.3 0.0 7.5 0.2
Financial service activities w/o insurance 88.0 0.4 9.9 1.6 98.8 0.0 1.2 0.0
Activities auxiliary to financial services 87.4 0.6 10.3 1.7 98.4 0.0 1.5 0.0
Real estate activities 87.3 0.9 9.4 2.4 99.0 0.0 0.9 0.0
Legal and accounting activities 90.0 0.4 8.0 1.5 98.8 0.0 1.1 0.0
Activities of head offices and consultancy activities 86.4 0.9 10.2 2.5 98.0 0.1 1.9 0.1
Architectural and engineering activities 81.8 2.5 11.8 3.9 96.5 0.8 2.4 0.4
Scientific research and development 36.6 4.1 37.7 21.5 88.7 1.9 6.6 2.8
Advertising and market research 78.7 0.7 18.3 2.3 95.5 0.0 4.4 0.0
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 88.1 0.6 9.2 2.0 97.8 0.1 2.0 0.1
Veterinary activities 80.8 4.1 11.8 3.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rental and leasing activities 88.8 0.7 8.9 1.7 98.4 0.1 1.5 0.0
Employment activities 86.3 0.4 12.1 1.2 97.8 0.0 2.1 0.0
Travel agency, tour operator and related activities 84.9 0.4 13.2 1.5 96.8 0.0 3.2 0.0
Security and investigation activities 89.2 0.2 9.1 1.5 98.6 0.0 1.2 0.2
Services to buildings and landscape activities 88.3 0.6 9.2 1.9 99.2 0.0 0.7 0.0
Office administrative activities 81.9 1.0 14.6 2.5 97.4 0.1 2.4 0.1
Public administration and defence 90.3 0.2 9.2 0.3 98.2 0.0 1.8 0.0
Education 83.8 0.4 13.8 2.0 97.6 0.0 2.3 0.0
Human health activities 84.3 0.5 13.4 1.8 97.7 0.0 2.2 0.1
Residential care activities 87.1 0.5 9.3 3.1 99.5 0.0 0.5 0.0
Social work activities without accommodation 87.4 0.4 10.4 1.7 99.2 0.0 0.8 0.0
Creative, arts and entertainment activities 82.4 0.4 14.8 2.4 97.1 0.0 2.9 0.0
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 80.5 0.6 16.0 2.8 98.2 0.0 1.8 0.0
Gambling and betting activities 88.6 0.5 9.4 1.5 99.2 0.0 0.8 0.0
Sports activities and Amusement 86.5 0.5 11.4 1.6 97.7 0.0 2.3 0.0
Activities of prof and other membership org, trade unions 85.0 0.4 13.9 0.8 97.5 0.2 2.2 0.0
Repair of computers and personal equipment 90.0 0.6 7.5 1.9 98.7 0.1 1.1 0.0
Other personal service activities 82.7 1.0 13.6 2.7 97.0 0.1 2.7 0.1
Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 84.8 0.0 15.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 70.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 68.8 1.9 21.5 7.8 96.4 0.3 3.0 0.4
Industry level observations 86
Source: Own calculations based on BvD Amadeus, DPMA, OHIM and PATSTAT data
Table A.2.2: Patent and trade mark activity for all and young firms across industries
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IPR use all IPR users IPR use young IPR users
NACE Rev. 2 division National TM OHIM TM National Patents EP Patents National TM OHIM TM National Patents EP Patents
Crop and animal production 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3
Forestry and logging 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Fishing and aquaculture 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Mining of coal and lignite 1.2 0.0 3.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mining of metal ores 1.4 0.5 1.8 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other mining and quarrying 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Mining support service activities 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Manufacture of food products 3.6 1.8 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.2
Manufacture of beverages 5.8 2.0 0.6 0.4 3.5 1.1 0.3 0.2
Manufacture of tobacco products 9.2 1.4 1.9 2.3 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.3
Manufacture of textiles 1.8 1.3 2.3 3.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.4
Manufacture of wearing apparel 1.9 1.6 1.4 2.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2
Manufacture of leather and related products 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
Manufacture of wood and of products 0.7 0.7 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.1
Manufacture of paper and paper products 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.8 0.8 0.8
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.6 0.5 2.3 4.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 3.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 0.4 1.3 1.4
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 5.2 4.3 9.6 25.0 2.5 2.0 3.9 5.9
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 19.5 7.7 8.4 32.4 4.7 1.9 1.9 6.3
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1.8 1.6 4.1 3.9 1.2 1.0 2.5 2.2
Manufacture of other non 1.9 1.5 3.7 4.0 0.8 0.5 1.3 1.6
Manufacture of basic metals 1.1 1.2 3.3 3.2 0.5 0.6 2.3 2.6
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 0.9 0.9 3.9 3.8 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.2
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 1.9 1.6 8.1 7.1 1.3 1.2 3.5 4.0
Manufacture of electrical equipment 2.2 1.9 11.6 13.3 0.7 0.6 3.9 4.6
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.5 1.4 7.0 6.6 0.7 0.8 2.7 2.6
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 5.5 8.5 105.3 82.2 0.9 0.7 7.7 5.9
Manufacture of other transport equipment 1.4 1.4 16.8 18.5 0.6 0.5 3.6 2.2
Manufacture of furniture 2.0 1.3 2.8 2.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.4
Other manufacturing 1.6 1.4 2.8 3.1 0.8 0.8 1.8 1.9
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.6 0.6 3.8 4.3 0.3 0.2 1.5 1.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Water collection, treatment and supply 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1
Sewerage 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Remediation activities, other waste mgmnt services 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
Construction of buildings 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Civil engineering 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Specialised construction activities 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Wholesale and retail trade 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4
Wholesale trade w/o motor vehicles 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4
Retail trade w/o motor vehicles 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2
Land transport and transport via pipelines 0.6 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
Water transport 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
Air transport 2.8 4.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4
Warehousing and support for transportation 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1
Postal and courier activities 3.4 3.7 2.8 7.0 0.8 1.6 0.4 0.2
Accommodation 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.2
Food and beverage service activities 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0
Publishing activities 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.0
Motion picture, video and TV programme production 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
Programming and broadcasting activities 2.1 2.0 0.2 0.2 1.3 3.7 0.4 0.4
Telecommunications 6.0 5.4 2.5 3.1 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6
Computer programming and related activities 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.2
Information service activities 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1
Financial service activities w/o insurance 1.2 0.9 1.7 2.6 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.5
Activities auxiliary to financial services 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1
Real estate activities 0.7 0.4 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Legal and accounting activities 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
Activities of head offices and consultancy activities 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3
Architectural and engineering activities 0.9 0.7 2.3 2.4 0.6 0.4 2.2 2.1
Scientific research and development 1.2 1.1 6.6 8.8 0.6 0.7 2.6 3.3
Advertising and market research 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 1.2 0.8 3.7 6.1 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.3
Veterinary activities 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0
Rental and leasing activities 0.8 0.7 1.3 5.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Employment activities 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.0
Travel agency, tour operator and related activities 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0
Security and investigation activities 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2
Services to buildings and landscape activities 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
Office administrative activities 1.3 0.9 1.4 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.8
Public administration and defence 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.1
Education 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1
Human health activities 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5
Residential care activities 2.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Social work activities without accommodation 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
Creative, arts and entertainment activities 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2
Gambling and betting activities 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
Sports activities and Amusement 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1
Activities of prof and other membership org, trade unions 1.4 0.7 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.4
Repair of computers and personal equipment 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2
Other personal service activities 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7
Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Undifferentiated products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 1.7 1.0 2.9 3.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.8
Industry level observations 87
Source: Own calculations based on BvD Amadeus, DPMA, OHIM and PATSTAT data
Table A.2.3: Average patent and trade mark use for all and young IPR-active firms across
industries
Left panel: Average number of registered IPRs by IPR-activity types. Right panel: Average number of
registered IPRs by firms that were IPR-active in their first two years after entry.
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Gross entry rates
NACE Rev. 2 division Mean Sd Min Max
Crop and animal production 5.5 2.5 1.3 14.1
Forestry and logging 8.3 3.2 1.9 19.3
Fishing and aquaculture 7.0 17.3 0.0 100.0
Mining of coal and lignite 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 6.8 6.6 0.0 20.0
Mining of metal ores 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other mining and quarrying 1.7 1.4 0.0 5.6
Mining support service activities 11.3 24.4 0.0 100.0
Manufacture of food products 3.3 1.3 1.4 10.9
Manufacture of beverages 3.4 2.0 0.0 10.4
Manufacture of tobacco products 3.0 4.7 0.0 16.7
Manufacture of textiles 4.0 2.4 1.0 18.1
Manufacture of wearing apparel 4.5 2.9 0.0 17.0
Manufacture of leather and related products 3.8 4.6 0.0 33.5
Manufacture of wood and of products 3.2 1.3 1.0 7.5
Manufacture of paper and paper products 2.7 1.8 0.0 12.2
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 3.1 1.2 0.7 7.3
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 5.0 8.4 0.0 50.0
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4.6 2.1 1.8 13.1
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 4.3 2.5 0.0 12.7
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3.0 1.3 1.0 8.6
Manufacture of other non 2.6 1.0 0.9 7.3
Manufacture of basic metals 4.1 1.5 1.3 8.0
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 3.1 0.8 1.8 6.1
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 3.9 1.5 1.3 10.6
Manufacture of electrical equipment 3.3 1.3 0.0 8.9
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 4.2 1.8 2.1 16.6
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi 3.2 1.5 0.0 7.9
Manufacture of other transport equipment 4.9 3.0 0.0 14.6
Manufacture of furniture 3.2 1.8 0.0 9.1
Other manufacturing 3.2 0.9 1.7 6.6
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 7.7 2.2 3.7 16.0
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 13.9 3.4 6.9 23.9
Water collection, treatment and supply 2.7 4.1 0.0 20.8
Sewerage 4.1 3.0 0.0 15.5
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities 4.2 1.4 1.2 9.5
Remediation activities, other waste mgmnt services 7.9 9.9 0.0 60.0
Construction of buildings 3.8 1.0 2.0 7.6
Civil engineering 4.3 1.5 1.2 10.7
Specialised construction activities 3.8 0.8 2.1 7.1
Wholesale and retail trade 4.0 1.0 1.9 8.5
Wholesale trade w/o motor vehicles 4.7 1.0 3.1 9.9
Retail trade w/o motor vehicles 4.1 0.9 2.5 8.3
Land transport and transport via pipelines 4.2 1.3 2.2 9.2
Water transport 4.4 4.8 0.0 21.4
Air transport 3.7 5.0 0.0 29.2
Warehousing and support for transportation 6.3 1.4 3.9 11.7
Postal and courier activities 9.6 4.2 0.0 28.9
Accommodation 4.7 1.2 2.4 8.9
Food and beverage service activities 8.6 1.6 4.8 14.4
Publishing activities 4.7 1.6 1.6 9.8
Motion picture, video and TV programme production 7.0 1.8 1.9 12.7
Programming and broadcasting activities 6.3 6.1 0.0 40.0
Telecommunications 13.0 4.8 0.0 31.2
Computer programming and related activities 7.0 1.2 4.7 11.7
Information service activities 11.9 4.4 0.0 25.0
Financial service activities w/o insurance 13.8 2.9 8.9 29.2
Activities auxiliary to financial services 6.8 1.3 4.2 12.0
Real estate activities 5.6 1.0 3.6 9.1
Legal and accounting activities 5.2 1.2 2.0 8.1
Activities of head offices and consultancy activities 6.7 0.9 4.8 9.5
Architectural and engineering activities 5.4 1.0 3.8 8.1
Scientific research and development 7.1 1.5 3.0 13.4
Advertising and market research 5.8 1.2 2.8 8.9
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 7.3 1.5 3.8 11.9
Veterinary activities 3.3 5.5 0.0 20.8
Rental and leasing activities 5.2 1.5 2.1 10.5
Employment activities 10.0 2.3 5.2 18.9
Travel agency, tour operator and related activities 5.0 1.3 2.1 8.8
Security and investigation activities 7.0 2.8 0.8 15.4
Services to buildings and landscape activities 5.9 1.5 2.9 10.6
Office administrative activities 9.0 1.9 4.8 14.2
Public administration and defence 5.3 3.1 0.0 16.9
Education 7.7 1.8 1.9 11.3
Human health activities 7.9 1.8 4.4 13.0
Residential care activities 5.0 1.5 2.7 8.6
Social work activities without accommodation 9.0 2.8 1.8 25.1
Creative, arts and entertainment activities 7.8 4.9 0.0 40.0
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 4.7 4.2 0.0 20.0
Gambling and betting activities 6.1 2.2 0.0 13.5
Sports activities and Amusement 7.9 1.4 4.5 13.6
Activities of prof and other membership org, trade unions 6.9 3.9 0.0 25.8
Repair of computers and personal equipment 3.7 1.8 0.0 9.6
Other personal service activities 9.0 2.1 4.3 15.4
Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 1.0 2.9 0.0 8.3
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 8.3 14.4 0.0 25.0
Total 5.7 4.4 0.0 100.0
Industry-region level observations 7, 352
Source: Own calculations based on BvD Amadeus, DPMA, OHIM and PATSTAT data
Table A.2.4: Average gross entry rates across industries
Average gross entry rates in percent at the industry level. Gross entry is calculated as the proportion of
new firms in a given industry and region. Regions are weighted by their relative size (in terms of
number of firms) within an industry.
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Survival Employment
(Mean 2003) - (Mean 2006) (Mean 2003) - (Mean 2006)
Log of firm assets 0.0826∗∗∗ (10.26) 0.102∗∗∗ (8.36)
Log of firm employment 0.285∗∗∗ (64.91) 0.285∗∗∗ (58.13)
Log of firm capital intensity −0.175∗∗∗ (−17.11) −0.190∗∗∗ (−17.73)
National patent-activity rate 0.396∗∗∗ (58.03) 0.396∗∗∗ (27.21)
EP-activity rate 0.226∗∗∗ (50.01) 0.221∗∗∗ (23.16)
National TM-activity rate 1.075∗∗∗ (101.86) 0.926∗∗∗ (44.26)
CTM-activity rate 0.249∗∗∗ (62.69) 0.232∗∗∗ (28.68)
Log national patent apps this year 0.00163∗∗∗ (8.05) 0.00290∗∗∗ (5.57)
Log national patent stock 0.00269∗∗∗ (8.34) 0.00989∗∗∗(11.41)
Log EP apps this year 0.000918∗∗∗(5.77) 0.00196∗∗∗ (4.54)
Log EP stock 0.00132∗∗∗ (5.41) 0.00592∗∗∗ (8.73)
Log national TM apps this year 0.00166∗∗∗ (8.44) 0.00144∗∗ (3.14)
Log national TM stock 0.0112∗∗∗ (21.60) 0.0235∗∗∗ (18.27)
Log CTM apps this year 0.000102 (0.85) 0.000725∗ (2.43)
Log CTM stock 0.00110∗∗∗ (4.20) 0.00597∗∗∗ (8.83)
Number of firms −6130 (.) −2461 (.)
Employment growth in percent −3.248∗∗∗ (−14.95)
Observations 681, 680 490, 816
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.3.1: T-tests for mean-differences between 2003 and 2006 samples
2003 2006
(Mean Survival) - (Mean Employment)(Mean Survival) - (Mean Employment)
Log of firm assets −0.249∗∗∗ (−22.68) −0.230∗∗∗ (−23.72)
Log of firm employment −0.0624∗∗∗ (−11.97) −0.0617∗∗∗ (−15.37)
Log of firm capital intensity 0.00609 (0.56) −0.00901 (−0.90)
National patent-activity rate −0.212∗∗∗ (−16.57) −0.212∗∗∗ (−21.68)
EP-activity rate −0.116∗∗∗ (−13.86) −0.121∗∗∗ (−18.85)
National TM-activity rate −0.111∗∗∗ (−6.19) −0.261∗∗∗ (−17.41)
CTM-activity rate −0.0764∗∗∗ (−10.97) −0.0934∗∗∗ (−16.31)
Log national patent apps this year −0.00371∗∗∗ (−8.30) −0.00244∗∗∗ (−7.26)
Log national patent stock −0.0120∗∗∗ (−15.81) −0.00480∗∗∗ (−9.06)
Log EP apps this year −0.00258∗∗∗ (−6.80) −0.00154∗∗∗ (−5.91)
Log EP stock −0.00720∗∗∗ (−11.97) −0.00260∗∗∗ (−6.56)
Log national TM apps this year −0.00296∗∗∗ (−7.57) −0.00318∗∗∗ (−10.21)
Log national TM stock −0.0286∗∗∗ (−24.97) −0.0164∗∗∗ (−20.97)
Log CTM apps this year −0.00177∗∗∗ (−7.19) −0.00115∗∗∗ (−5.56)
Log CTM stock −0.00886∗∗∗ (−15.17) −0.00400∗∗∗ (−9.30)
Number of firms 38988 (.) 42657 (.)
Observations 368, 243 313, 437
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.3.2: T-tests for mean-differences between survival and employment sample
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Survival 2003
Mean Sd Min Max
Log of firm assets 2.731521 2.438153 0 14.3121
Log of firm employment 1.76366 1.136366 .6931472 9.472781
Log of firm capital intensity 1.748039 2.104605 0 13.11333
Logarithmic gross entry rate 1.78276 .5147461 0 4.61512
(Log of employment)2 4.401814 6.382639 .480453 89.73358
(Log firm assets)2 13.40574 20.22239 0 204.8361
National patent-activity rate 2.44561 3.433044 0 20.02621
EP-activity rate 1.415862 2.243259 0 13.95138
National TM-activity rate 7.785566 4.722885 2.496879 41.37931
CTM-activity rate 2.017788 1.864183 0 18.60068
Log national patent apps this year .0078534 .1121802 0 4.077538
Log national patent stock .0245454 .2072602 0 5.331248
Log EP apps this year .0049996 .0983778 0 4.477337
Log EP stock .0136497 .1670672 0 5.436164
Log national TM apps this year .0106357 .1031196 0 4.007333
Log national TM stock .0776705 .3175438 0 5.267858
Log CTM apps this year .004685 .0753044 0 3.465736
Log CTM stock .0215587 .1741365 0 4.828314
(Log national patent stock)2 .0435589 .5655194 0 28.4222
(Log EP patent stock)2 .0280975 .5317245 0 29.55188
(Log national TM stock)2 .1068659 .7061294 0 27.75033
(Log CTM stock)2 .030788 .3770301 0 23.31261
Number of firms 45, 392
Observations 368, 243
Survival 2006
Mean Sd Min Max
Log of firm assets 2.576237 2.587519 0 15.5013
Log of firm employment 1.420237 .988669 .6931472 11.78535
Log of firm capital intensity 1.909993 2.338657 0 13.89974
Logarithmic gross entry rate 1.868533 .5255237 0 4.61512
(Log of employment)2 2.994531 5.485444 .480453 138.8944
(Log firm assets)2 13.33219 22.24433 0 240.2904
National patent-activity rate 2.032651 2.924373 .1881615 20.02621
EP-activity rate 1.187044 1.929365 0 13.95138
National TM-activity rate 7.240985 4.402719 2.496879 40.20618
CTM-activity rate 1.822657 1.693235 0 18.60068
Log national patent apps this year .0058915 .0993295 0 5.043425
Log national patent stock .0137686 .156207 0 6.188182
Log EP apps this year .0032793 .0755268 0 4.110874
Log EP stock .006978 .1135066 0 5.33723
Log national TM apps this year .0098033 .0931928 0 2.70805
Log national TM stock .0491976 .2316558 0 3.951244
Log CTM apps this year .0034096 .0624968 0 2.639057
Log CTM stock .0126136 .1281006 0 3.89182
(Log national patent stock)2 .02459 .464426 0 38.2936
(Log EP patent stock)2 .0129323 .303085 0 28.48602
(Log national TM stock)2 .0560844 .3883419 0 15.61233
(Log CTM stock)2 .0165687 .2470547 0 15.14626
Number of firms 53, 634
Observations 313, 437
Table A.3.3: Summary statistics for survival subsamples
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Employment 2003
Mean Sd Min Max
Employment growth in percent 6.06279 32.37128 −99.87624 300
Log of firm assets 2.819694 2.443647 0 14.30801
Log of firm employment 1.844229 1.170695 .6931472 9.213037
Log of firm capital intensity 1.752637 2.092632 0 12.81955
Logarithmic gross entry rate 1.752446 .5152004 0 4.61512
(Log of employment)2 4.771691 6.708844 .480453 84.88004
(Log firm assets)2 13.92201 20.51287 0 204.7191
National patent-activity rate 2.480698 3.482637 0 20.02621
EP-activity rate 1.432054 2.26757 0 13.95138
National TM-activity rate 7.749479 4.756233 2.496879 41.37931
CTM-activity rate 2.030276 1.889577 0 18.60068
Log national patent apps this year .0085176 .1174881 0 4.077538
Log national patent stock .0284317 .2247677 0 5.331248
Log EP apps this year .0056531 .1055915 0 4.477337
Log EP stock .0162237 .1844437 0 5.436164
Log national TM apps this year .0108432 .1046639 0 4.007333
Log national TM stock .0863017 .3365636 0 5.267858
Log CTM apps this year .0053069 .0823896 0 3.465736
Log CTM stock .0251829 .1914253 0 4.828314
(Log national patent stock)2 .0513282 .6282609 0 28.4222
(Log EP patent stock)2 .0342822 .6046884 0 29.55188
(Log national TM stock)2 .1207215 .7639888 0 27.75033
(Log CTM stock)2 .0372773 .4260704 0 23.31261
Number of firms 27, 993
Observations 272, 426
Employment 2006
Mean Sd Min Max
Employment growth in percent 10.28476 44.06177 −99.9901 500
Log of firm assets 2.706878 2.593622 0 15.5013
Log of firm employment 1.513779 1.040827 .6931472 9.950371
Log of firm capital intensity 1.944446 2.334522 0 13.89974
Logarithmic gross entry rate 1.808218 .5238957 0 4.424847
(Log of employment)2 3.374833 5.863589 .480453 99.00988
(Log firm assets)2 14.05397 22.62519 0 240.2904
National patent-activity rate 2.060188 2.993456 .1881615 20.02621
EP-activity rate 1.199033 1.965307 0 13.95138
National TM-activity rate 7.161674 4.430235 2.496879 40.20618
CTM-activity rate 1.825029 1.722311 0 18.60068
Log national patent apps this year .0063196 .1053843 0 5.043425
Log national patent stock .0164732 .1726441 0 6.188182
Log EP apps this year .0040055 .085152 0 4.110874
Log EP stock .0088055 .1298547 0 5.33723
Log national TM apps this year .0089287 .089898 0 2.70805
Log national TM stock .0587842 .2539827 0 3.89182
Log CTM apps this year .0039883 .0695447 0 2.639057
Log CTM stock .0156211 .1447416 0 3.89182
(Log national patent stock)2 .0300769 .5324946 0 38.2936
(Log EP patent stock)2 .0169395 .3547219 0 28.48602
(Log national TM stock)2 .0679619 .4300812 0 15.14626
(Log CTM stock)2 .0211939 .2873011 0 15.14626
Number of firms 31, 229
Observations 218, 390
Table A.3.4: Summary statistics for employment subsamples
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